Conceptual design study of a Harrier V/STOL research aircraft by Bode, W. E. et al.
NASA CR-152086
 
CONCEPTUAL DESIGN STUDY OF A HARRIER
 
V/STOL RESEARCH AIRCRAFT
 
STUDY OF wYS­IjU-AB -CR-152O86) CONCEPTUAL DESIGNf 
A.HARRIER V/STOL 23SEAMCHA1C T­
(tlcDonell-Douglas Corp.Y CSCL 00 IG Unclas293 p A3/tiF
G3/05 08504 j'A01 

Distribution of this report isprovided in the interest of 
information exchange. Responsibility for the contents 
resides inthe author or organization that prepared it. 
Prepared Under Contract No. NAS2-9748 by 
McDonnell Douglas Corporation 
Saint Louis, Missouri 
for 
4 
C 
MAR 7978 
RECEIVED 
SA41FA fyll 
yr 
'NATIONAL AERONAUTICS AND SPACE ADMINISTRATION 
https://ntrs.nasa.gov/search.jsp?R=19780011151 2020-03-22T06:07:52+00:00Z
NASA CR-15208
 
CONCEPTUAL DESIGN STUDY OF A HARRIER
 
V/STOL RESEARCH AIRCRAFT
 
Waldemar E. Bode
 
Roger L. Berger
 
Glen A. Elmore
 
Thomas R. Lacey
 
Distribution of this report is provided in the interest of 
information exchange. Responsibility for the contents 
resides in the author or organization that prepared it. 
FEBl 
Prepared Under Contract No. NAS2-9748 by
 
McDonnell Douglas Corporation
 
Saint Louis, Missouri
 
for
 
NATIONAL AERONAUTICS AND SPACE ADMINISTRATION
 
TABLE OF CONTENTS
 
Page 
1. INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY ...................... 1
 
2. BASIC MODIFICATIONS ......................... 3
 
2.1 SIMPLEX FLIGHT CONTROL SYSTEM .................. 3
 
2.1.1 SIMPLEX FLIGHT CONTROL SYSTEM DESCRIPTION ....... ......... 3
 
2.1.2 COCKPIT INFORMATION AND DISENGAGE REQUIREMENTS............ .. 19
 
2.1.3 COMPUTER HARDWARE ........... ..................... ... 32
 
2.1.4 HYDRAULICS ............ ......................... ... 41
 
2.1.5 ELECTRICAL............ ............................ . 41
 
2.1.6 EQUIPMENT INSTALLATION ......... .................... .. 41
 
2.1.7 INCREASED ROLL POWER ........ ..................... .... 41
 
2.2 DATA ACQUISITION SYS.TEM ........ ..................... ... 45
 
2.2.1 MEASURAND REQUIREMENTS....... ................... ..... 45
 
2.2.2 METHOD OF IMPLEMENTATION....... .................. .... 45
 
2.2.3 CONFIGURATION ........... .......................... . 45
 
.2.2.4 VERIFICATION.......... ....................... ..... 49
 
2.3 PROGRAMMABLE HEAD-UP DISPLAY....... ................ .... 49
 
2.4 LANDING GUIDANCE SYSTEM ..... ............. .......... 51
 
2.5 INERTIAL NAVIGATION SYSTEM....... ................ ..... 51
 
2.6 SIMULATION .............. ........................ .. . 53
 
2.6.1 PHASE I ...... ................... . ........ .... 53
 
2.6.2 PHASE II .......... ....................... ....... 53
 
2.6.3 PHASE III ......... ....................... ....... 55
 
2.7 SYSTEM SOFTWARE ......... ...................... ..... 55
 
2.7.1 COMPUTER SOFTWARE DEVELOPMENT ..... ............... ..... 55
 
2.8 GROUND TESTS ............. .......................... . 59
 
2.8.1 COMPONENT AIRWORTHINESS TESTS ....... .................. 59
 
2.8.2 RAMP OPERATIONS .......... ........................ .. 59
 
2.8.3 AIRCRAFT/SOFTWARE VERIFICATION....... .................. ... 59
 
2.9 AIRWORTHINESS TESTS .......... ........................ . 62
 
3. OPTIONAL MODIFICATIONS ......... ....................... ... 63
 
3.1 DUPLEX FLIGHT CONTROL SYSTEM........ .................... . 63
 
3.1.1 CONTROL SYSTEM MODIFICATIONS....... ................... ... 63
 
3.1.2 DATA ACQUISITION SYSTEMS........ ................... ... 77
 
3.1.3 HEAD-UP DISPLAY .......... ......................... ... 77
 
3.1.4 LANDING GUIDANCE SYSTEM ........ ..................... ... 77
 
TABLE OF CONTENTS (CONT'D)
 
Page 
3.1.5 INERTIAL NAVIGATION SYSTEM............. ......... ... 77
 
3.1.6 SIMULATION................. .................. ... 77
 
3.1.7 SYSTEM SOFTWARE ............... ............... ... 77
 
3.1.8 GROUND TESTS........... ...... .................. ... 77
 
3.1.9 AIRWORTHINESS TESTS ........................ 77
 
3.2 TRIPLEX FLIGHT CONTROL SYSTEM ................... 77
 
3.2.1 CONTROL SYSTEM MODIFICATIONS ................ ... 77
 
3.2.2 DATA ACQUISITION SYSTEM . . .................. 83
 
3.2.3 HEAD-UP DISPLAY ........................... 83
 
3.2.4 LANDING GUIDANCE SYSTEM . . .................. 83
 
3.2.5 INERTIAL NAVIGATION SYSTEM. ................... 83
 
3.2.6 SIMULATION........... ......... 83
 
3.2.7 SYSTEM SOFTWARE ..... ................. 83
 
3.2.8 GROUND TESTS. . ........................
 88
 
3.2.9 AIRWORTHINESS TEST. ....... . .. . ............ 88
 
3.3 SIMPLEX THROTTLE AND NOZZLE CONTROL SYSTEMS .... ........... .. 88
 
3.3.1 SIMPLEX THROTTLE CONTROL SYSTEM ......... ........... ... 88
 
3.3.2 SIMPLEX NOZZLE CONTROL SYSTEM ........... ......... ... 88
 
3.4 DUPLEX THROTTLE AND NOZZLE CONTROL SYSTEMS...... ......... ... 93
 
3.4.1 DUPLEX THROTTLE CONTROL ............. ........... ... 93
 
3.4.2 DUPLEX NOZZLE CONTROL .............. .......... .. 99
 
3.5 TRIPLEX THROTTLE AND NOZZLE CONTROL SYSTEMS .... ............ .99
 
3.5.1 TRIPLEX THROTTLE SYSTEM . . .  ........... ....... .. 99
 
3.5.2 TRIPLEX NOZZLE SYSTEM ............... ......... .. 104
 
3.6 LOW RANGE AIR DATA SYSTEM . .................... 104
 
3.7 SIDE ARM CONTROLLER ........ ................... 107
 
4. PLANS AND SCHEDULES .................. ....... . i.111
 
4.1 MODIFICATION PLAN AND SCHEDULE. .i.. ............... 111
 
4.2 TEST PLAN AND SCHEDULE ..... .. ............. ..... 112
 
5. STUDIES AND ANALYSES ................... ....... .. 115
 
5.1 RELIABILITY ANALYSIS..-.-. . ................... 115
 
5.1.1 FMEA GUIDELINES AND RESULTS.. . . ... .l.......... .. 115
 
5.1.2 POTENTIAL LOSS OF CONTROL PREDICTIONS . . .... .... ..... .116
 
5.1.3 :HARDWARE IMPLEMENTATION IMPACT .............. .... .116
 
5.1.4 EFFECT OF SELECTIVE REDUNDANCY.............. .... .117
 
ii 
TABLE OF CONTENTS (CONT'D)
 
Page
 
5.2 AIRCRAFT PERFORMANCE........ ............. .. .... 121
 
5.2.1 LEVEL FLIGHT.......... ......... ............ 121
 
5.2.2 V/STOL.............. ........ ........... 121
 
5.2.3 ENGINE OPERATING LIMITATIONS................... 121
 
5.2.4 VTO ............... ......... ........... 123
 
5.2.5 HOVER . ............................. 123
 
5.2.,6 SHORT TAKEOFF. ........... ..... ........... 123
 
5.2.7 CLIMB .............. ........ ........... 123
 
5.2.8 CEILING ............... .... .. ........... 123
 
5.2.9 CRUISE.................. .................... .123
 
5.2.10 LOAD FACTOR ................... ............ .137
 
5.2.11 TURN PERFORMANCE................. ........... .. 137
 
5.2.12 DESCENT ................... ............... .. 137
 
5.2.13 VERTICAL LANDINGS .............. .............. .137
 
5.2.14 STALL SPEED .................. ............... .137
 
5.2.15 CONVENTIONAL LANDING.............. ............. .. 137
 
5.2.16 V/STOL RESEARCH MISSION ANALYSIS......... ............ .137
 
5.2.17 FERRY MISSIONS. ....................... 149
 
5.3 WEIGHT AND BALANCE ............. .................... .149
 
5.4 AIRCRAFT SUPPORT............ ....................... ... 149
 
5.4.1 VENDOR DATA ........ ........... . . .. ......... 167
 
5.4.2 SPARES, REPAIR PARTS AND GROUND SUPPORT EQUIPMENT ........ 167
 
5.4.3 GROUND SUPPORT EQUIPMENT (GSE) ... .......... ......... 167
 
5.4.4 TECHNICAL MANUALS ...... ................ ......... 167
 
5.4.5 ENGINEERING CHANGE PROPOSAL (ECP)- SUPPORT .... ......... 167
 
5.4.6 REPAIR OF REPAIRABLES ...... .............. ......... 167
 
APPENDIX A STATEMENT OF WORK ............ ................. .168
 
A-i INTRODUCTION............ ............................ .168
 
A-2 MCAIR STATEMENT OF WORK .......... ...................... .168
 
A-3 CONTRACT SCOPE OF WORK ......... ....................... .. 172
 
A-4 CONTRACT AMENDMENT SCOPE OF WORK ............. ........... .173
 
APPENDIX B TASK DESCRIPTIONS ............ ................. .174
 
B-I INTRODUCTION.............. ........................ .174
 
B-2 BASIC MODIFICATIONS ........... ................. 174
 
B-3 DUPLEX FLIGHT CONTROL SYSTEM.................. .... 188
 
B-4 TRIPLEX FLIGHT CONTROL SYSTEM . . ................. 194
 
B-5 LOW SPEED AIR DATA SYSTEM ....... ................. 199
 
B-6 SIDE ARM CONTROLLER ........... .................. 199
 
B-7 SIMPLEX THROTTLE AND NOZZLE SYSTEMS ...... ... ....... 200
 
B-8 DUPLEX THROTTLE AND NOZZLE SYSTEMS ........ ............ .. 201
 
B-9 TRIPLEX THROTTLE AND NOZZLE SYSTEMS ........ ........... .. 204
 
APPENDIX C FAILURE MODE AND EFFECTS ANALYSIS ..... .............. .206
 
APPENDIX D ACTION ITEM SUMMARY ......... ..................... .285
 
iii
 
1. INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY
 
MCAIR recently completed a conceptual design study to define modification
 
approaches to, and derive planning prices for the conversion of a two place
 
Harrier to a V/STOL control, display and guidance research aircraft. This
 
study was performed for NASA Ames Research Center under the NASA contract
 
"Conceptual Design Study of Modifications to Harrier G-VTOL" (NASA Contract
 
NAS2-9748). The statement of work for this program is contained in Appendix A.
 
NASA's objective is the flight investigation of control systems that have
 
been developed by analysis and simulation. Satisfactory handling qualities for
 
all weather VTOL operation both shipborne and landbased, are to be sought in
 
transition, approach, landing and takeoff.. Control concepts such as rate damping,
 
attitude stabilization, velocity command, and cockpit controllers are to be
 
demonstrated. Display formats will also be investigated, and landing, navigation
 
and guidance systems flight tested. And, of course, all this is to be done in a
 
safe airplane.
 
This MCAIR study is an early step in a long term NASA program. The proposed
 
test bed aircraft is to fly in 1981 so that NASA can spend the eighties developing
 
the control and display technology.for the future. The obvious application is to
 
the U.S. Navy Type A and Type B V/STOL which have an IOC in the early nineties.
 
Thus, MCAIR was asked to define and schedule modifications to a British civil 
registry Harrier (G-VTOL) that would permit this testing. The resulting pro-. 
gram schedule is shown in Figure 1-1. 
The modifications defined leave the front cockpit of the Harrier virtually
 
untouched. Thus, the safety pilot, flying in this cockpit is flying an unchanged
 
two place Harrier. The rear cockpit is modified such that it can be quickly '
 
adapted to faithfully simulate the controls, displays and handling qualities of
 
a Type A or Type B V/STOL. The safety pilot always has take command capability.
 
The modifications studied fall.into two categories: basic modifications and
 
optional modifications. The basic modifications include a simplex parallel digital
 
fly-by-wire flight control system, a data acquisition system, a headup display, a
 
landing guidance system, simulation, system software, ground tests, and airworthi­
ness tests. The optional modifications include a duplex series digital fly-by­
wire flight control system, throttle and nozzle control systems (simplex parallel,
 
duplex series, and triplex parallel), a low speed air data system, and a side arm
 
controller.
 
Technical descriptions of the basic modifications are contained in Section 2.
 
Technical descriptions of the optional modifications are contained in Section 3.
 
The modification plan and schedule as well as the test plan and schedule are pre­
sented in Section 4. The failure mode and effects analysis, aircraft performance,
 
aircraft weight, and aircraft support are discussed in Section 5.
 
The task -descriptions contained in Appendix B were prepared to aid in deriv­
ing the planning prices needed by NASA. (Those cost estimates were provided to
 
NASA under separate cover.) Appendix C presents-the detailed failure mode and
 
effects analysis that was performed. Appendix D summarizes the disposition of
 
action items accumulated at four coordination meetings with NASA.
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FIGURE 1-1 NASA RESEARCH AIRCRAFT 
MCAIR strongly believes that the NASA Two Place V/STOL Research Aircraft
 
will be an extremely valuable research tool for studying a variety of problems
 
associated with V/STOL flight. We are anxious to participate with NASA in
 
efforts aimed at making this research aircraft a reality.
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2. BASIC MODIFICATIONS
 
The basic modifications to the two place Harrier which were investigated
 
in this conceptual design study were simplex digital computer flight controls
 
for the aft cockpit, a flight test data acquisition system, a programmable
 
head up display, a landing guidance system, manned flight simulation, software
 
for the onboard computer, ground tests of the modified aircraft and equipment,
 
and airworthiness tests of the aircraft before delivery to NASA.
 
2.1 SIMPLEX FLIGHT CONTROL SYSTEM
 
'The flight control system design modifications were established on the
 
basis that the rear cockpit will be the evaluation pilot station and the forward
 
cockpit will be the safety pilot and solo pilot station. Sufficient information
 
will be provided in the front cockpit to enable the safety pilot to monitor the
 
activity of the evaluation pilot and of the digital flight control systems and
 
to disengage these systems should the necessity arise. The front seat pilot
 
would then fly the aircraft using an essentially unmodified Harrier flight con­
trol system.
 
2.1.1 SIMPLEX FLIGHT CONTROL SYSTEM DESCRIPTION - The aft cockpit's control
 
stick and rudder pedals are mechanically disconnected from the Harrier flight
 
control system and electrical position and force transducers substituted to,
 
provide pilot command inputs. Electrical torque motors provide artificial feel.
 
An onboard digital computer will be used to compute pitch, roll and yaw commands
 
to the servo actuators which will be attached to the mechanical linkages of the
 
Harrier longitudinal, lateral and directional flight control systems. It will
 
also supply command signals to the aft control stick and rudder pedal variable
 
feel systems.
 
Figure 2-1 is a schematic diagram of the longitudinal control system. An
 
electromechanical servoactuator is attached to the longitudinal mechanical control
 
mechanism at the tailplane compensator. This is a parallel servo since it moves
 
all of the mechanical controls, including the front cockpit stick, as well as the
 
valve on the stabilator actuator. The limited authority series servo in the
 
Harrier stabilator actuator will be retained and an electromechanical series
 
servo actuator will be added to the forward reaction control valve (RCV). The
 
'series servo design for this RCV will be based on that developed for the YAV-8B
 
(the forward RCV of the production Harrier is not servoed). Note that the series
 
servos will not move the forward cockpit control stick.
 
When the digital fly-by-wire control system is turned off, the safety pilot
 
has the standard Harrier flight control system. (The drag of the parallel servo
 
will be low and will not affect handling qualities.) He can then fly the aircraft
 
with or without the production stability augmentation system.
 
When the digital flight control system is turned on, the evaluation pilot's
 
stick force and stick position are measured by the transducers connected to the
 
stick and applied to the digital computer. Using these signals and other infor­
mation, such as aircraft angular rates, accelerations and air data, the digital
 
computer calculates the signals to send to the parallel servo. In special
 
situations, small-amplitude high-frequency signals could also be sent to the
 
series servos. The computer would also use these signals to compute the signal
 
to send to the aft cockpit stick's variable feel system.
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The forward pilot can monitor the position of the stabilator and RCVs
 
commanded by the parallel servo by monitoring the activity of his control stick.
 
If he deems it necessary, he can press a button on the stick grip or throttle
 
and immediately disengage the fly-by-wire flight control system. Alternatively,
 
he can apply sufficient stick force to cause the force disengage switch attached
 
to the stick to disengage the parallel servo, and if this force link fails, he can
 
manually override the parallel servo. A master switch on his control panel can
 
also be used to switch off the system.
 
Longitudinal trim is accomplished by feeding trim signals from the aft
 
cockpit through the computer and into the parallel servo. The normal system
 
trim actuator is slaved to the computer so that the trim position of the
 
,normal trim actuator is the same as the trim position of the parallel servo.
 
The technique for implementing the variable feel system for the aft stick
 
is shown in Figure 2-2. The force transducer (strain gage) on the aft stick
 
provides stick force information to the computer. The computer then computes
 
the stick position which would give the desired stick-force stick-displacement
 
characteristic. This desired stick position is compared to the actual stick
 
position measured by the stick position transducer (RVDT) and the resulting
 
error signal used to position the stick. This technique is widely used at MCAIR
 
and throughout the industry to provide variable feel systems for manned simulators.
 
The main component of the electromechanical parallel servo actuator is a two­
phase servo motor equipped with a gear train to reduce velocity and increase torque.
 
An RVDT is used for position feedback and a tachometer is used to provide rate feed­
back for servo stabilization. Brakes are not used so that when the servo actuator
 
is electrically disengaged it rotates freely. When the pilot overpowers the servo
 
actuator, the force generated by the pilot is proportional to the servo motor stall
 
force.
 
Since the parallel servo has to move the entire longitudinal mechanical con­
trol system, an analysis was performed to estimate the longitudinal servoactuator
 
frequency response. Longitudinal mechanical control system dynamics data developed
 
during the YAV-8B forward servo RCV design activities along with a nonlinear model
 
of the electrohydraulic servoactuator were used in the frequency response calcu­
lations. The resulting stabilator yalve position/servo command frequency responses
 
are shown in Figure 2-3. It can be seen that the frequency response depends on the
 
amplitude of the input signal. It was found that the bandpass was determined by
 
the force level at which the pilot could override the servo. A pilot override
 
force of 26 pounds was used for this study. Increasing the pilot override force
 
level would increase the bandpass. If the frequency response capability of the
 
parallel servo is found to be inadequate for certain closed loop control config­
urations, the computer can be programmed to use the series servos to increase the
 
effective servo bandpass.
 
Figure 2-4 shows response to the forward cockpit stick/series servo input
 
frequency response and the series servo output/series servo input frequency
 
response. These frequency responses are almost identical to about 4 Hz. There­
fore, the motion of the forward stick should give the safety pilot a good indication
 
of the stabilator and RCV positions which the digital computer is commanding.
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The lateral control system is shown in Figure 2-5. In concept, it is
 
identical to the longitudinal system. Aft cockpit stick force and stick position
 
signals are sent to the computer which computes commands for the parallel servo
 
which has been added to the lateral system. The parallel servo drives the lateral
 
control system mechanism, including the forward cockpit stick and servo valves on
 
both ailerons. The roll RCVs are mechanically connected to the ailerons. Forward
 
cockpit disengage includes stick and throttle disengage buttons, stick force
 
electrical disengage, and force override of the parallel actuator. The limited
 
authority series servos of the production Harrier aileron actuators can be used
 
to augment the parallel servo's frequency response capability if necessary. Trim
 
is accomplished in the same manner as in the longitudinal system.
 
The directional control system is shown in Figure 2-6. In concept it is
 
similar to the longitudinal and lateral systems. However, the rudder of the
 
Harrier is not powered. Therefore, the parallel servo will experience the rudder
 
airloads. Since the pilot must be able to override the parallel servo driving
 
the rudder, airloads will also be able to override the servo so the rudder will
 
be hinge moment limited during fly-by-wire flight. Figure 2-7 gives the rudder
 
hinge moment versus airspeed for rudder deflections of 50, 100, and 150. Since
 
a rudder force of 100 pounds is equivalent to 812.5 inch-pounds of rudder hinge
 
moment, it can be seen that the selected override force value of 100 pounds will
 
provide full rudder displacement of 150 for airspeeds to approximately 160 KEAS.
 
The yaw puffer of the production Harrier is servoed and the production yaw
 
puffer servo will be available to augment the frequency response capabilities
 
of the parallel servo. The method used for directional trim will be the same
 
as used for longitudinal and lateral trim.
 
Figure 2-8 gives the pitch, roll and yaw parallel servo actuator override
 
forces which the safety pilot must exert if his electrical force disengage does
 
not function. The electrical disengage force loads, which will be well below
 
these override force levels, will be determined in manned simulations.
 
The maximum rates of stabilator actuator and aileron actuators are 60 degrees/
 
second and 80 degrees/second, respectively. The parallel actuators would be sized
 
to have a maximum rate capability about 10% higher than these values. It is
 
expected that the rudder actuator will have a rate capability of approximately
 
45 degrees/second.
 
Figures 2-9 thru 2-11 show the longitudinal, lateral and directional flight
 
-control systems installed'in the aircraft. The installations of the longitudinal
 
and directional parallel servos are shown in Figure 2-12. The longitudinal parallel
 
servo is connected at the tailplane compensator. The directional parallel servo
 
is connected at the rudder compensator. Spring cartridges are included so that
 
the safety pilot will be able to fly the aircraft in the event of a parallel
 
servo jam.
 
The installation of the lateral parallel servo is shown in Figure 2-13. This
 
servo is attached to the front spar of the wing. A spring cartridge enables the
 
safety pilot to fly the aircraft if the parallel servo jams.
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Figures 2-14 through 2-16 show how the position transducers, force transducers
 
and feel system torque motors will be attached to the aft cockpit stick and rudder
 
pedals.
 
It is important to note that both electrohydraulic and electromechanical
 
actuators were considered for mechanizing the parallel servos. Electromechanical
 
actuators were chosen for two reasons. First, it is mandatory that the actuator
 
be instantly disengaged and "float" while the safety pilot flies the aircraft.
 
This could be done with off the shelf electromechanical actuators, but required
 
development efforts if electrohydraulic actuators were used. Second, any appre­
ciable increase in hydraulic loads would require significant changes in the
 
Harrier hydraulic system.
 
2.1.2 COCKPIT INFORMATION AND DISENGAGE REQUIREMENTS - The special controls
 
in the two place V/STOL Research Aircraft are pictured in Figures 2-17 and 2-18.
 
The panels are further described in Figures 2-19 through 2-24. The pilot in the
 
aft cockpit is the test conductor and has the necessary controls to engage the
 
fly-by-wire system and change the computer program parameter values. The front
 
cockpit-pilot is the safety pilot and has the controls necessary to override or
 
disconnect the fly-by-wire system and revert to the normal airplane control system.
 
If a failure occurs in any axis of control, the safety pilot can take command by

applying control force of a moderate level to activate a force disengage switch.
 
The computer will then disengage the servo which is not operating properly.
 
The force levels required for the safety pilot to override the pitch, roll, and
 
yaw parallel servos are given in Figure 2-8. The safety pilot will also have
 
emergency disengage buttons on his stick and throttle lever.
 
- The controls for operating the digital flight control system are in the 
aft cockpit. They include a keyboard and single line readout for entering para­
meter values such as system gains into the computer. The individual axis gains 
are selectable and are shown on the aft cockpit panel and repeated on the forward
 
cockpit control panel. The aft cockpit panel has the system engage switch which
 
activates the fly-by-wire system if the safety pilot has activated the enable
 
switch in the forward cockpit. The head-up display is used to show both pilots
 
that there is a satisfactory range of mismatch between the forward and aft control
 
position before the fly-by-wire system is engaged. Both cockpits have indicators
 
showing channel selection, gain selection, built-in test results, and engage
 
enable status, but only the aft cockpit has the controls to change the computer
 
program parameters. A built-in safety included in the electronic design will
 
limit a computer program parameter change to be made only when the system is not
 
engaged. A summary of the cockpit displays, control selection available, and
 
disengage requirements is given in Figure 2-25.
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FIGURE 2-25 COCKPIT INFORMATION 
AND DISENGAGE REQUIREMENTS 
PROVISION COCKPIT 	 FUNCTION 

MASTER CONTROL PANEL AFT 
o SYSTEM POWER 	 SWITCH SYSTEM POWER ON AND OFF 

.o BUILT IN TEST 	 PREFLIGHT INITIATION (WITH 
SAFETY INTERLOCKS) OF GROUND 
TEST FOR FBW SYSTEM
 
" MODE SELECTION 	 SELECTIVE ENABLEMENT OR 

DESELECTION OF EACH CONTROL 

SYSTEM BY AXIS (THROTTLE 
AND NOZZLE SYSTEMS IF 

APPLICABLE) 
o MASTER ENGAGE/ 	 MASTER ENGAGEMENT/DISENGAGE-
DISENGAGE 	 MENT OF ALL CONTROL SYSTEM 

MODES SELECTED (THE FORWARD 

COCKPIT ENGAGE ENABLE SWITCH 
MUST BE ACTIVATED PRIOR TO 
AFT COCKPIT ENGAGEMENT) 
o INFLIGHT FAILURE 	 ALERT AND DEFINE TO THE FLIGHT 
MONITORING 	 CREW THOSE FAILURES DETECTED 
BY THE INFLIGHT INTEGRITY 
MANAGEMENT SYSTEM AND THE 
AFFECT OF AUTOMATIC DISENGAGE-
MENT WHEN- APPLICABLE 

INDICATION
 
GREEN SYSTEM POWER
 
LIGHT ON OR OFF
 
(BOTH COCKPITS) 
GO/NO GO
 
(BOTH COCKPITS) 
AMBER MODE LIGHT
 
ON OR OFF FOR
 
EACH CONTROL 
SYSTEM BY AXIS
 
(THROTTLE AND 
NOZZLE SYSTEMS
 
IF APPLICABLE) 
(BOTH COCKPITS)
 
GREEN MASTER 
ENGAGE/DISENGAGE
 
LIGHT ON OR OFF
 
(BOTH COCKPITS) 
RED MASTER FAIL 
LIGHT ON OR OFF 
(BOTH COCKPITS) 
RED MODE LIGHT ON 
OR OFF FOR FAILED
 
CONTROL SYSTEM BY
 
AXIS AND/OR CHANNEL 
(THROTTLE AND
 
NOZZLE SYSTEMS IF
 
APPLICABLE) (BOTH 
COCKPITS)
 
AMBER MODE LIGHT(S) 
AND/OR GREEN MASTER
 
ENGAGE/DISENGAGE 
LIGHT ON OR OFF
 
DEPENDING UPON 
DISENGAGE LOGIC
 
(BOTH COCKPITS)
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FIGURE 2-25 CONT'D
 
COCKPIT INFORMATION
 
AND DISENGAGE REQUIREMENTS 
PROVISION COCKPIT 	 FUNCTION 

DIGITAL COMPUTER CONSOLE AFT 
o 	 GAIN SELECTION SELECTIVE ENABLEMENT OF AIR-
CRAFT FBW DYNAMIC RESPONSE AND 
FEEL SYSTEM CHARACTERISTICS 

FOR EACH CONTROL SYSTEM AXIS 

(THROTTLE AND NOZZLE SYSTEMS 
IF APPLICABLE) WITHIN A PRE-
DEFINED SAFE RANGE OF VALUES 
o 	 GAIN ENGAGE ENGAGE SELECTED GAINS (AVAIL-
ABLE ONLY WHEN NOT IN FBW 
MODE) 

DISENGAGE MECHANISMS 
o MASTER DISENGAGE AFT MASTER CONTROL PANEL DISENGAGE-
MENT OF ALL CONTROL SYSTEM 

MODES SELECTED 

o 	SWITCH DISENGAGEMENT OF ALL CONTROL 
SYSTEM MODES SELECTED 
STICK AND THROTTLE FWD 
STICK 	 AFT 
o 	FORCE LINK FWD CONTROL STICK AND RUDDER 
PEDALS - DISENGAGEMENT OF ALL 
CONTROL SYSTEM MODES SELECTED 

BY APPLICATION OF A SPECIFIED 

FORCE LEVEL 
(IF .APPLICABLE).
THROTTLE AND NOZZLE -

DISENGAGEMENT OF THROTTLE 
AND NOZZLE CONTROL SYSTEMS 

BY APPLICATION OF A 
SPECIFIED FORCE LEVEL 
­
o AUTOMATIC DISENGAGEMENT INFLIGHT INTEGRITY MANAGEMENT 
AUTOMATIC DISENGAGEMENT OF 

FAILED CONTROL SYSTEM 
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FIGURE 2-25 CONT'D 
COCKPIT INFORMATION 
AND DISENGAGE REQUIREMENTS 
PROVISION COCKPIT FUNCTION INDICATION 
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AIRCRAFT CONTROL 
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DISPLACEMENT ALIGN-
MENT FOR EACH 
CONTROL SYSTEM BY 
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APPLICABLE) (BOTH 
COCKPITS) 
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DISPLACEMENT 
FWD DISPLACE COCKPIT CONTROL 
STICK AND RUDDER PEDALS 
(THROTTLE AND NOZZLE IF 
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ONLY) 
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CONTROL SYSTEM COMMAND IF 
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2.1.3 COMPUTER HARDWARE - A trade study was conducted to select a digital
 
computer to perform flight control system and display system computations.
 
The three candidate computers for the flight control system and display
 
and control system were the IBM AP-101,the ROLM 1664 and the ROLM Ruggedized
 
Eclipse. The criterion for selecting the three candidates was the availability
 
of a HAL/S compiler. A search for additional candidates was made but no other
 
suitable computers with an associated HAL/S compiler are available. The ROLM
 
1664 does not, in fact, have a compatible HAL/S compiler but Intermetrics Inc.,
 
(the company that developed the HAL/S compiler for the AP-101) states that a
 
moderate change to an existing compiler for the Nova Computer will produce a
 
somewhat limited ROLM 1664 compatibility.
 
The IBM AP-101 computer is being used in the Space Shuttle and an F-8
 
aircraft digital fly-by-wire system; 56 have been delivered to date. The ROLM
 
1664 has been available for about a year and has been used in small numbers on
 
a NASA-Langley Helicopter Program, and on various U.S. Navy shipboard applica­
tions. An order for just under 200 computers has been placed by the U.S. Navy
 
under a "Design to Price" contract. The Ruggedized Eclipse Computer is being
 
designed for a U.S. Army application and its architecture is almost identical
 
to that of the Data General Eclipse Commercial Computer. Since the Ruggedized
 
Eclipse is only in the development stage, the data available for this trade
 
study was very limited. Although the manufacturer will not furnish even bud­
getary cost data, preliminary information from ROLM Corp. indicates that the
 
cost of the Reggedized Eclipse will be considerably more than that of the ROLM
 
1664.
 
A comparison of the important trade study parameters and the computer
 
selected are shown in Figure 2-26. The following paragraphs present the
 
tradeoff parameters in more detail and discuss the selection of the IBM AP-101
 
computer.
 
Software Support - An extensive support software library is available
 
with each of the three candidate computers. The support software for the
 
AP-101 includes program development software, which is used with the IBM
 
360/370 equipment, plus preflight and inflight self-test programs for fault
 
detection and isolation. The AP-101 support software includes such HOL com­
pilers as HAL/S, FORTRAN, JOVIAL and others.
 
The ROLM 1664 computer support software includes an extensive software
 
development library and program debugging software which can be used for pre­
flight software check. Compilers are available fot FORTRAN, ALGOL and BASIC.
 
The ROLM 1664 Computer does not have an inflight self-test program which
 
is an important component in the IFIM and Redundancy Management software modules.
 
The AP-101 computer self-test program plus associated BIT hardware provide a 95%
 
fault-detection capability.
 
The ROLM.1664 computer does not have a HAL/S compiler although a HAL/S
 
compiler has been developed for a similar machine, the NOVA computer. A
 
compiler could be developed for the ROLM 1664 by either retargeting the NOVA
 
compiler or by generating a new code generator for the ROLM 1664. Disadvan­
tages in retargeting the NOVA compiler are:
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IBM AP-101 ROLM 1664 
HAL/S COMPILER AVAILABLE / 
INFLIGHT SELF TEST I 
RELIABILITY (MTBE) 1050 NOT AVAILABLE 
WEIGHT - LB (32K) 46 85 
SIZE - IN 7.62 X 10.12 X 19.56 7.62 X 13.12 X 24.31 
MEMORY EXPANSION (16 BIT WDS) 160K 64K 
THROUGHPUT (KOPS) 405 490 
COST - NONRECURRING INCL TEST SET $138,000 $233,100 
- RECURRING (2 COMPUTERS) 316,000 109,900 
- TOTAL 453,000 343,000 
SELECTED
 
2TCT 
FIGURE 2-26 COMPUTER TRADE STUDY SUMMARY
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NOT AVAILABLE
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7.62 X 13.12 X 19.56
 
NOT AVAILABLE
 
NOT AVAILABLE
 
NOT AVAILABLE
 
NOT AVAILABLE
 
NOT AVAILABLE
 
o 	The HAL/S compiler used on NOVA does not implement all of the current
 
HAL/S language.
 
o 	The retargeted compiler would not be as efficient as a compiler gener­
ated specifically for the ROLM 1664.
 
The big advantages in using the retargeted compiler are a considerable
 
cost saving and a shorter development time.
 
The AP-10 HAL/S computer was developed for the NASA Space Shuttle program.
 
Early difficulties experienced with the compiler have been corrected and it is
 
reported that the compiler efficiency is very good.
 
NASA/Houston has developed extensive software which was used to debug and
 
validate the operational flight program for Space Shuttle. The software was
 
written to operate on the IBM 360/370 and would be useful on this program if
 
the AP-101 computer were used.
 
The ROLM Ruggedized Eclipse Computer will have a support software comple­
ment similar to that of the ROLM 1664.
 
A summary of support software available for the candidate computers is
 
shown in Figure 2-27. The immediate availability of a very efficient HAL/S
 
compiler and an inflight self-test program are important factors which favor
 
selection of the AP-IOl.
 
Reliability - The IBM AP-101 computer has a specified MTBF of 1050 hours
 
and is undergoing reliability tests for the Space Shuttle. It contains burned­
in, high reliability parts similar to those incorporated in the AP-i computer
 
which was tested-and qualified for the F-15 aircraft.
 
The ROLM 1664 computer does not have a specified MTBF and has not exper­
ienced reliability tests. It uses Class C parts which require no burn-in.
 
Therefore, the IBM AP-101 computer is the most reliable candidate for use
 
in a flight control system.
 
Weight - The AP-101 computer has a definite weight advantage over the
 
other candidates. As shown below, the uninstalled weight advantage over the
 
ROLM 1664 in a triplex configuration is 117 lb.
 
WEIGHT-LB (32K MEMORY) WEIGHT PENALTY
 
CONFIGURATION AP-1OI ROLM 1664 ROLM R.E. ROLM 1664 ROLM R.E.
 
SIMPLEX 46 85 80 	 +39 +34
 
DUPLEX 92 170 160 	 +78 +68
 
TRIPLEX 138 255 240 	 +117 +102
 
Size - As shown below the AP-101 computer has a size advantage over the
 
ROLM computers. This is most important in the duplex and triplex configurations.
 
In the duplex configuration the 24.31 in length of the ROLM 1664 will not permit
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PROGRAM IBM AP-101 ROLM 1664 ROLM R.E. 
Linkage Editor 
Assembler 
Utilities 
Subroutine Library 
Functional Simulator 
Self-Test Preflight 
Self-Test Inflight 
HAL/S Compiler 
Fortran Compiler 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
FIGURE 2-27 SUPPORT SOFTWARE AVAILABILITY 
its mounting on the lower aft access door. For the triplex configuration, in
 
addition to the door mounting problem, the 13.12 in. width of the ROLM computers
 
prevent their installation in the gun pod.
 
COMPUTER HEIGHT WIDTH LENGTH 
AP-101 7.62 in 10.12 in 19.56 in 
ROLM 1664 7.62 13.12 24.31 
ROLM R.E. 7.62 13.12 19.56 
Memory - Program memory requirements for the single computer in the simplex
 
system and the computers in the duplex or triplex system are shown in Figure 2-28.
 
A more detailed breakdown of memory module size is presented in Section 2-7.
 
Program estimates indicate that a 32K/16 bit memory size is sufficient for the
 
operational program and adequate spare memory. The ROLM 1664 provides internal
 
memory expansion to 64K/16 bit words, the IBM AP-101 to 160K/16 bit words.
 
The 0FP memory requirements were estimated for programming in HAL/S language.
 
The estimates were derived from comparisons with a MCAIR flight control system
 
which were programmed in assembly language. An upward adjustment of 20% was made
 
in the memory estimates to provide for the use of HAL/S language. All three com­
puters have sufficient memory capacity to satisfy initial requirements, but the
 
internal memory expansion capability of the IBM AP-101 and ROLM 1664 are an advan­
tage for future growth.
 
Computation Speed - Computation speed is a very important consideration in
 
this flight control system. MCAIR's experience has been that a computer with a
 
throughput of at least 380 Kops is necessary to perform the computation task for
 
a system with redundancy management or inflight integrity management (IFIM).
 
This minimum value is based on a computer program iteration rate of 60 per
 
second. Computer programming is assumed to be in HOL. Computation rates were
 
calculated for an instruction mix of 85% add, 10% multiply and 5% divide.
 
The ROLM 1664 Computer is somewhat faster than the AP-101 and therefore,
 
from a computation speed aspect, is somewhat superior. All three candidates
 
are acceptable, however.
 
Cost Comparison - A comparison of non-recurring and recurring costs for
 
the IBM AP-101 and ROLM 1664 computers is shown in Figure 2-29 for a buy of
 
two, three and four computers. It is estimated that these quantities of com­
puters would be required for the simplex, duplex and triplex computer config­
urations, respectively. This would provide one spare computer for each config­
uration which is considered adequate. The ROLM Corp. was unwilling to supply
 
cost figures for the Ruggedized Eclipse computer due to its early stage of
 
development.
 
Since the unit cost of the IBM AP-1O1 computer is significantly higher
 
than the ROLM 1664, a comparison of the three configurations shows a cost
 
advantage for the ROLK 1664. However, the extra software development required
 
for the ROLM 1664 partially offsets that advantage for the simplex system and,
 
to a lesser degree, the duplex and triplex configurations.
 
ORIGINAL PArE IS 
36 OF POORP QtThLITY 
-- MEMORY WORDS (16 BITS) -
MODULE SIMPLEX DUPLEX TRIPLEX 
COMMON FUNCTION 
CONTROL LAWS 2300 2300 2300
 
IFIM/REDUNDANCY MGT 6100 3300 3900
 
EXECUTIVE 2600 2600 2600
 
Lo 
BIT 2300 2500 2500
 
PECULIAR FUNCTION
 
NLS/FLIGHT DIRECTOR 2400 2400 2400
 
TOTALS
 
1ST COMPUTER 15,700 13,100 13,700
 
2ND COMPUTER* NONE 10,700 11,300
 
3RD COMPUTER* NONE NONE 11,300
 
TOTAL 15,700 23,800 36,300
 
*MLS/FLIGHT DIRECTOR NOT REQUIRED.
 
FIGURE 2-28 OPERATIONAL FLIGHT PROGRAM MEMORY REQUIREMENTS (HAL/s PROGRAMMING)
 
Loco 
COMPUTERS PURCHASED 
NON-RECURRING COST 
TEST SET 
SOFTWARE 
- HAL/S COMPILER 
- MODIFY OS FOR HAL/S 
- COMPILER MAINTENANCE* 
RECURRING COST 
32K COMPUTERS 
TWO 
8,100 
130,000 
20,000 
75,000 
233,100 
109,900 
ROLM 1664 
THREE 
8,100 
130,000 
20,000 
75,000 
233,100 
164,900 
FOUR 
8,100 
130,000 
20,000 
75,000 
233,100 
219,900 
IBM AP-101 
TWO THREE FOUR 
137,000 137,000 137,000 
NOT REQUIRED 
137,000 137,000 137,000 
316,000 474,000 632,000 
TOTAL 343,000 398,000 453,000 453,000 611,000 769,000 
*COMPILER MAINTENANCE IS ESTIMATED FOR 5 YEARS'@ $15,000 PER YEAR. 
FIGURE 2-29 COMPUTER COST COMPARISON 
Costs shown in Figure 2-29 are vendor catalog prices or estimates and
 
do not necessarily represent the actual current price of this equipment.
 
Conclusion - The IBM AP-1Ol computer was selected based on an evaluation
 
of the significant trade-off parameters. The AP-101 design incorporates high­
reliability burned-in parts. The computer has been designed to achieve high
 
reliability and has been reliability tested. The AP-101 is lighter and smaller
 
than the other candidates and has a greater memory expansion capability. An
 
inflight self-test program is available with the AP-101 and an extensively
 
reworked, efficient HAL/S compiler is immediately available. Although the
 
throughput of the AP-101 is not as fast as the ROLM computers it is within
 
the estimated requirement for this application. Thus, the advantages of the
 
AP-101 are considered to justify the cost difference with the ROLM 1664 for
 
this research application.
 
Selected Computer Description - The AP-101 computer (Figure 2-30) consists 
of: 
o Central Processor unit and input/output (CPU-I/O).
 
o Main storage (MS).
 
o Power supply (PS).
 
The electrical parts and assemblies, along with the repair status of each item,
 
are listed in Figure 2-30. The internal items are accessible when the top and
 
bottom covers are removed.
 
External electrical connections to the computer are made through the I/O
 
connector J1, the aerospace ground equipment (AGE) connector J2, the dc power
 
connector J3, and the rear mounted blower power connector J4. Connectors Jl,
 
J2 and J3 are mounted on the front panel along with the time totalizing meter
 
Ml and the fault indicator DSl.
 
The computer is mounted in the aircraft shelf by means of two mounting
 
hooks on the front of the unit and two mounting pins on the rear. There are
 
two handles on the front panel.
 
Cooling air is drawn into the unit by a Retron 3501 centrifugal blower.
 
It enters through two inlet ports located on the structure front panel, passes
 
through the two side wall heat exchangers, flows into a common plenum and is
 
exhausted to the environment by the blower. Heat generated in the electronic
 
assemblies is conducted through the structure walls to heat exchanger fins where
 
it is dissipated by the forced air that passes through the ducts.
 
CPU Packaging - The CPU I/0 group consists of ten pluggable electronic
 
assemblies (A3-A8, Al0-A12 and A25), and a fault indicator (DSI) that are inter­
connected by a backpanel assembly (A23). (AO1, A02, and A09 are spare locations.)
 
The backpanel assembly consists of a multilayer printed circuit board bonded to
 
a metal support plate. Page connector receptacles are soldered to plated holes
 
in the board. The backpanel assembly is attached to two "tray rails"-which are
 
mounted to the heat exchanger rails with socket head cap screws. The ten plug­
gable electronic assemblies are plugged into the backpanel and secured to the
 
tray rails by captive mounting hardware.
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Main Storage Packaging - The Main Storage Group consists of five pluggable
 
page assemblies (A14 through A18) interconnected by a backpanel assembly (A24).
 
Four of the page assemblies are identical, interchangeable storage pages; the
 
fifth is a timing page. A19 through A22 are spare storage page locations.
 
Power Supply Packaging - The power supply consists of a radio-frequency
 
filter (FLi) which contains power connector J3, a modular power supply (PSI),
 
and a time totalizing meter (Ml). The power supply consists of eight printed
 
circuit board assemblies and an RFI filter assembly. Each printed circuit
 
board is bonded to a metal backing plate which provides structural support.
 
Interconnections between the various printed circuit board assemblies are
 
made through a backpanel Multilayer Interconnect Board (MIB) which is mounted
 
perpendicular to the board assemblies. Each assembly is plugged to the backpanel
 
through 49-pin connectors. Discrete wires are used to connect the high power,
 
frame-mounted components to the backpanel. Input and output connections are
 
made through three 50-pin connectors mounted along the edge of the backpanel.
 
2.1.4 HYDRAULICS - The simplex flight control system requires no modifications
 
to the existing hydraulic system. Electromechanical actuators have been chosen
 
for the fly-by-wire mode so there is no increase-in hydraulic requirements.
 
2.1.5 ELECTRICAL - The existing power system in the Harrier G-VTOL consists of
 
two 4 KVA AC generators and two 2 kW transformer rectifiers. A basic assumption
 
was made that the electrical load will be similar to the post Mod 800 AV-8A. Based
 
on this assumption, the load summary shown in Figure 2-31 indicates that the addi­
tional equipment increases the load beyond the capability of the existing electrical
 
system for each of the flight control configurations. It will therefore be neces­
sary to update the aircraft to 12 KVA AC and 5 KW DC. However, this is the standard
 
system for the TAV-8A and will be installed before the aircraft is delivered to
 
MCAIR for modification.
 
The wiring for the-systems that are being removed will be capped and tied
 
back except where it can be used for the new systems or if the-available space
 
dictates that the wire be removed. New wiring will consist of compact wire
 
bundles with Kapton insulated wire.
 
2.1.6 EQUIPMENT INSTALLATION - Figure 2-32 shows the locations of the added
 
avionics equipment. With the exception of the low range airspeed system and
 
the microwave landing system mounted in the nose equipment bay, all the avionic
 
equipment for the simplex fly-by-wire control system is located in the aft equip­
ment bay. The equipment shelf was designed specifically for this test airplane
 
and is built to accept the large INS platform oriented fore and aft in the
 
airplane. It is attached to the same pickup points as the replaced shelf,
 
and includes cooling ducts that will deliver the required cooling air from the
 
aft environmental control unit. (See Figure 2-33). The equipment is accessible
 
through two large structural doors located on the sides of the fuselage between
 
Frames 33 and 36.
 
2.1.7 INCREASED ROLL POWER - A number of methods for increasing control power
 
were investigated. It was found that the roll control power could be increased
 
by about 12.5% by changing the wing tip reaction nozzle to the unit developed for
 
the Sea Harrier. Other methods for improving control power require major aircraft
 
design changes.
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TOTAL A/C LOAD
 
SIMPLEX PARALLEL 115V AC 28V DC EXISTING GVTOLPOWER SOURCE
 
ELECTRO - MICH 8130 VA 4320 W o TWO 4 KVA GENERATORS
 
o 	TWO 2 KW TRUs
 
DUAL SERIES
 
ELECTRO - HYD 8330 VA 4495'W
 
TRIPLEX PARALLEL
 
ELECTRO - MECH 9435 VA 5045 W
 
CONCLUSION:
 
o THE EXISTING POWER SYSTEM IS INADEQUATE FOR ALL OPTIONS.
 
RECOMMENDATION:
 
o 	INCORPORATE ECP 580 WHICH INCREASES THE POWER SOURCE TO ONE 12 KVA GENERATOR
 
AND ONE 5 KW TRU.
 
FIGURE 2-31 ELECTRICAL LOAD SUMMARY
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FIGURE 2-32 AVIONICS INSTALLATION SIMPLEX SYSTEM
 
DIGITAL COMPUTER INS PLATFORM 
COMPASS JUNCTION BOX 
4­
-- RADIO AkLT. 
1FF TRANSPONDER 
TACAN ADAPTER 
PROCRAMMABLE GRAPHICS GENERATOR 
GYRO AMPLIFIER 
EMERGENCY RADIO 
FIGURE 2-33 AVIONICS INSTALLATION EQUIPMENT BAY SHELF
 
Figure 2-34 shows the present wing tip reaction control valve design and the
 
Sea Harrier design. In the present design, upblowing does not start until the
 
aileron has traveled 6' from neutral. In the Sea Harrier design, upblowing
 
begins when the aileron starts to move from 00. Also, the upblowing force in­
creases by approximately 80 pounds at maximum deflection due to an increase in
 
the bucket area of the nozzle. The combination of the upblowing reaction control
 
on one-wing tip and the downblowing reaction control on the other produces greater
 
roll control moments for the Sea Harrier.
 
Figure 2-35 compares the reaction control rolling moments of the present
 
nozzle design and the Sea Harrier design. The Sea Harrier design produces higher
 
rolling moments over the entire range of deflections. It can be seen that at 6
 
of aileron deflection the ratio of the change in rolling moment to change in
 
aileron deflection increases for the present design. This is where upblowing
 
starts. At 7, both the downblowing shutters are fully open for both the present
 
system and Sea Harrier.
 
2.2 DATA ACQUISITION SYSTEM
 
The aircraft will be instrumented for NASA use as a V/STOL control, display
 
and guidance research aircraft. The data system is anticipated to reach a maximum
 
of 90 measurands. The current measurand list is given in Figure 2-36.
 
2.2.1 MEASURAND REQUIREMENTS - Because the aircraft will be used to obtain
 
research data, NASA participation is required in the definition of measurands
 
to be acquired. To ensure the development of an integrated meaningful measurand
 
list, an early series of design coordination meetings will be held. Emphasis
 
will be placed on the definition and correlation of evaluation pilot (rear seat)
 
commands and reactions. Control surface and control system feedbacks are of
 
primary concern and will be measured with sufficient frequency response to be
 
meaningful.
 
2.2.2 METHOD OF IMPLEMENTATION - The nucleus of the data acquisition system
 
will be the Teledyne AIFTDS-4000 data acquisition/control system. This system,
 
consisting of a Remote Multiplexer/Demultiplexer Unit (RMDU) and associated
 
transducer power supply, will be provided as GFE through NASA-Ames. MCAIR will
 
specify, procure and install the measurand sensors. The data system will consist
 
of an onboard tape recorder, provided as GFE and a telemetry system consisting
 
of signal conditioning equipment, transmitter, power divider and telemetry
 
antennas. The telemetry system and an airborne time code generator will also be
 
provided as GFE. The aircraft will be modified for upper and lower telemetry
 
antennas to maximize telemetry reception during VTOL transition and conventional
 
flying.
 
2.2.3 CONFIGURATION - The RMDU, tape recorder, time code generator and telemetry
 
transmitter will be housed in a centerline pod. The loading density in the equip­
ment and avionics bay will preclude the installation of any instrumentation hardware
 
other than sensors in these areas. The configuration of the centerline pod is
 
currently being evaluated but in all probability, a configuration that is already
 
cleared for the Harrier aircraft will be chosen. Due to power dissipation loads
 
which are currently being evaluated, it may be necessary to send cool air to the
 
centerline pod under certain flight conditions. Existing pods (GFE) will be
 
modified or new pods built of suitable structural sheet metal will be manufactured
 
(GFE) based on airworthy configurations. Design installation drawings utilizing
 
British Aerospace and MCAIR design data will be utilized whenever possible.
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FIGURE 2-36 DATA ACQUISITION PRELIMINARY MEASURAND LIST
 
1. AIRSPEED PRESSURE 46. MAIN LG LIFTOFF 
2. ALTITUDE (PRESS) 47. NLG LIFTOFF 
3. Nz @ CG 48. HYD NO. 1 PRESS 
4. Nx @ CH 49. HYD NO. 2 PRESS 
5. Ny @ CG 50. HYD NOS. 1 AND 2 TEMP 
6. ANGLE OF ATTACK 51. THROTTLE ANGLE 
7. ANGLE OF SIDESLIP F.T. NOSEBOOM 52. NOZZLE ANGLE 
8. FLT PATH ACCEL 53. NOZZLE LEVER ANGLE 
9. TOTAL TEMPERATURE 54. JET PIPE TEMP 
10. ROLL ANGLE 55. LP RPM 
11. ROLL RATE 56. HP RPM 
12. PITCH RATE 57. WATER QUANTITY 
13. YAW RATE 58. WATER RUN ON/OFF 
14. PITCH ANGLE 59. FIRE WARN MONITOR 
15. FUEL QUANTITY 60. ENG FUEL FLOW 
16. ALTITUDE (RADAR) 61. ENG INLT FUEL PRESS 
17. SINK SPEED 62. PRIMARY CONTROLLER POSITION 
18. BEACON (VERTICAL VELOCITY COMMAND) 
19. RUDDER POSITION 63. PROPORTIONAL CONTROLLER (HORIZONTAL 
20. TAILPLANE POSITION VELOCITY (COMMAND) 
21. TAILPLANE TRIM POSITION 64. SIDE ARM CONTROLLER (PITCH COMMAND) 
22. L AILERON POSITION 65'. SIDE ARM CONTROLLER (ROLL COMMAND) 
23. R AILERON POSITION 66. SIDE ARM CONTROLLER (YAW COMMAND) 
24. FLAP POSITION 67. THROTTLE COMMAND 
25. SPEEDBRAKE POSITION 68. THRUST VECTOR ANGLE COMMAND 
26. SAS ON/OFF 69. EVALUATION SYSTEM DISENGAGE 
27. PILOT VOICE 70. SERVO PITCH COMMAND 
28. TIME CODE GENERATOR 71. SERVO ROLL COMMAND 
29. RUDDER PEDAL FORCE 72. SERVO ENGINE THROTTLE COMMAND 
30. LONGITUDINAL STICK FORCE 73. SERVO ENGINE NOZZLE COMMAND 
31. LATERAL STICK FORCE 74. SERVO RUDDER COMMAND 
32. LONG STICK POSITION 75. SERVO RUDDER CONTROL 
33. LATERAL STICK POSITION 76. INS RCVR GLIDESLOPE ANGLE 
34. RTDDER PEDAL POSITION " 77. INS RCVR AZIMUTH ANGLE 
35. LANDING GEAR POSITION 78. INS INTEGRATOR - SLANT RANGE 
36. MAIN LANDING GEAR - LOADS - SIDE 79. TRANSVERSE SHAFT ANGLE 
37. MAIN LANDING GEAR - LOADS - DRAG 80. ROLL THRUSTER POSITION - LEFT 
38. MAIN LANDING GEAR - LOADS - TORQUE 81. ROLL THRUSTER POSITION - RIGHT 
39. MAIN LANDING GEAR - LOADS - 82. YAW THRUSTER POSITION - FORWARD 
VERTICAL BENDING - LEFT 83. PITCH THRUSTER POSITION - FORWARD 
40. MAIN LANDING GEAR - LOADS - 84. PITCH THRUSTER POSITION - AFT 
VERTICAL BENDING - RIGHT 85. INLET GUIDE VANE POSITION 
41. NOSE LANDING GEAR - LOADS - SIDE 86. COMPRESSOR DISCHARGE PRESSURE 
42. NOSE LANDING GEAR - LOADS - DRAG 87. NOZZLE STATIC PRESS - LEFT AFT 
43. NOSE LANDING GEAR - LOADS - TORQUE 88. NOZZLE STATIC PRESS - RIGHT AFT 
44. NOSE LANDING GEAR - LOADS - 89. NOZZLE STATIC PRESS - LEFT FORWARD 
VERTICAL BENDING - LEFT 90. NOZZLE STATIC PRESS - RIGHT FORWARD 
45. NOSE LANDING GEAR - LOADS -
VERTICAL BENDING - RIGHT 
48 OPIGINAL PAGK IS 
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2.2.4 VERIFICATION - Due to the highly flexible nature of the RMDU and of a
 
lack of similarity with existing MCAIR data systems, the checkout and verification
 
of the installed instrumentation system is going to be highly dependent on Instru­
mentation Ground Equipment (IGE) being provided as GFE. If simulated entries,
 
either physical or software controlled, are to be applied as part of the preflight
 
checkout, the instrumentation system must be responsive and capable of being
 
diagnostically evaluated to assure a high degree of confidence in flight envi­
ronment.
 
2.3 PROGRAMMABLE HEAD-UP DISPLAY (HUD)
 
The programmable HUD is based on technology being developed for the YAV-8B.
 
Programmable symbology is provided by replacing the GFE HUD Display Waveform
 
Generator (DWG) with a CFE form fit replacement Programmable Display Processor
 
(PDP). Figure 2-37 is a block diagram of the PDP.
 
The direct replacement POP is an all digital calligraphics generator
 
under the control of a microprocessor. It can communicate with both analog
 
and digital equipment and can simultaneously drive the two Pilot Display Units
 
(PDUs) with an almost unlimited variety of symbology. The PDP has a Program­
mable Read Only Memory (PROM) enabling it to perform the HUD display function
 
independently of the aircraft digital computer. This feature reserves the
 
computer time for the flight control functions and provides the pilot with
 
head-up primary flight data in case of computer failure.
 
Reprogramming is accomplished by replacing a plug-in PROM element with
 
one having the desired new code. It is estimated that no more than 2 of
 
the 12 PROM elements will be replaced for any but the most drastic symbology
 
changes. PROM elements are estimated to cost less than $100 in small lots,
 
making this an economical technique.
 
PROM programming, which uses a programming adapter, consists of the
 
following steps:
 
o 	Develop and debug the desired program (FORTRAN) using a host computer
 
tied into the programming adapter or insert desired program manually
 
via the adapter keyboard.
 
o 	Replace adapter PROM simulator with new PROM element and transfer
 
program into PROM element.
 
o 	Install new PROM in PDP and verify'symbology.
 
The fact that the PDP has an analog interface permits deletion of the
 
Interface/Weapon Aiming Computer (IWAC), for a weight savings of 14.5 pounds.
 
The aircraft modifications required to install the PDP in the NASA Research
 
aircraft include:
 
o 	Delete the HUD Display Waveform Generator (DWG) and Interface/Weapon
 
Aiming Computer (I/WAG).
 
o 	Install Programmable Display Processor (PDP).
 
o 	Delete the wiring that presently exists between the DWG and I/WAC.
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FIGURE 2-37 PROGRAMMABLE DISPLAY PROCESSOR BLOCK DIAGRAM 
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o 	 Add approximately 10 new wires from the PDP to various aircraft sensors. 
o 	Add digital interface wiring (2 shielded pairs) from the aircraft digital
 
computer to the PDP.
 
o 	Reterminate the existing I/WAC wiring, as required, to be compatible
 
with the PDP.
 
2.4 LANDING GUIDANCE SYSTEM
 
The Microwave Landing System (MLS) installation provides steering infor­
mation to both cockpits for the landing guidance function. The Bendix landing
 
guidance system (GFE) consists of the following Weapon Replaceable Assemblies
 
(WRAs):" 
o 	 HLS Angle Receiver 
o 	Receiver Mount
 
o 	MLS Control Panel
 
o 	C-Band Antenna
 
o 	DME Interrogator
 
o 	DME Indicator
 
o 	L-Band Antenna
 
The mechanization includes the flight director computation within the
 
airborne computer. Steering information is presented both head-up on the
 
HUD and head-down on the ADI.
 
An automatic landing interface with the digital fly-by-wire system is not
 
provided. The TACAN system is retained as a separate mechanization. A Digital
 
Adapter Unit provides buffering and scaling of interface parameters. A trimetric
 
view showing WRA locations is presented in Figure 2-38. Physical descriptions
 
are presented in Figure 2-39.
 
2.5 INERTIAL NAVIGATION SYSTEM
 
The GFE Litton LTN-51 Inertial Navigation System will provide data to the
 
airborne computer and pilot displays, both head-up and-head-down. The system
 
consists of an LTN-51 Inertial Navigation Unit, INS Control Display Unit, and
 
INS Mode Select Unit.
 
The Inertial Navigation Unit will be mounted on the aft equipment bay
 
shelf. The INS Control Panel will be mounted in the forward cockpit on the
 
right hand console where the ARC-l14 radio is now located. The INS Mode Select
 
Panel will be mounted in the forward cockpit on the right hand main instrument
 
panel. The LTN-51 will be loaded with the appropriate INS program prior to
 
delivery to MCAIR.
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FIGURE 2-38 NLS WEAPON REPLACEABLE ASSEMBLY LOCATIONS
 
WRA SIZE VOL WT 
H W D 
ANGLE RECEIVER 7.84 3.73 12.62 369 9.5 
MOUNT 3.31 3.63 14.34 IRREG 1.8 
MLS CONTROL 3.0 5.75 4.17 72 1.8
 
C-BAND STUB 2.0 
 2.12 5.1 IRREG 0.3
 
DEE INTERROGATOR 7.625 5.25 12.5 500 10.5
 
DME FREQ SELECT 3.4 2.25 5.2 40 2.2
 
DME INDICATOR 1.5 3.21 8.5 41 1.1
 
L-BAND ANTENNA 3.23 0.92 3.97 IRREG 0.4
 
WEAPON REPLACEABLE ASSEMBLY PHYSICAL DESCRIPTIONS
FIGURE 2-39 
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2.6 SIMULATION
 
Simulation studies associated with the NASA Two Place V/STOL Research
 
Aircraft will include the evaluation of the flight control system modifications,
 
associated flight safety aspects and failure effects. These studies will be
 
conducted on the NASA Ames Research Center's Flight Simulator for Advanced
 
Aircraft (FSAA). The FSAA simulation studies will be conducted by NASA with
 
MCAIR technical assistance. Manned flight simulations at MCAIR will be limited
 
to verification of the two place Harrier simulation model, checkout of digital
 
control laws which will be provided by MCAIR, and familiarizing NASA pilots
 
with the two place aircraft flight characteristics.
 
The simulation program will consist of three phases as indicated in Figure
2-40,
 
2.6.1 PHASE I - During the first phase of the simulation program MCAIR will
 
prepare a simulation data package which will include aerodynamics, propulsion,
 
flight control and landing gear characteristics and HUD displays in the latest
 
Harrier format. MCAIR will flight test the two place Harrier model using MCAIR
 
manned simulator facilities.
 
After the aircraft simulation has been verified, it will be used to famil­
iarize NASA pilots with the handling qualities and flight characteristics of
 
the aircraft. A three day flight simulation familiarization program for two
 
Harrier qualified NASA pilots is suggested. Familiarization will include VTO,
 
hover, transition, short takeoff, short landing, and high speed maneuvers.
 
Ground effects, winds and turbulence will be simulated. Flights will be con­
ducted with stability augmentation on"and off.
 
The first phase of the simulation program will require approximately nine
 
weeks to complete.
 
2.6.2 PHASE II - During the second phase of the simulation program the NASA
 
Ames Research Center's FSAA simulation of the two place Harrier will be devel­
oped. At the start of the second phase MCAIR will deliver the simulation'data
 
to NASA. The package will include sufficient check cases to permit verification
 
of the simulation. The programming of the FSAA Sigma 8 digital computer will
 
be performed by NASA. MCAIR will provide technical assistance for:
 
o Aircraft Simulation Generation.
 
o Control System Failure Mode Simulation.
 
o Software/Hardware Checkout.
 
o Data Requirements, Formats and Units.
 
The two cockpits required to generate the FSAA simulation will be provided
 
by NASA. One cockpit will be used to simulate the two place Harrier front (safety
 
pilot) cockpit, the other will be used to simulate the aft (evaluation pilot)
 
cockpit. All hardware for the two cockpits will be furnished by NASA. Check
 
cases provided by MCAIR will be used to verify the software conversion including
 
the control system failure effects. Use of a spare flight control research com­
puter for onboard computations within the simulation is suggested.
 
The second phase of the simulation program will require approximately six
 
weeks to complete.
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FIGURE 2-40 NASA V/STOL RESEARCH AIRCRAFT 
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2.6.3 PHASE III - During the third phase of the simulation program the FSAA
 
simulation will be used to evaluate candidate systems, and to examine flight
 
safety implications and flight system failure effects. At the start of the
 
third phase MCAIR will provide a simulation test plan for NASA use. The test
 
plan, balanced insofar as possible for the effects of pilot learning, pilot
 
fatigue, time of day, day of test and candidate order of appearance, will pro­
vide for a sufficient number of flight operating points so that sufficient
 
data of quality will be generated to permit the determination of the statis­
tical significance of results. NASA Ames will furnish Harrier qualified pilots,
 
operating personnel and technicians. NASA Ames will generate and analyze the
 
data. MCAIR will provide technical assistance for the simulation, reduction and
 
analysis of data and for report preparation.
 
Phase III may be conducted as a continuous eight week simulation or two
 
four week simulations with sufficient time to analyze data and modify the control
 
system.
 
2.7 SYSTEM SOFTWARE
 
The onboard computer will implement the control law 'equations, inflight
 
integrity management and system BIT. It will also generate steering commands
 
for the display system. The computer program will be organized in a modular
 
design in which program functional responsibilities will be partitioned into
 
well-defined modules. Figure 2-41 shows each of the major software modules
 
that make up the computer program and their respective submodules. An estimate
 
of the computer memory requirement for the simplex configuration is also shown.
 
2.7.1 COMPUTER SOFTWARE DEVELOPMENT - Development of the computer software
 
requires that NASA furnish MCAIR with the latest version of the HAL/S compiler.
 
Required from the computer vendor will be the support software needed in program
 
development (linkage editor, functional simulator, and utilities) as well as
 
preflight and inflight computer self-test program modules.
 
An overview of the software development process is presented in Figure 2-42.
 
As shown, the Flight Control System software will evolve during the System Design
 
Phase which will be devoted to problem analysis, planning and establishing standards
 
for subsequent software activities. Specific tasks to be accomplished during this
 
phase include:
 
o 	Generation of Integration Block Diagrams (IBDs).
 
o 	Extraction of major computation tasks from IBDs.
 
o 	Establishment of timing and program operation.
 
o 	Determination of modes and mode switching requirements.
 
o 	Resolution of logic for selection of secondary modes.
 
o 	Establishment of variables, iteration rates range scaling, format
 
and engineering units for computer interface signals.
 
o 	Organization of software standards.
 
o 	Generation of test specifications and software design verification.
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SOFTWARE MODULE STORAGE (16 BIT WORDS) 
Control Laws 
- Solution of Control Law Equations & Algorithms 
- Digital Filtering 
2000 
300 
2300 
Inflight Integrity Mgmt 
- Data Reasonableness Check 
- Aircraft Departure Limit Check 
- Predetermine Hazard Situation Check 
- Computer Self-Test 
2100 
1400 
1600 
1000 
6100 
BIT 
- Power Supply Tests 
- Sensor Tests 
- Actuator Tests 
- Digital Interface Tests 
- Switch Tests 
- BIT Subexecutive & Display Routine 
100 
600 
400 
700 
200 
300 
2300 
0 0 
C) 
Executive 
- Program Initialization 
- Interrupt Processing 
- Program Scheduling 
- Input/Output Processing 
- Mode Switching Logic 
6g 
500 
700 
200 
500 
700 
2600 
0 Display 
- MLS/Flight Director 2400 
TOTAL 15,700 
FIGURE 2-41 COMPUTER MEMORY REQUIREMENTS - SIMPLEX 
DEFINE 
SIMULATION SIMULATION
 
REQUIREMENTS
 
SYTMDVLPPRODUCE TEST MODIFY ROL COMPILERMODE LOGIC FLIGHT RESULTS PROGRA4 AND SUPPORT SOFTWARE 
DEIN& EQUATIONS PROGRAM MODULES RUNNING ON GON 
MODULES BASED COMPUTER
 
HOL COMPILER CODED 
RUNNING ON PARTIAL MODULE­
GROUND-BASED MODULE 
IN T E GR A 
COMPUTER 

TEST
 
PROCEDURES
 
HOL COMPILER AND' 
SUPPORT SOFTWARE 
SOFTWARE
 
TEST FACILITY TEST PROCEDURES &
 
COE(UTHARDWARE & SOFTWARE) SUCCESS CRITERIA 
INTEGRATE 
 IGHT PROGRAM NSTALLATION OPERATIONAL 
FLT. COMPUTER,._. RUNNING ON PRE-FLIGHTSOFTWARE & AIRBORNE TEST 
AVINICSOTHE COMPUTER 
INTEGRATED_
C OFF TEST

PROCEDURES NOTES: 
OFF - OPERATIONAL FLIGHT PROGAM 
EIP - ELECTRICAL INTERFACE PROGRAM 
HOL - HIGHER ORDER LANGUAGE 
FIGURE 2-42 SOFTWARE DEVELOPMENT (HOL)
 
(a) Development of Program Modules - After the system design has been
 
completed and the software requirements defined, the actual programming phases
 
of the softwate development will begin by generating top-level flow diagrams
 
from the IBDs. Equations to be solved will then be formulated and modified
 
to a form suitable for a digital computer. Detailed math flows will be created,
 
the flight program will be organized into functional modules and will be program­
med in the HAL/S language. The program will be compiled and the program modules
 
debugged.
 
Each individual software module will be tested in an isolated environment
 
before combining it with other modules. The program module will be tested on
 
an IBM 360/370 with a test driver which is a special test routine that provides
 
the proper test environment by simulating inputs and outputs to the module.
 
The individual modules will then be tested on a host computer (IBM 360/370)
 
using a functional simulator. This simulator is a computer program that provides
 
a bit-by-bit simulation of the airborne computer instruction set while executing
 
on the host computer. The functional simulator will be used in conjunction with
 
a User's Control Program, a Pathfind program and Dynamic Statistic Program, all
 
of which were developed by MCAIR for the F-15 Program. These programs will be
 
modified for use on this program.
 
The software modules will then be modified as a result of the functional
 
simulator tests and as a result of MCAIR manned flight simulation.
 
(b) Module - Module Integration - As groups of modules are completed
 
and tested they will be integrated. The module integration will be completed
 
when the individual module source decks or tapes have been combined by the
 
linkage editor into a single object deck or tape. This tape will include the
 
inflight diagnostic support software which is furnished by the computer vendor.
 
The integrated modules will then be tested much as the individual modules
 
were tested, i.e. using test drivers, and performing tests with the functional
 
simulator and associated programs. The integration and testing will be con­
tinued at ever-higher program levels until the complete operational program is
 
debugged and verified. An OFP tape will then be prepared in object computer
 
language for insertion into the AP-101 computer for on-line testing.
 
(c) On-Line Software Test - The flight computer program which was vali­
dated off-line will next be tested on-line in a Software Test Facility. The
 
Software Test Facility will contain:
 
o 	A flight computer loaded with the flight program.
 
o 	An auxiliary computer loaded with the software test facility
 
operating system program.
 
o 	Tapes containing software utility routines and an assembler for the
 
auxiliary computer.
 
o 	An interface unit which interfaces the flight computer and auxiliary
 
computer.
 
o 	Peripheral equipment which interfaces with the auxiliary computer.
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The auxiliary computer program will simulate the aircraft dynamic environ­
ment and airborne computer peripheral avionic subsystems and will exercise the
 
airborne computer to operate the flight program in real time.
 
(W) Hardware/Software Bench Integration - After the OFP has been tested
 
with simulated peripherals the AP-101 computer will be connected with avionic
 
system peripheral systems and tested one step at a time until the airborne
 
avionics system has.been tested. In some cases where avionics systems cannot,
 
from a practical viewpoint, be connected into the avionic system, simulated
 
inputs will be used to substitute for these systems. A summary of softiare
 
test requirements is shown in Figure 2-43
 
(e) Support Software Modification - The support software which is used
 
in flight program generation and verification and which must be modified is
 
shown in Figure 2-44.
 
2.8 GROUND TESTS
 
The ground test program will demonstrate that the new or modified components,
 
subsystems and systems are flightworthy. In the main, these activities will be
 
conducted prior to first flight and can be categorized as follows:
 
o Component Airworthiness Tests.
 
o Ramp Operations.
 
o Aircraft/Software Verification.
 
2.8.1 COMPONENT AIRWORTHINESS TESTS - Modified or newly designed components
 
will be qualified during Vendor Airworthiness Tests. During system buildup and
 
integration, additional tests of components may be required to further evaluate
 
operational or functional characteristics.
 
2.8.2 RAMP OPERATIONS - The weight and center of gravity of the aircraft will
 
be determined. A ground vibration test of the rudder will be performed. Free
 
play and rigidity and frequency response of the aileron, flap, horizontal tail
 
and rudder will be tested. Accelerometers will be mounted on the equipment
 
shelf and in the gunpod. Their outputs will be recorded during engine ground
 
runs to check out equipment installations.
 
'A complete control system checkout of the modified control system will be
 
performed and this functional check will include items such as the digital com­
puter, inertial platform, sensors and software.
 
2.8.3 AIRCRAFT/SOFTWARE VERIFICATION - MCAIR will design and build a flight 
line analyzer (FLA) to permit rapid flight control system checkout on the air­
craft. It will provide open loop stimuli to the flight control system to the ­
extent necessary to assess the integrity of the system for flight. System soft­
ware checks performed by the FLA will be simplified tests such as memory scan 
checks. This equipment will be delivered with the aircraft. 
59
 
FIGURE 2-43 SOFTWARE TEST REQUIREMENTS
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FIGURE 2-44 SUPPORT SOFTWARE MODIFICATION 
2.9 AIRWORTHINESS TESTS
 
The functional test flights will be conducted at the MCAIR, St. Louis
 
facility. Five flights will be performed over a one month period to check out
 
the basic aircraft control system and the airborne data acquisition system.
 
The digital fly-by-wire flight control system will not be turned on during the
 
MCAIR flight tests. The instrumentation ground support equipment, to be sup­
plied GFE, will be required at St. Louis during the flight test period and also
 
during the preceding ground test of the fly-by-wire control system.
 
The functional checkout of the basic airplane will be accomplished in
 
accordance with NAVAIR 01-AV8A-lF, NATOPS Functional Checkflight Checklist,
 
modified as required to accommodate the aircraft configuration. Additional
 
flights, over and above those normally required to complete the NATOPS checklist,
 
will be required to evaluate the frictional effects of the fly-by-wire system
 
servos attached to the basic flight control system. Maneuvers will be per-.
 
formed throughout the conventional flight envelope and in the V/STOL mode.
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3. OPTIONAL MODIFICATIONS
 
Seven optional modifications to the two place Harrier were investigated
 
in this conceptual design study:
 
o A duplex digital flight control system.
 
o A triplex digital flight control system.
 
o Simplex throttle and nozzle control systems.
 
o Duplex throttle and nozzle control systems.
 
o Triplex throttle and nozzle control systems.
 
o A low speed air data system.
 
o A side arm controller.
 
If either the duplex or triplex flight control system is selected rather than
 
the simplex system the basic modifications described in Sections 2.2 through 2.9
 
are still required.
 
3.1 DUPLEX FLIGHT CONTROL SYSTEM
 
The modifications to produce the duplex flight control system were estab­
lished on the basis that the rear cockpit will be the evaluation pilot station
 
and the forward cockpit will be the safety pilot and solo pilot station. Suffi­
cient information will be provided in the front cockpit to enable the safety
 
pilot to monitor the activity of the evaluation pilot and of the digital flight
 
systems and to disengage these systems should the necessity arise. The front
 
seat pilot can then fly the aircraft using an essentially unmodified Harrier
 
flight control system.
 
3.1.1 CONTROL SYSTEM MODIFICATIONS - The design approach for implementing the
 
duplex flight control system differs significantly from the simplex design
 
approach in two respects. First, the aft cockpit's control stick and rudder
 
pedals remain mechanically connected to the Harrier flight controls. Second,
 
dual channel electrohydraulic series servos are used for system implementation
 
rather than single channel parallel electromechanical servos.
 
A schematic diagram of the dual series longitudinal flight control system
 
is givern in Figure 3-1. Since the aft cockpit control stick remains mechanically
 
connected to the Harrier flight control system, the stick in the forward cockpit
 
will move in unison with the aft cockpit stick. This means that the safety
 
pilot could monitor the evaluation pilot's control stick movements by monitoring
 
the motion of the forward control stick. However, aft stick motions will not
 
necessarily be closely correlated with the stabilator and RCV inputs due to
 
the full authority series servos.
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Dual position and force transducers are attached to the aft control stick.
 
The digital computers, the pitch rate gyros, the series servo added at the tail­
plane, and the series servo driving the forward RCV are also dual. All other
 
elements, including the normal accelerometer, are simplex.
 
Signals from the aft control stick position and force transducers are pro­
cessed by the digital computers along with accelerometer and rate gyro signals
 
and, when needed, with information from the inertial navigation and air data
 
systems. The digital computers compute command signals for the forward RCV dual
 
series servo and the dual series servo at the tailplane. These servo motions
 
are then combined with the mechanical motion of the Harrier's longitudinal con­
trol system to provide the appropriate positioning of the stabilator and RCVs.
 
If required, the digital computers can also send command signals to the limited
 
authority series servo built into the production stabilator actuator in order
 
to augment the frequency response capability of the dual series servos. Trim
 
is accomplished through the production trim system.
 
The dual series actuator installation for the forward RCV is shown in
 
Figure 3-2. This installation is similar to the forward RCV series servo
 
developed for the YAV-8B except a dual electromechanical servo actuator is
 
used. Dual solenoids provide fast recentering of the servo when the digital
 
fly-by-wire flight control system is disengaged.
 
The dual series servo installation at the tailplane is shown in Figure
 
3-3. The servo actuator consists of two F-4 lateral series servos which have had
 
the orifices in their recentering circuits opened up in order to obtain near
 
instantaneous recentering when the fly-by-wire system is disengaged. The servo
 
actuator is connected to the actuator valve and the production Harrier flight
 
control system through a "walking beam bellcrank." A typical walking beam bell­
crank is shown in Figure 3-4. As shown in Figure 3-5, the mechanical
 
input from the pilot and the mechanical input from the servo actuator are added
 
to obtain a mechanical motion for the stabilator actuator valve.
 
A schematic diagram of the dual series lateral control system is given in
 
Figure 3-6. Dual position and force transducers attached to the aft control
 
stick provide pilot command signals to the two computers. Signals from the two
 
roll rate gyros and possibly air data and signals from'the inertial navigation
 
systems are processed by the digital computer to generate a command signal for the
 
dual series servo actuator. The dual series servo output motion combines with
 
the mechanical motion generated through the pilot's stick motion to provide the
 
actuator valve motion for the port and starboard aileron actuators. Trim is
 
provided by the production trim system.
 
The aileron dual series servo installation is shown in Figure 3-7. A walking
 
beam bellcrank type mechanism combines the motion from the pilot's stick and the
 
motion from the servo to generate the control motions sent to the aileron actuators.
 
The actuator is similar to the series electrohydraulic actuator used for the dual
 
series longitudinal control system.
 
A schematic diagram of the dual series directional flight control system is
 
shown in Figure 3-8. Position and force transducers attached to the aft rudder
 
pedals provide pilot input signals to the two digital computers. These signals
 
are processed with signals from the two rate gryos and the accelerometer, and
 
possibly with inertial navigation and air data signals, to generate commands for
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the dual series actuator. Trim is accomplished by adding a trim actuator to
 
the forward cockpit area of the directional control systems.
 
Figure 3-9 shows the installation of the dual series servo actuator. This
 
actuator consists of two F-15 rudder actuators combined in such a manner that
 
a hydraulic actuator having a mechanical input and a two channel series electri­
cal input is obtained. The mechanical input is to the actuator and is generated
 
by the pilot through the rudder pedals. The electrical inputs are provided by
 
the computer. When the digital fly-by-wire flight control system is disengaged
 
the safety pilot will have a powered rudder rather than the manual rudder of
 
the production Harrier.
 
The installation of the force and position transducer on the aft stick and
 
rudder pedals is similar to that used for the simplex system discussed in
 
Section 2.1.1. Also, the safety pilot can disengage the fly-by-wire system in
 
the same way he can disengage the simplex system.
 
(a) Cockpit Information and Disengage Requirements - The cockpit installa­
tion of the duplex fly-by-wire system is nearly identical to that of the simplex
 
system. The pilots make the same input to the system in either case. The
 
dual system will have a series of additional warning lights to isolate a pro­
blem in a failure situation. See Section 2.1.2 for the description of the pilot
 
functions since they are the same for both simplex and the duplex systems.
 
(b) Computer Hardware - The two onboard computers are the same as the
 
single computer used in the simplex configuration and described in Section 2.1.3.
 
(c) Hydraulics - The duplex flight control system requires the addition of
 
two channel full authority series actuators to each axis of flight control. Two
 
F-4 lateral series servos (P/N 32-69054), mounted in parallel, will be connected
 
in series in each of four control systems. The four control systems are the
 
pitch, roll, throttle and nozzle.
 
Two F-15 rudder actuators, mounted in parallel, will be connected in series
 
with the rudder control system. Aircraft Hydraulic System 1 will be utilized
 
to supply one valve of each dual series servo. The other'will be supplied by
 
Hydraulic System 2. The 32-69054 series servo actuators will be modified to
 
decrease centering time when the system is deenergized. Plumbing will consist of
 
added lines connecting each servo valve into its respective system including
 
a check valve and a last chance filter in each servo valve return line.
 
The flow/leakage requirements for the added series servo actuators will
 
require new hydraulic pumps of greater capacity. YAV-8B pumps will therefore
 
replace the existing hydraulic pumps and the engine gearbox will be modified
 
to be compatible with the higher torque required. Plumbing from the pumps
 
to the engine/airframe interface will be revised.
 
(d) Electrical - Same as Section 2.1.5.
 
(e) Equipment Installation - The areas where the new avionic duplex fly­
by-wire system is located are shown in Figure 3-10. The additional computer
 
and interface electronics unit are mounted on the lower access door between
 
Frames 36 and 38 in the aft fuselage. See Figure 3-11.
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3.1.2 DATA ACQUISITION SYSTEMS - Same as Section 2.2 except the definition of
 
the measurands defined in the preliminary measurand list may be altered due
 
to changes in the flight control system.
 
3.1.3 HEAD-UP DISPLAY - Same as Section 2.3. 
3.1.4 LANDING GUIDANCE SYSTEM - Same as Section 2.4. 
3.1.5 INERTIAL NAVIGATION SYSTEM - Same as Section 2.5. 
3.1.6 SIMULATION - Same as Section 2.6. 
3.1.7 SYSTEM SOFTWARE - The computer software requirements for the duplex 
configuration are very similar to those of the simplex configuration except
 
for the replacement of the IFIM module with a Redundancy Management module.
 
Computer memory estimates for the duplex configuration are shown in Figure
 
3-12. The memory estimates assume the use of HAL/S language in writing
 
programs. The Redundancy Management module is less complex than for the
 
smaller system and requires 2800 words less memory.
 
Computer memory estimates for each of the dual computers is shown in
 
Figure 3-13. The flight control system part of the computer program is the
 
same for each computer.
 
3.1.8 GROUND TESTS - Same as Section 2.8.
 
3.1.9 AIRWORTHINESS TESTS - Same as Section 2.9.
 
3.2 TRIPLEX FLIGHT CONTROL SYSTEM
 
The triplex flight control system design is based on the simplex system
 
design discussed in Section 2.1.1. The computers and other critical components
 
of the fly-by-wire system are implemented in a three channel fashion so that a
 
component failure will not result in a potentially hazardous aircraft transient.
 
3.2.1 CONTROL SYSTEM MODIFICATIONS - A schematic diagram of the triplex longi­
tudinal flight control system is given in Figure 3-14. This system is similar
 
.to the simplex longitudinal system except that three digital computers, three
 
pitch rate gyros, triplex.aft control stick force and position transducers,
 
and a triplex parallel electromechanical servo are utilized.
 
A schematic diagram of the triplex lateral flight control system is
 
presented in Figure 3-15. This system is similar to the simplex lateral
 
system except that it has three digital computers, three roll gyros, triplex
 
aft control stick force and rudder pedals, and triplex aft control stick force
 
and position transducers, and a triplex parallel electromechanical servo,are
 
utilized.
 
A schematic diagram of the triplex directional flight control system is
 
given in Figure 3-16. This system is similar to the simplex directional system
 
except that it uses three digital computers, three yaw rate gyros, triplex aft
 
control stick force and position transducers, and a triplex parallel electro­
mechanical servo.
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- Sensor Tests 600
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- Digital Interface Tests 700
 
- Switch Tests 
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- Program Initialization 500
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FIGURE 3-13 OPERATIONAL FLIGHT PROGRAM MEMORY REQUIREMENTS
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TRIPLEX PARALLEL
 
The triplex parallel electromechanical servo actuators are constructed
 
using three two-phase servo motors. A gear train is used to combine motor
 
outputs as well as reduce speed and increase torque. RVDT's are used for
 
position feedback and tachometers are used to provide rate feedback for stabil­
ization. Brakes are not used so that when the servo actuator is electrically
 
disengaged it rotates freely. When the pilot overpowers the servo actuator,
 
the force generated by the pilot is proportional to the stall force of the
 
servo motors.
 
The use of cross-element monitoring is planned for the triplex servo
 
actuators by making a direct comparison to determine servo motor status. In
 
this approach, the tachometer feedback in each servo motor is compared to the
 
tachometer feedback in the remaining two servo motors. The logic circuitry
 
defines a failure when all of the comparator limits associated with a particular
 
servo motor are exceeded for a time duration determined by comparator delay time.
 
The installation of the parallel servos, position transducer, force
 
transducer, and variable fuel system mechanization are the same as for the
 
simplex flight control system. If one of the three channels of control fails,
 
that channel is shut down and the system continues to operate using the other
 
two channels.
 
(a) Cockpit Information and Disengage Requirements - The cockpit instal­
lation for a triplex fly-by-wire system is nearly identical to the simplex and
 
the duplex installations. The pilots make the same inputs to the system in
 
all three cases and will only have a small change to the warning lights in
 
order to isolate a failure in a computer failure situation. See Section 2.1.2
 
-for the description of the pilot functions.
 
(b) Computer Hardware - The three onboard computers are the same as the
 
computer used in the simplex configuration and described in Section 2.1.3.
 
(c) Hydraulics - The triplex flight control system requires no modifica­
tions to the existing hydraulic system due to using electromechanical actuators
 
for the fly-by-wire mode.
 
(d) Equipment Installation - The avionics installation for a triplex fly­
by-wire system is shown in Figure 3-17. The additional computer and interface
 
electronics unit needed are mounted in a gun pod shape under the center fuselage
 
of the airplane. See Figure 3-18.
 
3.2.2 DATA ACQUISITION SYSTEM - Same as Section 2.2. 
3.2.3 HEAD-UP DISPLAY - Same as Section 2.3.
 
3.2.4 LANDING GUIDANCE SYSTEM - Same as Section 2.4.
 
3.2.5 INERTIAL NAVIGATION SYSTEM - Same as Section 2.5.
 
3.2.6 SIMULATION - Same as Section 2.6.
 
3.2.7 SYSTEM SOFTWARE - The computer-program is very similar to that for the
 
duplex configuration. The memory estimates are shown in Figure 3-19. Opera­
tional flight program requirements for the three computers are shown in Figure
 
3-20. The flight control program for each of the computers is identical.
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3.2.8 GROUND TESTS - Same as Section 2.8.
 
3.2.9 AIRWORTHINESS TEST - Same as Section 2.9.
 
3.3 SIMPLEX THROTTLE AND NOZZLE CONTROL SYSTEMS
 
The simplex throttle and nozzle control system can be used in conjunction
 
with any of the proposed flight control systems since only one digital computer
 
is required. The parallel servo mechanization concept used for this option is
 
similar to that used for the simplex parallel flight control system.
 
3.3.1 SIMPLEX THROTTLE CONTROL SYSTEM - The schematic diagram of the simplex
 
throttle control system is given in Figure 3-21. The aft throttle lever is
 
mechanically disconnected from the production Harrier throttle system linkages
 
and equipped with a RVDT position transducer. A parallel electromechanical
 
servo is connected to the outboard end of the fuel control torque tube. A
 
force disengage switch (strain gage) is attached to the throttle mechanism.
 
When the fly-by-wire throttle system is engaged, the position transducer
 
on the aft throttle provides throttle lever position information to the computer.
 
The computer uses this information and, when necessary, other information such
 
as nozzle position, gyro and accelerometer-signals, air data, and inertial
 
navigation system variables, to compute a command signal for the parallel servo.
 
The parallel servo moves the entire throttle linkage including the forward cock­
pit throttle lever and the fuel control torque tube. The safety pilot can
 
monitor the operation of the system by monitoring the motion of the forward
 
cockpit throttle lever. If he detects a malfunction, he can disengage
 
the entire fly-by-wire flight control system, including the throttle system,
 
by use of the disengage button on his control stick, the disengage button on
 
his throttle or the master switch on his control panel. He can also disengage
 
the fly-by-wire throttle system alone by applying a force on the throttle lever
 
of sufficient magnitude to activate the force disengage switch. If this switch
 
fails, he can mannally override the parallel servo.
 
The throttle system installation is shown in Figure 3-22. Detail A shows
 
the electromechanical parallel servo installation. It can be seen that whLn the
 
fly-by-wire system is disengaged the safety pilot has essentially the production
 
Harrier throttle system.
 
The aft cockpit throttle is shown in Figure 3-23. The throttle lever is
 
disconnected from the linkage connecting the forward cockpit throttle to the
 
fuel control unit. An RVDT and linkage are added to provide the position measure­
ments. A disengage switch is added so that the evaluating pilot can quickly
 
disengage the system.
 
3.3.2 SIMPLEX NOZZLE CONTROL SYSTEM - The schematic diagram of the simplex
 
parallel nozzle control system is given in Figure 3-24. The aft nozzle lever
 
is mechanically disconnected from the production Harrier nozzle system linkages
 
and equipped with a,position transducer. A parallel electromechanical servo is
 
connected to the Air Motor Servo Unit (AMSU). A force disengage switch,
 
constructed using a strain gage, is attached to the nozzle mechanism.
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When the fly-by-wire nozzle system is engaged, the position transducers
 
on the aft nozzle provide nozzle lever position information to the computer.
 
The computer uses the nozzle lever position, and possibly other information
 
such as throttle position, gyro and accelerometer signals, air data, and
 
inertial navigation system variables, to compute a command signal for the
 
parallel servo. The parallel servo drives the mechanical input to the ASMU
 
so that the nozzles are driven to the proper position. The parallel servo
 
moves the entire nozzle linkage including the forward cockpit nozzle lever,
 
so the safety pilot can monitor the operation of the fly-by-wire nozzle system
 
by monitoring the motion of the forward cockpit nozzle lever. If he detects
 
a malfunction, he can disengage the entire fly-by-wire flight control system,
 
including the nozzle system, by means of the disengage button on his control
 
stick, the disengage button on his throttle, or te master switch on his control
 
panel. He can also disengage the fly-by-wire nozzle system by applying enough
 
force on the nozzle control to activate the force disengage switch. If this
 
switch fails, he can manually override the parallel servo.
 
The nozzle system installation is shown in Figure 3-25. Detail A shows the
 
strain gage force link installation. Detail B shows the electromechanical
 
parallel servo installation. It can be seen that when the fly-by-wire system
 
is disengaged, the safety pilot has essentially the production Harrier throttle
 
system.
 
The aft cockpit nozzle lever is shown in Figure 3-26. The nozzle lever is
 
disconnected from the linkage connecting the forward cockpit throttle to the fuel
 
control unit. An RVDT and linkage are added to provide the position measurements.
 
A disengage switch is added so that the evaluation pilot can quickly disengage
 
the system.
 
3.4 DUPLEX THROTTLE AND NOZZLE CONTROL SYSTEMS
 
The duplex throttle and nozzle control systems can be used in conjunction
 
with either the duplex or triplex flight control system since two digital
 
computers are required. The series servo mechanization concept used for this
 
option-is similar to that used for the duplex flight control system.
 
3.4.1 DUPLEX THROTTLE CONTROL - The schematic diagram of the duplex throttle
 
control system is presented in Figure 3-27. In the duplex configuration, the
 
aft cockpit throttle lever remains mechanically connected to the production
 
Harrier throttle mechanism. It is equipped with a position transducer which is
 
an RVDT. A dual electrohydraulic series servo is added in the throttle linkage.
 
The installation of the throttle system is shown in Figure 3-28. The dual
 
series servo is an electrohydraulic servo fabricated using two F-4 lateral series
 
servos. The orifices in the hydraulic recentering circuits of these actuators
 
have been enlarged so that the servo recenters almost instantaneously when the
 
servo is disengaged. A walking beam bellcrank connects the servo to the linkage
 
from the throttle levers so that the servo output and the position of the throttle
 
lever are added to obtain the mechanical motion which is applied to the fuel control
 
shaft.
 
Figure 3-29 shows the throttle controller for the dual mechanization. The
 
throttle lever remains mechanically connected to the production Harrier throttle
 
mechanism. An RVDT and link are connected to the throttle lever to provide a
 
position transducer. A disengage button is added to the throttle grip.
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In the dual mechanization, the forward cockpit and aft cockpit throttle
 
levers move together so the safety pilot monitors the aft cockpit throttle
 
lever position rather than the input to the engine fuel control unit as he
 
does in the simplex mechanization. The disengage features of the simplex
 
and duplex mechanizations are the same except that the duplex system does not
 
have a force disengage switch since there is no convenient way to measure the
 
force applied by the safety pilot.
 
3.4.2 DUPLEX NOZZLE CONTROL - The schematic diagram of the duplex nozzle control
 
system is given in Figure 3-30. In the duplex configuration the aft cockpit
 
nozzle level remains mechanically connected to the production Harrier nozzle
 
mechanism. It is equipped with a position transducer which is an RVDT. A dual
 
electrohydraulic series servo is added in the nozzle linkage.
 
The installation of the nozzle system is shown in Figure 3-31. The dual
 
series servo is an electrohydraulic servo fabricated using two F-4 lateral series
 
servos. The orifices in the hydraulic recentering circuits of these actuators
 
have been enlarged so that the servo recenters almost instantaneously when the
 
servo is disengaged. A walking beam bellcrank is used to connect the servo to
 
the linkage from the nozzle levers so that the servo output and the position
 
of the throttle lever are additive with respect to the mechanical motion applied
 
to the ASMU.
 
Figure 3-32 shows the nozzle controller for the dual mechanizations. The
 
nozzle lever remains mechanically connected to the production Harrier nozzle
 
mechanisms. An RVDT and link are connected to the nozzle lever to provide a
 
position transducer. A disengage button is added to the nozzle grip.
 
In the dual mechanizatioh, the forward cockpit and aft cockpit nozzle levers
 
move together. The safety pilot monitors the aft cockpit nozzle lever position
 
rather than monitoring the input to the ASMU as he does in the simplex mechani­
zation. The disengage features of the simplex and duplex mechanizations are the
 
same except that the-duplex system does not have a force disengage switch since
 
there is no convenient way to measure the force applied by the safety pilot.
 
3.5 TRIPLEX THROTTLE AND NOZZLE CONTROL SYSTEMS - The triplex throttle and
 
nozzle control-systems can only be used in conjunction with the triplex flight
 
control system since three digital computers are required. The parallel servo
 
mechanization concept used for this option is similar to that used for the
 
triplex flight control system.
 
3.5.1 TRIPLEX THROTTLE SYSTEM - The schematic diagram of the triplex throttle
 
control system is given in Figure 3-33. It is essentially the same as the
 
simplex throttle system described in Section 3.3.1 except that three RVDTs are
 
attached to the throttle lever to obtain a triplex position transducer, a three
 
channel electromechanical actuator is used instead of a single channel electro­
mechanical actuator, and a triplex computer configuration is used to generate
 
the servo command signal.
 
The installation and operational aspects of the'simplex and triplex throttle
 
systems are similar. The main difference is that in the triplex configuration,
 
a component failure will not produce an appreciable throttle transient.
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3.5°2 TRIPLEX NOZZLE SYSTEM - The schematic diagram of the triplex nozzle
 
control system is given in Figure 3-34. This system is essentially the same
 
as the simplex nozzle system described in Section 3.3.2 except that three RVDTs
 
are attached to the nozzle lever to obtain a triplex position transducer, a three
 
channel electromechanical parallel servo is used instead of a single channel
 
electromechanical parallel servo, and a triplex computer configuration is used
 
to generate the servo command signal.
 
The installation and operational aspects of the simplex and triplex nozzle
 
systems are similar. The main difference is that in the triplex configuration a
 
component failure will not produce an appreciable nozzle transient.
 
3.6 LOW RANGE AIR DATA SYSTEM - The air data sensor which has been selected
 
for the low range air data system option is the Applied Devices sensor which has
 
also been selected for the YAV-8E. As shown in Figure 3-35, two sensors will be
 
mounted on the aircraft. One will be mounted in the same location as it will
 
be mounted on the YAV-8B so that the design, testing and calibration performed
 
on the YAV-8B program.will be directly applicable to this program. It will
 
provide low speed air data measurements in the asymmetrical (X-Y) plane. The
 
other will be mounted on the left side of the nose of the aircraft in a position
 
which will be a mirror image of the location of the production angle of attack
 
probe. This sensor will provide low speed air data measurements in the symmetrical
 
(X-Z) plane. Installation design and calibration must be performed for this sensor
 
since the YAV-8B will not have a similar sensor installation.
 
The air data probe is a small flat plate which rotates at right angles to
 
the sensing plane. It is coupled to a piezoelectric generator which serves as
 
both a restoring spring and signal generator. Its operation is such that when
 
a steady state air flow impinges upon the rotating flat plate an oscillating
 
torque is exerted on the crystal restraint. This gives a measure of total
 
vector direction and amplitude of the air mass flow with respect to the sensor
 
mount. The proposed two sensor system would therefore measure the magnitude and
 
direction of the air flow in both the symmetrical and asymmetrical aircraft planes.
 
In order to determine the direction of the input air, it is necessary to have
 
a reference signal to which the output signals can be compared to effect a
 
coordinate conversion from the rotating frame to the fixed frame. This is
 
accomplished by mounting a reference generator configured with two 900 phase
 
shifted outputs on the spin axis with their null points aligned accurately to the
 
alignment pin on the sensor outer case. Using these reference signals in con­
junction with the probe output, it is then possible to determine the direction of
 
the components in terms of body axis coordinates.
 
The sensor and its associated electronic unit are relatively small and
 
light. Each sensor is 3 inches long, 1.25 inches in diameter and weighs 0.5 pounds.
 
The electronic unit for each sensor is 3.5 inches by 2.5 inches and weights 1.2
 
pounds.
 
The two sensor units will be interfaced to the flight control computer and
 
head up display through the digital adapter unit. The digital computer will be
 
used to process the signals from the sensor electronic units in order to obtain
 
the desired data format and improve data accuracy.
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3.7 SIDE ARM CONTROLLER - The controller selected for this option is the two axis
 
base pivot unit which was developed in the F-15 High Acceleration Cockpit (HAC)
 
program. The controller is equipped with three LVDTs in each axis and three
 
separate wire bundle connectors so that the unit can be used with either the
 
simplex, duplex or triplex flight control configuration. Feel force gradients
 
in the pitch and roll axis are provided by two spring cartridges located inside
 
the controller. If a feel force gradient change is desired the spring cartridges
 
can be removed and replaced with cartridges which have the desired gradients.
 
A procurement specification (P/N 68-031012-101) has been prepared but the unit
 
has not been purchased or qualified.
 
The inclusion of the side arm controller in the aft cockpit requires
 
structural preparation in the right console area. The oxygen indicators
 
located just above the right -console will be moved to the forward right hand
 
subinstrument panel where they will replace the TACAN control panel which is
 
not required for this test. The small oxygen indicator shelf is removed to
 
give the side arm control stick enough clearance for full control travel. The
 
top of the right console will be cleared of equipment control boxes and-a
 
structural support will be added to accept the unit. The support will include
 
adjustment provisions to assure pilot comfort and smooth operation.
 
Figure 3-36 shows the location in the aft cockpit where the side arm
 
controller will be mounted. Also shown are the new location of the oxygen
 
indicators and the indicator shelf which will be removed.
 
Figures 3-37 and 3-38 give side and top views of the controller mounted
 
in the cockpit. As shown in these figures the controller mounting is such that
 
ample clearance is available for the designed controller displacements of +10'
 
in the pitch axis and +7.50 in the roll axis.
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4. PLANS AND SCHEDULES
 
The modification of a two place Harrier to the NASA V/STOL Research Air­
craft configuration will be controlled by a carefully prepared modification
 
plan. Subsequent testing will also be carefully planned and scheduled. The
 
preparation of these plans and schedules is described in this section.
 
4.1 MODIFICATION PLAN AND SCHEDULE
 
Once the options have been specified and Authority to Proceed has been
 
issued, Manufacturing Planming will prepare a modification book. This book
 
will be in the form of a Parts List Assembly.Order and will contain instruc­
tions for implementation of the modifications required. It will describe the 
required operations in sequence to facilitate manloading and establish clear 
inspection points. Inspectors will stamp the pages as the work is completed 
and turn them over to Inspection Permanent Records. The pages can thus be
 
used at any time in the future to verify that any portion of the work was
 
done. It has been demonstrated on many previous programs that this system
 
provides the most efficient, cost effective means of guaranteeing a quality
 
product to the customer on schedule and within budgeted cost.
 
The modification plan has the following highlights:
 
o 	Coordinated Engineering Release Schedule - After receipt of Authority
 
to Proceed, Manufacturing and Engineering will negotiate a mutually
 
agreeable Item Release Schedule for the timely release of drawings
 
to 	Manufacturing.
 
o 	Tools and Parts Fabrication - Manufacturing and Planning will
 
order tools to fabricate the necessary parts.
 
6 	Aircraft Receipt and Inventory - Upon receipt of the aircraft, an
 
inventory of installed equipment will be recorded to establish
 
the configuration.
 
o 	Prepare for Modification - For safety reasons and accessibility
 
it is necessary to remove the engine, defuel and purge the fuel
 
system.
 
o Removals - Certain equipment will be removed to gain access to
 
areas that require structural modifications for new and relocated
 
equipment.
 
o 	Structural Modifications - The required structural modifications
 
will be incorporated.
 
o 	Installations - New equipment, and equipment previously removed,
 
will be installed.
 
o 	Operations and Checkout - A systems operation and checkout will
 
be performed (flying controls, landing gear, flaps, etc.).
 
ill
 
o Paint - The aircraft will be painted. with the paint scheme agreed 
upon by the customer.
 
o 	Preflight - A complete preflight including engine run will be
 
performed to ensure all systems are operational and the aircraft
 
will be released for flight.
 
o 	First Flight - A MCAIR pilot will fly the aircraft. This flight
 
will be limited to checking out the retained Harrier flight control
 
system (front cockpit).
 
The Modification Schedule is given in Figure 4-1.
 
4.2 TEST PLAN AND SCHEDULE
 
The Test Plan for the NASA V/STOL Research Vehicle is presented in
 
Figure 4-2. The primary elements in this test plan are:
 
o 	Check out of all aircraft systems while aircraft is on ramp status.
 
o 	Check out of installed fly-by-wire system by simulating signals
 
into the computer and measuring the output signals.
 
o 	Ground tests on the aircraft (fly-by-wire system action):
 
Rudder Ground Vibration Test (GVT).
 
Free play and rigidity tests control surfaces.
 
Frequency response of control surfaces.
 
o 	Engine ground run will measure vibration environment in the
 
equipment shelf and the gun pod.
 
o 	The basic-aircraft systems (excluding the fly-by-wire system)
 
will be evaluated prior to delivery of the aircraft to NASA,
 
these checks will require five flights out of the MCAIR facility
 
at St. Louis, Missouri.
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5. STUDIES AND ANALYSES
 
Investigations which were performed during this program included studies
 
and analyses in the areas of reliability, performance, and weight and balance.
 
Results of these studies are summarized in this section. The detailed failure
 
mode and effects analyses which were developed during the reliability studies
 
are contained in Appendix C.
 
5.1 RELIABILITY ANALYSIS
 
Failure Mode and Effects Analysis (FMEA) is a design evaluation procedure
 
which documents potential failures and determines, by analysis, the effect of
 
those failures on system operation. FMEAs are prepared early in the design
 
formulation process through the coordinated efforts of reliability, maintain­
ability, system safety, and design engineers. System deficiencies are thus
 
detected early and guidance for corrective action provided.
 
5.1.1 FMEA GUIDELINES AND RESULTS - FMEA's are prepared using MIL-STD-2070(AS),
 
"Procedures for Performing a Failure Mode, Effects and Criticality Analysis"
 
as a guide. The criticality (hazard) classifications used are divided into
 
four classes consistent with MIL-STD-882 hazard levels:
 
a. 	Class I - Negligible - A failure that does not degrade performance
 
or operation but which requires corrective maintenance.
 
b. 	Class I - Marginal - A failure that can degrade performance or
 
result in degraded operation. Special operating techniques or
 
alternative modes of operation necessitated by the loss can be
 
tolerated throughout the mission but should be corrected upon
 
its completion.
 
c. 	Class III - Critical - A single failure that can result in the
 
loss of mission or serious hazard or injury to personnel.
 
d. 	Class IV - Catastrophic - A single failure that can result in
 
death or severe injury or loss of system (aircraft, missile, etc.).
 
FMEA's for the simplex, duplex and triplex flight control systems are
 
presented in Appendix C. Their comparison reveals the effectiveness of pro­
gressive levels of redundancy in alleviating the effects of two of the more
 
serious failures in electronic flight controls. Hardovers and disconnects
 
are 	seen to be the most serious potential problem.
 
For safe operation with a simplex system in the aft cockpit, the safety
 
pilot must be able to detect, respond to and recover from hardovers and dis­
connects at any point in the flight envelope. Going to a duplex system vir­
turally eliminates hardovers but has at least twice the disconnects of the
 
simplex system. Thus, with a duplex system the safety pilot would still have
 
to recover from disconnects but would not have to contend with hardovers. A
 
triplex system in the back seat would virtually eliminate both disconnects
 
and hardovers on first failure, the only out of the ordinary indication to
 
either pilot would be a channel-fail light. Control of the aircraft could
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then be passed from evaluation pilot to safety pilot at the convenience of the
 
crew.
 
Because safe recovery from hardover and disconnect failures in the sim­
plex and duplex systems is highly dependent on the safety pilot's reaction
 
time, it is recommended that manned simulator studies for simplex or duplex
 
configurations include uncommanded hardovers and disconnects. These should
 
be introduced at random intervals and without prior notice to the pilots
 
throughout the flight envelope. Analysis of the simulator data should help
 
provide a basis for decisions as to whether a simplex or duplex system con­
stitutes an acceptable risk.
 
5.1.2 POTENTIAL LOSS OF CONTROL PREDICTIONS - The preliminary FMEAs have
 
identified uncommanded hardovers and back seat disengagement as potential
 
causes for concern for the simplex and duplex electronic flight control
 
systems. This concern led to math modeling and calculation of control loss
 
probability from these two failure modes for each of the three levels of
 
redundancy under consideration.
 
For the purpose of this evaluation, the existing mechanical flight con­
trol system of the TAV-SA aircraft was considered sufficiently similar to
 
that of the single place AV-8A to permit the use of AV-8A failure frequency
 
data. This is extremely desirable since most of the more than 70,000 flight
 
hours accumulated by the Marine Corps have been logged on the AV-gA. The
 
source of the baseline mechanical flight control system failure data for this
 
evaluation is the Navy's 3M (Logistics and Maintenance) data system for the
 
time period 1974-76 (39,500 Flight Hours). Certain "How Malfunctioned" codes
 
(i.e. 070-Broken, 135 Bound Binding, Stuck, or Jammed and 780 Bent, Buckled,
 
or Collapsed) were considered to represent real failures which could result
 
in degraded flight control characteristics. Examination of these codes re­
vealed that 140 of them had occurred in the lateral, longitudinal and dir­
ectional flight control systems. In contrast, safety data reviewed for the
 
same time period revealed only 1 accident in which the flight control system
 
was even a contributing factor (and in that single case, pilot error was
 
attributed to bethe primary cause). Conservatively, it was therefore con­
sidered that 1% of the flight control system broken/bound/bent failures would
 
result in a potential loss of control situation. Utilizing this approach,
 
the distribution of TAV-8A baseline flight control failures which could result
 
in a potential loss of control situation was estimated as follows:
 
Lateral Control = .0117 Failures/1000 Flight Hours
 
Directional Control = .0165 Failures/1000 Flight Hours 
Longitudinal-Control = .0074 Failures/1000 Flight Hours 
Total = .0356 Failures/1000 Flight Hours
 
5.1.3 HARDWARE IMPLEMENTATION IMPACT - The impact of adding the hardware
 
necessary to implement the rear cockpit digital flight control system capa­
bility was estimated by using failure rate data from Rome Air Development
 
Center studies (AFFDL-TR-75-59) and component vendors. These data, in con­
junction with estimates of the percent of component failures which could
 
result in a potential loss of control situation and the Built In Test (BIT)/
 
In Flight Integrity Management (IFIM) percentages considered to be reasonably
 
116
 
achievable for different types of components, were used to arrive at an
 
undetected-potential-loss-of-control-failure rate for the alternate system
 
implementations. For purposes of simplification only added major flight con­
trol system components were considered.
 
Figure 5-1 illustrates the predicted effect of adding the single channel
 
parallel digital flight control system to the basic TAV-8A aircraft. In effect,
 
a failure every 225 flight hours is added to the flight control system by the
 
simplex system. More importantly, the predicted potential-loss-of-control-failure
 
rate for the flight control system is increased approximately ten-fold over
 
the baseline mechanical flight control system from one per 30,000 flight hours
 
to approximately one per 3000 flight hours. Assuming adequate and IFIM for
 
the single channel, the system will experience disengagements at a rate of
 
approximately 1 1/2 times the digital flight control system component failure
 
rate, because of in line monitoring measurement techniques. Therefore, a
 
disengagement can be expected every 150 flight hours.
 
Figure 5-2 illustrates the predicted effect of adding the dual channel
 
series digital flight control system to the basic TAV-8A aircraft. In effect,
 
a failure every 100 flight hours is added to the flight control system by the
 
dual system. The predicted potential loss-of-control failure rate for the
 
flight control system is increased approximately 10% over the baseline mech­
anical flight control system to approximately one per 25,000 flight hours.
 
Assuming a simple cross-channel comparison BIT/TFIM system, a disengagement
 
can be expected every 100 flight hours.
 
Figure 5-3 illustrates the predicted effect of adding the triplex parallel
 
digital flight control system to the basic TAV-8. A failure every 75 flight
 
hours is effectively added to the flight control system by the triplex system.
 
The predicted potential loss-of-control failure rate for the flight control
 
system is effectively unchanged from the baseline mechanical flight control
 
system. Assuming a voting scheme (2 out of 3), a warning light indicating a
 
failure in one of the channels can be expected every 75 flight hours. The
 
evaluation pilot can then transfer aircraft control to the safety pilot at
 
their mutual convenience without either a potential loss-of-control failure
 
or an uncomnandad disengagement. After the occurrence of the first failure
 
in a channel, that channel is disconnected and the remaining two channels are
 
compared for failure detection.
 
Each of these analyses assumes that the integrity of each channel of the
 
added system will be validated (by BIT, visual checks, etc.) between flights.
 
Each flight is assumed to average one hour.
 
5.1.4 EFFECT OF SELECTIVE REDUNDANCY - Figures 5-2 and 5-3 reflect the pre­
dicted reliability of redundant systems in which all the added elements have
 
been duplicated or triplicated, as the case may be, which is most desirable
 
from a reliability standpoint. In the event of a design decision not to dup­
licate (or triplicate) a given component type such as the accelerometer, the
 
summary numbers are modified as follows:
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FIGURE 5-1
 
SINGLE CHANNEL RELIABILITY MODEL (DIGITAL FLIGHT CONTROL SYSTEM)
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FIGURE 5-2
 
DUAL CHANNEL RELIABILITY MODEL (DIGITAL-FLIGHT CONTROL SYSTEM)
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FIGURE 5-3
 
TRIPLEX RELIABILITY MODEL (DIGITAL FLIGHT CONTROL SYSTEM)
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UNDETECTED POTENTIAL LOSS 
OF CONTROL FR 
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Dual System (except accelerometer)
 
Total Failures/1000 Flight Hours (FH) 9.600
 
Potential Loss of Control Failure Rate (FR) 3.520
 
Undetected Potential Loss of Control FR 0.0102
 
Triplex System (except accelerometer)
 
Total Failures/1000 FR 12.490
 
Potential Loss of Control FR 4.494
 
Undetected Potential Loss of Control FR 0.006
 
The study results indicate that a significant numerical increase in loss
 
of control probability is associated with the use of a simplex system. Adding
 
a second channel to make it a duplex system reduces the control loss probability
 
to slightly move than that of the mechanical system. A third channel makes
 
the electronic system approximately equal to the mechanical system.
 
The selective redundancy study indicated that the system failure rate
 
becomes essentially that of the nonredundant components.
 
5.2 AIRCRAFT PERFORMANCE
 
This section summarizes the performance data for the NASA V/STOL research
 
aircraft, and provides typical variations of data for V/STOL performance with
 
ambient temperature and pressure altitude. Performance data is included for
 
conventional wing-borne flight, partially jet-borne flight and jet-borne flight.
 
Performance comparisons are presented for the simplex, duplex and triplex
 
flight control system.
 
5.2.1 LEVEL FLIGHT - The NASA V/STOL research aircraft is a high performance 
vectored thrust aircraft. The level flight envelope for the clean configura­
tion with a gross weight of 7585 kg (16707 lb) is shown in Figure 5-4. Level 
flight at speeds lower than M = 0.4 requires use of vectored thrust while 
flight at speeds lower than M = 0.25 requires that the throttle be moved into 
the lift rating range (RPM > 100%). 
5.2.2 V/STOL - Harrier V/STOL performance capability is a function of actual
 
(as distinguished from nominal) engine performance. The major variables are:
 
o Relative hover performance ORIGINAL PAGE k 
o Relative JPT OF POR QUALITY 
o JPT limiter settings 
o Maximum RPM settings 
These variables will be discussed in the following sections as their effects
 
on V/STOL performance are shown.
 
5.2.3 ENGINE OPERATING LIMITATIONS - An operational limitation imposed on
 
the engine restricts continuous engine bleed to a 5 minute period. This is
 
basicly an aircraft limitation on the use of the reaction control system
 
(RCS). The hot bleed air flowing through the RCS ducts heats the aircraft
 
structure and, when in hover, heats the landing gear, brakes and tires.
 
Each period of operating in the lift ratings must be separated by at
 
least 5 minutes in or below the maximum continuous thrust rating.
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JPT is limited, on the nominal engine, to 710QC for the SID rating, and 
to 740 0C for the SLW rating. 
5.2.4 VTO - Maximum VTO performance is shown in Figure 5-5. This figure shows 
the maximum gross weights for VTOs as a function of the outside air temperature. 
These curves represent standard VTO performance, i.e. VTOs which attain a 
height of 6 meters (20 ft) in 5 to 10 seconds. Also shown are the VL curves 
the the Short Lift Dry (SLD) and Short Lift Wet (SLW) throttle settings. Fig­
ure 5-6 shows the effects of altitude and type of day on VTO performance for
 
the same conditions. It should be noted that water injection is used only
 
when the outside temperature is 5C or higher.
 
5.2.5 HOVER - The effects of specific engine performance is addressed in this
 
section in terms of relative hover performance. Figures 5-7 and 5-8, taken
 
from the AV-8A/TAV-8A NATOBS Manual, illustrate these effects. Figure 5-7
 
shows the engine RPM required as a function of hover gross weight. This fig­
ure shows that a +3% difference in relative hover performance can mean a diff­
erence of up to 4% in RPM required to hover. Figure 5-8 shows the effect of
 
JPT in hover. A +30' difference in relative JPT can result in a 5.5% RPM
 
difference in RPM-required to hover.
 
The relative hover performance of a specific aircraft is easily deter­
mined by carefully establishing a steady hover and recording the RPM, JPT and
 
aircraft gross weight. The ambient temperature and pressure at the hover
 
altitude are also noted. This data point is then compared to the nominal
 
engine by using the plots shown in Figures 5-7 and 5-8 to obtain the "Relative
 
Hover" performance.
 
5.2.6 SHORT TAKEOFF - A large improvement in takeoff gross weight and mission
 
range results from using the short takeoff instead of the vertical takeoff.
 
Figure 5-9 shows the target rotation speed and nozzle angle for the corrected
 
hover weight. Figure 5-10 shows the distances to takeoff and to 15 meters
 
(50 ft) as a function of the rotation speed. Both of these figures are from
 
the AV-8A/TAV-8A NATOPS Manual. Figures 5-11 and 5-12 show the effects of.
 
gross weight on both ground roll and to a 15 M (50 ft) obstacle. Figure 5-11
 
is for the short lift wet (SLW) rating and Figure 5-12 is for short lift dry
 
(SID).
 
5.2.7 CLIMB - Time, distance and fuel required to climb are shown in Figure
 
5-13 for the maximum thrust (15 min. rating) engine setting. This is for a
 
drag index of 10 and shows the effects of 3 gross weights.
 
5.2.8 CEILING - The ceiling, as a function of gross weight, is shown in
 
Figure 5-14. This is the 91 MPM (300 FPM) Rate Of Climb Ceiling.
 
5.2.9 CRUISE - Cruise performance is shown in Figures 5-15 through 5-16.
 
Figure 5-15 shows the optimum and fast cruise as a function of gross weight.
 
Figure 5-16 shows the sea level cruise performance for various drag indexes
 
as functions of gross weight. Figure 5-17 shows the optimum altitude cruise
 
performance for various drag indexes.
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5.2.10 LOAD FACTOR - Figure 5-18 shows the load factor available as a func­
tion of Mach number and altitude. This is for buffet onset and is therefore
 
not the maximum available.
 
5.2.11 TURN PERFORMANCE - Figure 5-19 shows the turn performance as a func­
tion of Mach number and altitude.
 
5.2.12 DESCENT - Maximum range descents at 230 KIAS, idle thrust, flaps up,
 
and speedbrake retracted, are shown in Figure 5-20. For practical purposes
 
these curves can be used for all aircraft gross weights since the variation
 
with gross weight is rather small; e.g. 3% for a 25% weight increase. The
 
aircraft gross weight used for the descent calculations is 15,000 lb.
 
5.2.13 VERTICAL LANDINGS - Vertical landing performance is shown in Figures
 
5-21 and 5-22. Figure 5-21 shows the gross weight effects. Figure 5-22 shows
 
the altitude and type of day effects of maximum vertical landing weight.
 
The vertical landing performance at the higher ambients is based upon a
 
50 0 C JPT margin below the JPT limiter setting. In the SLD rating, a JPT above 
6600 at 90 KIAS in level transition will result in an excessive JPT or insuffi­
cient thrust at lower airspeeds. If the JPT margin is in excess of 500 C, the 
deceleration is continued to the hover. If the margin is less than 50C the
 
aircraft is accelerated to wing-borne flight and flown in this mode until a
 
significant amount of fuel has been expended before the VL is attempted.
 
5.2.14 STALL SPEED - Figure 5-23 presents the stall speed as a function of
 
gross weight for zero and 500 flap settings for the power off condition;
 
nozzle angle is 0'.
 
5.2.15 CONVENTIONAL LANDING - Conventional landing performance is shown as a
 
function of gross weight in Figure 5-24. This figure shows approach speed,
 
touchdown speed, ground roll distance, and distance from a 15 M (50 ft) height
 
for landings with and without nozzle braking. Nozzle braking reduces landing
 
ground roll significantly. It is noted that nozzle braking is terminated
 
when the airspeed decreases to 65 KIAS in order to preclude thermal reinges­
tion in the inlets.
 
5.2.16 V/STOL RESEARCH MISSION ANALYSIS - The typical mission flight test
 
pattern is shown in Figure 5-25. The takeoff, either VTO or STO, is performed,
 
followed by a climb to 305 M (1000 ft) altitude. A race track pattern is then
 
flown at 180 KIAS with gear and flaps down and nozzles aft. This pattern
 
allows the 5 minutes operation with nozzles aft as required after each period
 
of nozzles-deflected flight. A decelerating transition is then initiated
 
followed by either a standard NATOPS deceleration to a VL or a slow approach
 
to a SL. These are illustrated in Figure 5-26 and 5-27.
 
Figure 5-28 shows a detail of the VTOL research mission profile which
 
includes fuel 'usage, distance, time and altitude. Two circuits are possible
 
in this mission since the 150 kg (330 lbs) of fuel for starting are used only
 
.once and the 48 kg (105 ibs) for taxi and reposition are used only once. This
 
leaves the aircraft with 272 kg (600 lbs) of fuel at the end of the second
 
complete circuit.
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FIGURE 5-25 
NASA V/STOL RESEARCH AIRCRAFT 
TYPICAL VTOL AND STOL FLIGHT TEST PATTEP.NS 
2 
LATERAL 
DISTANCE 
- NM 
I 
1. RACE TRACK PATTERN FLOWN AT 180 KIAS WITH GEAR AND FLAPS 
DOWN AND NOZZLES AFT AT 1,000 FT ALT FOR 5 MINUTES. 
0 
2 2 3,4 1 
2. PUSH-OVER AND TRANSITION INITIATED. 1 
1,000 
ALTITUDE 
-FT 
500/ 
3. FOR SHORT LANDINGS CONSTANT SPEED, 50 APPROACH ESTABLISHED 
AT PT. 3 (AT 500 FT ALT THIS PROVIDES APPROX 45 SEC ON 
CONSTANT CONDITION APPROACH TO T.D.). 
4. FOR VERTICAL LANDINGS, A STD NATOPS DECELERATION IS INITIATED AT 200 FT 
ALTITUDE, 1.0 NM FROM LANDING POINT. 
2 2 11 
' 
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ 
3/ ---FLAPS & GEAR DOWN 
V = 180 KIAS 
_ _ _ 
I I 4 1 
4 3 2 1 0 1 2 3 4 
GROUND DISTANCE - NM 
NAVAIR 01-AV8A-1FIGURE 5-26 
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SLOW LANDING
 
TYPICAL
 
0KNOT ____-­
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FIGURE 5-28
 
NASA V/STOL RESEARCH AIRCRAFT
 
TYPICAL RESEARCH MISSION PROFILE
 
VTOL
 
D D
 
D - 1,000
 
D 

VTOGW 16,740 LB 
C TAKFFUEL 25-07-LB h - FTE 

F 
I B 
4 3 2 1 G,H;A 1 2 3 4 
DISTANCE NM 
LB. 	 TIME MIN ALTITUDE
OPERATION 	 -FUEL A DIST. 

A CUM N.M. A I cUM FT
 
A. START, CHECK ENGINES & TAX 330 330 	 5.0 5.0 0
 
B. 	VTO @ SLD ENGINE RATING 110 440 - 0.5 5.5 0"--50 
50---1,000C. CLIMB & ACCELERATE TO 1,000' @ 180KCAS 110 550 1 0.5 6.0 

372 922 15 5.0 11.0 1,000
D. FLY PATTERN AT 1,000' @ 180 KEAS; ej =0 

E. REDUCED PWR. PUSHOVER AND DESCENT TO
 
nj" INITIAL POINT AT 200' ALT, 1.0 N.M.
 
1.0 12.0 1,000
FROM VL POINT 75 998 2 

1073 0.50 12.5 200-60
F. DECELERATING TRANSITION TO VL MODE 75 1 

50 1123 - _0.25 12.75 60-0
G. VERTICAL LANDING FROM 60 FT.
6Q 

17.75 0
H. TAXI & REPOSITION FOR NEXT CIRCUIT 105 1228 	 5.0 

0 
Figure 5-29 shows a detail of the STOL research mission profile with the
 
Using STOL allows 5 circuits.
same conditions as in the VTOL mission profile. 

The fuel allowances listed represent the average gross weight associated with
 
the 5 circuit capability.
 
A performance summary is shown in Figure 5-30 for each of the missions
 
with each of the proposed control systems.
 
These circuit capabilities are for the SLD throttle setting on a standard
 
day at sea level, and consequently represent a nominal capability. Due to the
 
large effects of ambient temperature, field altitude and use of water, the
 
V/STOL performance charts must be checked for specific mission planning.
 
Figure 5-31 shows the effect of fuel loading at takeoff on the number of
 
cycles for the two different takeoff and landing operations.
 
.Figure 5-32 shows the effect of fuel loading at takeoff for the total
 
time including takeoff, circuit, landing, and repositioning the aircraft.
 
5.2.17 FERRY MISSIONS - Figures 5-33 and 5-34 are examples of the ferry
 
mission capability. Figure 5-33 shows a typical ferry from Moffat Field to
 
the Crows Landing auxiliary test site. It includes a weight, distance, time
 
and altitude breakdown for this 44 nautical miles mission. Figure 5-34 shows
 
the capability in-the ferry mission with this aircraft.
 
5.3 WEIGHT AND BALANCE
 
Weight and balance data were computed for the basic and optional aircraft
 
modifications. Data are given in units of pounds and inches to be consistent
 
with performance data contained in NATOPS Flight Manual NAVAIR 01-AV8A-l. The
 
computations were based on the assumption that the Harrier G-VTOL aircraft is
 
brought up to TAV-8A standards before delivery to MCAIR. The update modifica­
tion will decrease the present G-VTOL weight by 391 pounds.
 
Table 5-1 presents the weight and balance data for the equipment added
 
and deleted to implement the basic modifications. Tables 5-2 and 5-3 give the
 
weight and balance-changes to the data of Table 5-1 if the duplex or triplex
 
flight control system is implemented instead of the simplex system. Figures
 
5-4 through 5-8 give weight and balance data for the other options.
 
Table 5-9 gives a total aircraft weight summary for the simplex, duplex
 
and triplex flight control systems installed in the Harrier G-VTOL and a pro­
duction TAV-8A." Figure 5-35 shows the center of gravity envelope for the
 
aircraft equipped with the simplex system and the aircraft equipped with a
 
triplex system. The en#elope for the aircraft equipped with the duplex system
 
-falls between the simplex and triplex envelopes. Also shown is the point on
 
the production TAV-8A envelope which is for a crew of two and full internal
 
fuel.
 
5.4 AIRCRAFT SUPPORT
 
NCAIR recommends limited support of the NASA Research Airplane modifica­
tion and flight test program.
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D 
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4 3 2 1 
LnOPERATION
 
0 
A. START, 	CHECK ENGINES & TAXI 
B. STO AT 	SLD ENGINE RATING 

C. CLIMB & ACCELERATE TO 1,000 FT. @ 
180 KCAS 
D. FLY PATTERN AT 1,000' @ 180 KEAS:
 
0°
0 	 e3 = 
E. PUSHOVER, ESTABLISH APPROACH NOZZLE
 
4 	 SETTING AND DECELERATE TO APPROACH
 
SPEED 

F. CONSTANT SPEED APPROACH TO SHORT
 
LANDING V = 110 KIAS 

G. LOG. RUNOUT, TAXI & REPOSITION FOR
 
NEXT CIRCUIT 

FIGURE 5-29
 
NASA V/STOL RESEARCH AIRCRAFT
 
TYPICAL RESEARCH MISSION PROFILE
 
STOL
 
D 
STOGW 20,660 LB 
C TAKEOFF FUEL = 6110 LB 
G A,B 1 2 3 
DISTANCE - NM 
FUEL LB. A DIST. TIME MIN 
A CUM N.M. A CUM 
330 330 5.0 5.0 
110 440 - 0.5 5.5 
110 550 1 0.5 6.0 

440 990 15 5.0 11.0 

150 1140 1 0.75 11.75 

150 1290 1 0.75 12.5 

105 1395 - 5.0 17.5 

h -FT
 
4 
ALTITUDE
 
FT
 
0
 
0
 
01,O00
 
1,000
 
1,000-500
 
500-0
 
0
 
FIGURE 5-30
 
NASA 	V/STOL RESEARCH AIRCRAFT
 
PERFORMANCE SUMMARY
 
CONTROL SYSTEM
 
SIMPLEX 	 DUPLEX 

A. CONFIGURATION DATA
 
1. OWE INCLUDING FLIGHT TEST LB 14,233 14,443 

INSTRUMENTATION
 
2. GUN POD CARRIAGE 	 NO NO 

B. VTOL CAPABILITY
 
3. VTO G.W. (STD DAY)* 	 LB 16,740/17,640 16,740/17,640 

4. TAKEOFF FUEL (INTERNAL) LB 2,507/2,907 2,297/2,697 

5. WATER 	 0/500 0/500 

6. NUMBER OF TEST CIRCUITS 	 2/2 2/2

AVAILABLE
 
7. TOTAL CIRCUIT TIME' MIN 22/28 19/24 

AVAILABLE
 
C. STOL CAPABILITY
 
8. 	STO G.W. (STD DAY, 1000' LB 20,660/21,590** 20,660/21,800**
G.R.)*
 
9. TAKEOFF FUEL 	 LB 6063/6793 5853/6793 

10. 	 WATER 0/200 0/200 

11. 	 NO. OF TEST CIRCUITS 5/6 5/6 

AVAILABLE
 
12. 	 TOTAL CIRCUIT TIME MIN 61/70 59/70 

AVAILABLE
 
*NOTE: SHORT LIFT DRY/SHORT LIFT WET OPERATION 4 **NOTE: FUEL LIMITED. 
ASSUMES NOMINAL ENGINE PERFORMANCE.
 
TRIPLEX
 
14,491
 
YES
 
16,740/17,640
 
2,249/2,649
 
0/500
 
2/2.
 
19/24
 
20,660/21,848**
 
5805/6793
 
0/200
 
5/6
 
58/70
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FIGURE 5-33
 
NASA V/STOL RESEARCH AIRCRAFT
 
TYPICAL RESEARCH FERRY MISSION
 
(MOFFET FIELD TO CROWS LANDING AUXILIARY LANDING FIELD)
 
ALT FT. C 
0A F G
0  
H DIST. 44 NM 
OPERATION FUEL LB A DIST TIME MIN ALTITUDE
OA TICU N.M. A cum FT 
A. START, ENGINE CHECK & TAXI 330 330 5.0 5.0 0
 
B. STO @ SLD ENGINE RATING 110 440 - 0.5 3.0 0 
C. MAX. PWR. CLIMB TO 10,000 FT.CRUISE ALT. 160 660 6 0.9 3.9 O-1O,000
 
D. CRUISE OUT AT 10,000 FT. ALTITUDE, M .55 225 825 23 3.9 7.8 10,000
 
E. IDLE PWR. DESCENT TO SEA LEVEL 70 895 15 3.5 11.3 10,000"-0 
0 F. DECELERATE & SL @ TEST SITE 300 1195 - 1.5 12.8 0 
G. TAXI FOR 5 MINUTES AT TEST SITE 105 1300 - 5.0 17.8 0­
44 Nm ­
FIGURE 5-34
NASA V/STOL RESEARCH AIRCRAFT 
FERRY MISSION CAPAILITY 
INTERNAL FUEL + 
(2)120 GALLON ZANKS 
(TANKS RETAINED) 
CRUISE 
OPTIMUM ALTITUDE 
Z/SHORT TAKEOFF 
RANGE (SIMPLEX SYSTEM) = 1032 NM 
RANGE (TRIPLEX SYSTEM) = 992 NM' 
LANDING WITH RESERVES 
(5%INITIAL FUEL 
10 MIN LOITER FUELI 
TABLE 5-1
 
NASA RESEARCH AIRPLANE
 
WEIGHT STATEMENT
 
BASIC MODIFICATIONS
 
REMOVE: 

Stand By Sight 

Weapon Control Panel 

Sidewinder Control Panel 

Throttle (2) 

Control Column Grip (2) 

Ballistics Panel' 

Waveform Generator, HUD 

Displays, HUD (2) 

VHF Radio, ARC-114 (2) 

VHF Antenna 

VHF Coupler 

IFF Test Set 

IFF Test Set, Mt. 

IFF Secure Voice 

Vertical Speed Xducer 

SEAM Box, ASA-83 

Rate Gyros 

Camera, F-95 

Camera Control 

WEIGHT (LB) 
(-248.0) 
-1.0 
-10.0 
-1.8 
-1.4' 
-2.8 
-2.0 
-18.3 
-33.2 
-13.2 
-8.0 
-0.9 
-3.0 
-1.5 
-14.5 
-1.5 
-5.0 
-2.5 
-23.1 
-1.5 
ARM (IN) MOMENT (IN-LB) 
(346.4) (-85908) 
180.0 -180 
125.2 -1252 
127.0 -229 
162.1 -227 
162.5 -455 
128.0 -256 
465.0 -8510 
161.7 -5368 
166.7 -2200 
390.0 -3120 
232.0 -209 
476.0 -1428 
476.0 -714 
465.9 -6756 
468.5 -703 
444.0 -2220 
204.0 -510 
198.0 -4574 
127.0 -191 
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TABLE 5-1 (Continued)
 
WEIGHT (LB) 

REMOVE:
 
IWAC Computer -15.1 

Equipment Rack -66.7 

AHRS ASN-116 -21.0 

ADD: (483.7) 

Emerg. Spring Cartridges (3) 4.5 

Feel Sys. Servoactuator - Yaw 5.6 

Feel Sys. Servoactuator - Pitch 6.8 

Feel Sys. Servoactuator - Roll 2.7 

System LVDT's (3) 3.0 

Strain Gages 2.5 

Series Servoactuator 2.8 

Parallel Servoactuator - Roll 2.6 

Parallel Servoactuator - Yaw 6.9 

Parallel Servoactuator - Pitch 5.4 

Control Rods, Bellcranks & Instl. 12.8 

Power Amplifiers (6) 1.5 

DME Indicator 1.1 

Sidewinder Panel 1.8 

Throttle (2) 1.5 

Control Column Grip (2) 2.9 

INS Mode Select Panel 0.8 

DME Frequency Selector 2.2 

MLS Angle Receiver 9.5 

157 

ARM (IN) MOMENT (IN-LB)
 
456.8 -6898
 
463.2 -30895
 
429.2 -9013
 
(332.2) (160708)
 
340.0 1530
 
88.0 493
 
180.0 1224
 
180eO 486
 
267.7 803
 
340.0 850
 
95.0 266
 
310.0 806
 
530.0 3657
 
540.0 2916
 
304.5 3897
 
560.0 840
 
127.0 140
 
127.0 229
 
162.0 243
 
162.4 471
 
127.0 102
 
1127.0 279
 
100.0 950
 
ORIGIAL PAGE IS 
OF pOOR QUALITY 
TABLE 5-1 (Continued)
 
WEIGHT (LB) ARM (IN) MOMENT (IN-LB)
 
MLS Angle Receiver Mt. 1.8 100.0 180
 
MLS Control 1.8 127.0 229
 
C-Band Antenna 0.3 88.0 26
 
DME Interrogater 10.5 465.0 4883
 
L-Band Antenna 0.4 525.0 210
 
Digital Computer AP-101 46.0 465.0 21390
 
Inertial Nay. Unit 61.1 465.0 28412
 
Control Display Unit 5.1. 127.0 648
 
Programable Graphics Gen. 15.0 . 465.0 6975 
Rate Gyro Assy. 5.4 468.0 2527 
Lateral Accelerometer 2.0 468.0 936 
Vertical Accelerometer 2.0 130.0 260 
Digital Adapter 24.0 465.0 11160 
Engaging Control 6.0 127.0 762 
Displays, HUD (2) 33.0 91.5 3020 
Compass C-2J 11.0 408.0 4488
 
Installation - Mtg. Prov. 28.4 362.2 10286
 
Installation - Wire 59.0 362.2 21370
 
Nose Boom 52.0 80.0 4160
 
Equipment Rack 42.0 463.2 19454
 
TOTAL CHANGE (235.7) (317.4) (74800)
 
CL Pod (Data Acquisition)' 290.0 322.2 93438
 
C Pylon 52.0 326.7 16988
 
Flt Test Equipment 30.0 341.1 10233
 
(372.0) (324.4) (120659)
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, TABLE 5-2 
NASA RESEARCH AIRPLANE
 
WEIGHT STATEMENT
 
DUPLEX FLIGHT CONTROL SYSTEM
 
CHANGES TO BASIC SIMPLEX SYSTEM
 
WEIGHT (LB) ARM (IN) MOMENT (IN-LB) 
REMOVE: (-21.5) (356.0) (-7654) 
Hydraulic Pumps (2) -15.3 294.2 -4502" 
Power Amplifiers (6) -1.5 560.0 -840 
Access Door 266408 -4.7 492.0 -2312 
ADD: (231.7) (429.4) (99483)
 
Hydraulic Pumps (2) 17.3 294.2 5090
 
Cooling Sys. 14.0 294.0 4116
 
System RDVT's (3) 3.0 267.7 803
 
Dual Series Servoactuator - Yaw 24.0 530 12720
 
Dual Series Servoactuator - Pitch (2) 12.4 540 6696
 
Dual Series Servoactuator - Roll (2) 12.4 310 3844
 
Power Amplifiers (3) 0.8 560 448
 
Trim Motor - Yaw 6.5 180 1170
 
Control Rods, Bellcranks & Instl 17.7 442 7825
 
Access Door 8.0 402.0 3936
 
Digital Computer 46.0 492.0 22632
 
Digital Adapter 24.0 492.0 11808
 
Rate Gyro Assembly 5.4 468.0 2527
 
Installation - Mtg. Prov. 10.2 490.4 5002
 
Installation - Wire 30.0 362.2 10866
 
TOTAL CHANGE TO SIMPLEX SYSTEM 210.2 436.9 91829
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TABLE 5-3
 
NASA RESEARCH AIRPLANE
 
WEIGHT STATEMENT
 
TRIPLEX FLIGHT CONTROL SYSTEM 
'CHANGES TO BASIC SIMPLEX SYSTEM 
WEIGHT (LB) ARM (IN) 
REMOVE: (-4.7) (492.0) 
Access Door 266408 -4.7 492.0 
ADD: (256.9) (420.9) 

Parallel Servoactuator - Yaw 10.0 530 

Parallel Servoactuator - Pitch 10.0 540 

Parallel Servoactuator - Roll 10.0 310 

Control Rods, Bellcranks & Instl. 9.0 460 

Access Door 8.0 492.0 

Digital Computers (2) 92.0 418.5 

Digital Adapters (2) 48.0 418.5 

Rate Gyro Assy (2) 10.8 468.0 

Installation - Mtg Rov. 19.1 425.6 

Installation - Wire 40.0 362.2 

TOTAL CHANGE TO SIMPLEX SYSTEM (252.2) 419.6 

Remove CL Pod -290.0 322.2 

Remove CL Pod -52.0 326.7 

Data Acquisition 378.0 334.7 

(2 Gun Pods)
 
TOTAL CHANGE TO DATA
 
ACQUISITION SYSTEM (36.0) (447.0) 

MOMENT (IN-LB)
 
(-2312) 
-2312
 
(108136)
 
5300
 
5300
 
3100
 
4140
 
3936
 
38502
 
20088
 
5054
 
8128
 
14488
 
(105824)
 
-93438
 
-16988
 
126517
 
(16091)
 
ORIGINAL PAGE IS 
OF POOR QUALITY 
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Sensor 

Electronic Unit 

Installation 

TOTAL CHANGE 
REMOVE: 
ARC-114 Radio 
ARC-150 Radio 
Voice Recorder 

Oxygen Indicator 

Shelf 

TOTAL WEIGHT REMOVED 
ADD: 
Side-Arm Controller 

D403 Radio 

Oxygen Indicator 

Shelf 

Installat~on 
TOTAL WEIGHT ADDED 

TOTAL CHANGE 
TABLE 5-4 
NASA RESEARCH AIRPLANE 
WEIGHT STATEMENT 
LOW RANGE AIR DATA SYSTEM 
WEIGHT (LBS) 
1.0 
2.4 
1.0 
4.4 
TABLE 5-5 
NASA RESEARCH AIRPLANE 
WEIGHT STATEMENT 
SIDE-ARM CONTROLLER 
-7.0 
-10.0 
-3.0 
-.2 
-.6 
(-20.8) 
4.8 
5.5 
.2 
.5 
3.3 
C14.31 
-6.5 
161 
TABLE 5-6 
NASA RESEARCH AIRPLANE 
WEIGHT STATEMENT 
SIMPLEX THROTTLE AND NOZZLE SYSTEM 
WEIGHT
 
REMOVE: 
Link Assy -. 5 
Connecting Rod -. 9 
Quadrant Assy -.5
 
TOTAL WEIGHT REMOVED (-1.9) 
ADD: 
Force Link .5 
Servoactuator 2.8 
RVDT .1 
Quadrant Assy .8 
Parallel Servoactuator 2.8 
Force Link .9 
RVDT .1 
Link .3
 
Installation 1.7
 
TOTAL WEIGHT ADDED (10.0) 
TOTAL CHANGE 8.1 
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TABLE 5-7
 
NASA RESEARCH AIRPLANE 
WEIGHT STATEMENT
 
DUPLEX THROTTLE AND NOZZLE SYSTEM 
WEIGHT
 
REMOVE: 
Idler 

Control Rod 

TOTAL WEIGHT REMOVED 
ADD: 
Walking Beam Bellcrank 

Dual Series Servo 

RVDT (2) 

Link 

Dual Series Servoactuator 

Bellcrank 

Walking Beam Bellcradk 

RVDT (2) 

Link 

Installation 

TOTAL WEIGHT ADDED 

TOTAL CHANGE 

--.3
 
-.2
 
(-.5)
 
1.0
 
12.4
 
.2
 
.3
 
12.4
 
.3
 
1.0
 
.2
 
.3
 
7.4
 
(35.5)
 
35.0
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TABLE 5-8
 
NASA RESEARCH AIRPLANE
 
WEIGHT STATEMENT
 
TRIPLEX THROTTLE AND NOZZLE SYSTEM
 
WEIGHT
 
REMOVE:
 
Link Assy 

Connecting Rod 

Quadrant Assy 

TOTAL WEIGHT REMOVED 
ADD:
 
Force Link 

Servoactuator 

RVDT 

Quadrant Assy 

Servoactuator 

Force Link 

RVDT 

Link 

Installation 
TOTAL CHANGE 

-.5
 
-.9
 
-.5
 
(-1.9) 
.5
 
4.0
 
.6
 
.8
 
4.0
 
.9
 
.6
 
.3
 
2.4
 
(14.1) 
12.2
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TABLE 5-9
 
WEIGHT SUMMARY
 
NASA RESEARCH AIRPLANE
 
G/VTOL TAV-8A
 
OPERATING WEIGHT EMPTY (INCLUDES UPDATE MODS) 13540 13625
 
SIMPLEX SYSTEM 236 236
 
FLIGHT TEST EQUIPMENT 30 30
 
DATA ACQUISITION (CL POD + CL PYLON) 342 342
 
OWE - SIMPLEX SYSTEM 14148 14233
 
DELTA CHANGE TO SIMPLEX SYSTEM 	 210 210
 
OWE - DUPLEX SYSTEM 	 14358 14443
 
DELTA CHANGE TO SIMPLEX SYSTEM 	 252 252
 
REMOVE CL POD & CL PYLON -342 -342
 
ADD GUN PODS - DATA ACQUISITION EQUIPMENT 378 378
 
OWE - TRIPLEX SYSTEM 14436 14521
 
OPTIONS:
 
o 	LOW RANGE AIR DATA SYSTEM 4 4
 
o 	SIDE-ARM CONTROLLER "-7 -7
 
o 	 THROTTLE AND NOZZLE SYSTEM 
- DELTA CHANGE TO SIMPLEX SYSTEM 8 8 
- DELTA CHANGE TO DUPLEX SYSTEM 35 35 
- DELTA CHANGE TO TRIPLEX SYSTEM 12 12 
8NOTE: 
FIGURE 5-35 
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We have a staff of Integrated Logistics Support (ILS) personnel assigned
 
to the AV-8 Program. These personnel will be available to NASA to provide
 
support information. 'Normally, requests for support assistance would be made
 
through the MCAIR AV-8 ILS manager.
 
5.4.1 VENDOR DATA - MCAIR will obtain vendor data for hardware selected for
 
the NASA peculiar modifications. We will also identify spares requirements
 
and prepare Technical Manuals.
 
5.4.2 SPARES, REPAIR PARTS AND GROUND SUPPORT EQUIPMENT - Appendix A itemizes
 
MCAIR recommendations for spares, repair parts and ground support equipment
 
required for support of the aircraft over a four year period. These recommen­
dations are based on an aircraft utilization rate of 10 hours per month.
 
Appendix A will be revised, as required, to reflect aircraft configuration
 
changes and additional requirements resulting from USMC usage. NASA, at its
 
option, may contract with NAVAIR for material support on an as needed basis,
 
or may procure outfitting requirements through MGAIR. In the event NASA
 
elects to procure support materials from MCAIR, it is recommended that their
 
purchase be made concurrent with that of the aircraft due to limited quantity
 
and lead times.
 
5.4.3 GROUND SUPPORT EQUIPMENT (GSE) - Existing AV-8A/TAV-8A Organizational
 
Level GSE items required to support the program are identified in the GSE
 
section of Appendix A. Additional test equipment and integration benches to
 
support peculiar equipment will be developed by MCAIR as "laboratory type"
 
equipment. These additional items will be made available for NASA use upon
 
delivery of the reconfigured aircraft.
 
5.4.4 TECHNICAL MANUALS - MCAIR will utilize engineering drawings and vendor
 
source data to provide Technical Manuals for the NASA flight test program.
 
MCAIR will provide NASA with one set of AV-8A/TAV-8A manuals of the latest
 
configuration and one set of supplements identifying the modifications made
 
by MCAIR for the NASA flight test program.
 
5.4.5 ENGINEERING CHANGE PROPOSAL (ECP) SUPPORT - MCAIR will provide NASA
 
with a copy of all ECPs approved by NAVAIR for the TAV-8A aircraft. If NASA
 
desires to have any of'these ECPs installed in the aircraft they can negotiate
 
directly with NAVAIR for kit procurement.
 
5.4.6 REPAIR OF REPAIRABLES - Spares, repair parts and GSE identified in
 
Appendix A provides material support for organizational level maintenance
 
(on-aircraft maintenance). It is recommended that NASA contract with NAVAIR 
for repair of components that are common to USMC TAV-8A configurations and 
with MCAIR for repair of components peculiar to the NASA Research Aircraft. 
Common components are identified in Appendix A by assignment of National 
Stock Numbers. Items not assigned National Stock Numbers are peculiar to
 
this airplane.
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APPENDIX A
 
STATEMENT OF WORK
 
A-I INTRODUCTION 
MCAIR Report MDC A4949 "Proposal for a Conceptual Design Study of Modifications
 
to Harrier G-VTOL" was submitted to the National Aeronautics and Space Administration
 
on 29 August 1977. It was submitted in response to Request for Proposal 2-26931(HK),
 
"Conceptual Design Study of Modifications to Harrier G-VTOL," dated 5 August 1977.
 
On 3 October 1977 MCAIR began work on the program under NASA Contract NAS2-9748.
 
The Scope of Work defined by this contract was the same as proposed by MCAIR except
 
that MCAIR was to provide, to the extent possible, the cost estimates for the indi­
vidual items in the basic modifications; as a minimum the costs for the control
 
system modifications, data acquisition systems, simulation, ground tests, and air­
worthiness tests. Amendment One to the contract added the conceptual design of a
 
triplex parallel flight control system and triplex parallel throttle and nozzle
 
controls.
 
This appendix contains those portions of the documents which define the state­
ment of work for this program. Section A-2 contains the Study Approach and Deliv­
erable Items sections from the MCAIR proposal. Sections A-3 and A-4 contain the
 
Scope of Work sections from the contract and contract amendment.
 
A-2 MCAIR STATEMENT OF WORK
 
The statement of work proposed by MCAIR is contained in Section 2 and Section
 
3 of MDC A4949. These sections are quoted below:
 
"2.0 STUDY APPROACH
 
"MCAIR will provide the materials and services necessary to perform a conceptual
 
design study which will define modification approaches and estimate costs associated
 
with converting the Harrier G-VTOL to a VTOL control, display, and guidance research
 
aircraft. This study will include, but not necessarily be limited to, defining
 
modifications required to the control system and cockpit, exploring various methods
 
of mechanization, defining research equipment and software requirements, exploring
 
methods for aircraft weight reduction and defining the weight of added equipment,
 
selecting major hardware components, defining provisions fox safety, and determining
 
the weight and performance capabilities of the modified aircraft. The design
 
modifications will be established in such a way that the ability to operate from a
 
ship will be retained or easily restored. The conceptual design study will identify
 
the basic modifications required in the overall modification program as well as
 
optional modifications which can be added initially or at a later date in order to
 
enhance the research capability of the aircraft. Where necessary certain simplifying
 
assumptions will be made."
 
"2.1 BASIC MODIFICATIONS
 
"MCAIR will develop the conceptual designs and the budgetary costing data for
 
the following basic aircraft modifications:
 
"2.1.1 CONTROL SYSTEM MODIFICATIONS - The flight control system design modifica­
tions will be established on the basis that the rear cockpit will be the evaluation
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pilot station and the front cockpit will be the safety pilot and solo pilot station.
 
The aft cockpit's control stick and rudder pedals will be mechanically disconnected
 
from the Harrier flight control system and equipped with electrical position and
 
force transducers as well as actuators for providing variable feel characteristics."
 
"The design approach for implementing the research aircraft control system
 
capability will be to use an onboard digital compiter to compute pitch, roll and
 
yaw servo command signals for the Harrier control surface/reaction control system
 
from the aft pilot's control stick and rudder pedal command signals, aircraft motion
 
sensor signals, and air data computer measurements. The digital computer will also
 
provide signals for the aft control stick and rudder pedal variable feel systems."
 
"Sufficient information will be provided in the front cockpit to enable the
 
safety pilot to monitor the activity of the evaluation pilot and of the digital
 
control system and to disengage these systems should the necessity arise. The
 
front seat pilot will then fly the aircraft using an essentially unmodified Harrier
 
flight control system. The front cockpit will also contain a digital computer
 
console which will permit the front seat pilot to change the aircraft dynamic
 
response and feel system characteristics provided to the evaluation pilot."
 
"This modification comprises the installation of a digital flight control
 
system and other systems, system modifications, and studies including:
 
a. 	The stick and rudder pedals shall be disconnected from the flight control
 
system and a force-feel system installed.
 
b. 	Installation of a powered rudder system or an acceptable alternate.
 
c. 	Installation of a digital flight control system and other systems
 
consisting of:
 
(1) A single thread system using full authority parallel along with
 
limited authority series servos utilizing as much existing hardware as
 
possible. In each channel of control (pitch, roll, and yaw) the parallel
 
servo will move the existing Harrier mechanical control linkages, includ­
ing the safety pilot's controller, in response to commands computed by
 
the digital computer. Since the frequency response capability of the
 
parallel servo system will be limited due to the mass of the control
 
linkages, a limited authority series servo, which would not cause the
 
safety pilot's controller to move, will be included in each channel to
 
provide the frequency response characteristics required for closed loop
 
control purposes. A high pass ("washout") network will be included in
 
each series servo so that control surface/reaction control will be
 
primarily due to the parallel servos. Therefore, the safety pilot can
 
effectively monitor control system activities by monitoring the motion
 
of his stick and rudder pedals. If required, he can manually override
 
and electrically disconnect the evaluation pilot's control system.
 
(2) A digital computer having sufficient memory capability and compu­
tational speed to perform the required control, display, and guidance
 
computations. A computer sizing analysis will be performed to an
 
appropriate depth for estimating computer requirements. Candidates
 
considered in the computer selection process will include, but not be
 
limited to, the IBM API01, the ROLM 1600, and the ROLM Ruggedized
 
Eclipse. Included in the computer selection criteria will be the
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availability of a higher order language compiler/code generator which
 
can be resident on either the IBM 360 or CDC 7600 Ames system. The
 
computer system selected will include all necessary peripheral equipment.
 
(3) An inertial platform similar to Litton LTN 51 to replace existing
 
Navigation Display Unit and Control (FE-541) to provide position, rate,
 
and acceleration information to the computational system.
 
(4) Transducers to provide input data to the computer and data acquisi­
tion system.
 
d. 	Hydraulic and electrical subsystem modifications as required.
 
e. 	The investigation of methods for improving control power. Included will
 
be methods which would not be desirable for production aircraft, such as
 
boom mounted roll reaction controls.
 
f. 	An abbreviated failure mode and effects analysis of the complete system."
 
"2.1.2 DATA ACQUISITION SYSTEM - MCAIR will prepare a conceptual design of a
 
data acquisition system to the depth required for cost estimation. A system
 
with 150 measurands will be assumed. A Teledyne Controls AIFTDS-4000 "Airborne
 
Integrated Flight Test Data System" shall be considered GFE. GFE will not
 
include data sensors, signal conditioning interface wiring, and necessary component
 
fixtures and bracketry. Sensors which are components of existing aircraft systems
 
will be utilized wherever possible. Use of the outputs from the inertial platform
 
will be used for both the control system and the data system."
 
"2.1.3 READ UP DISPLAY - MCAIR will determine the modifications required to allow
 
flexibility in presentation format of the Head Up Display (HUD). The displays in
 
both the front and rear cockpits will be identical. A programmable graphic gener­
ator will replace the existing waveform generator. The graphic generator will be
 
easily reprogrammable in order to provide flexibility for change and be interfaced
 
with the system computer. MCAIR will consider using the digital computer to
 
generate the HUD symbology instead of a new graphic generator."
 
"2.1.4 LANDING GUIDANCE SYSTEM - MCAIR will determine the modifications required
 
to incorporate a landing guidance system. The landing guidance system will consist
 
of MLS glide slope and DME receivers (GFE), MILS antennas (GFE), and the appropriate
 
electronics to interface with the digital computer. The MLS angle receiver inter­
face will conform to ARINC 582 and the MLS DME receiver interface will conform to
 
ARINC 563. In addition, the interface electronics unit will have room for adding
 
the electronics to interface an additional landing guidance sensor system."
 
"2.1.5 SIMULATION - MCAIR will estimate the planning price of modifying the exist­
ing AV-8A math model to be representative of the G-VTOL aircraft and compatible
 
with the Ames FSAA Simulator. This simulation will model aircraft aerodynamics,
 
propulsion, control, and landing gear characteristics. The support requirements
 
for a four week simulation by the Ames Research Center on the FSAA during the
 
design phase shall be determined. This simulation will evaluate the control
 
system modifications and the flight safety aspects of the design."'
 
"2.1.6 SYSTEM SOFTWARE- MCAIR will prepare a preliminary plan for developing
 
the required system software.. The software addressed in this software development
 
plan will consist of:
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a. 	All software required for functionally operating the system (e.g., for
 
accessing all sensor information, sending servo commands, driving displays
 
and setting flags, accomplishing a system preflight checkout, accomplish­
ing a computer self-check, and a utility program not necessarily resident
 
in the computer).
 
b. 	A software control system program that will functionally provide the same
 
control system performance as the basic vehicle control system (i.e.,
 
manual control system plus SAS).
 
c. 	A HUD software program that provides the same functional capability as
 
the standard AV-8A HUD,system."
 
"2.1.7 GROUND TESTS - MCAIR will define the requirements for a minimum ground test
 
of the modified control system and aircraft to assure the safe operation of the
 
aircraft, digital computer, inertial platform, sensors, and software."
 
"2.1.8 AIRWORTHINESS TESTS - MCAIR will define the requirements for a minimum
 
airworthiness flight test following the modification of the aircraft. This
 
flight test will address only the modified basic control system from the front
 
cockpit."
 
"2.2 OPTIONAL MODIFICATIONS
 
MCAIR will conceptually design and develop the budgetary costing data for
 
the following aircraft modifications:
 
"2.2.1 LOW SPEED AIR DATA SYSTEM - MCAIR will install a low speed air data system
 
in the aircraft. To accomplish this objective, MCAIR will review available low
 
speed air data sensors and review aircraft locations suitable for their installation.
 
Candidate sensors and their locations on the aircraft will be determined. Selection
 
criteria will include the consideration that inputs from a low speed air data
 
system may eventually be required to provide inputs to the aircraft control system.
 
If possible, the system installed will have had prior flight experience so develop­
ment or flight certification of'a new system will not be required."
 
"2.2.2 THRUST AND NOZZLE SERVO SYSTEM - A conceptual design of a thrust and nozzle
 
servo system for the rear cockpit will be made. In the design, the rear cockpit's
 
throttle lever and nozzle lever will be mechanically disconnected from the Harrier
 
engine and nozzle controls and equipped with electrical position transducers which
 
would provide lever position information to the digital computer. Single channel
 
servo systems utilizing full authority parallelservos and limited authority series
 
servos will be installed to permit the-engine fuel control unit and the air motor
 
servo unit (which positions the nozzles) to be controlled by signals from the digital
 
computer. The parallel servos will be used to move the existing Harrier throttle
 
and nozzle control mechanisms, including the throttle lever and nozzle lever in
 
the front cockpit. Since the frequency response capability of the parallel servo
 
system will be limited due to the mass of the linkages, limited authority series
 
servos will be included at the engine fuel control unit and air motor servo unit
 
to provide the frequency response characteristics required for closed loop control
 
purposes. A high pass ("washout") network will be included in each series servo so
 
that the mechanical inputs to the engine fuel control unit and air motor servo unit
 
would be due primarily to the parallel servos. Therefore, the safety pilot can
 
effectively monitor throttle and nozzle activities by monitoring the motion of his
 
throttle and nozzle levers. This thrust and nozzle servo system will permit
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integrated power management control concepts to be investigated. Provisions will be
 
made to readily replace the aft cockpit's throttle/nozzle control box which contains
 
the throttle and nozzle levers with a new integrated power management control unit
 
which will supply pilot command signals to the digital computer,"
 
"2.2.3 SIDE-ARM CONTROLLER - A conceptual design for a side-stick controller for
 
pitch, roll, and yaw control incorporated with functions that parallel the
 
electrical inputs from the stick and rudder pedals will be developed. A design
 
for the cockpit installation will be prepared."
 
"2.2.4 REDUNDANT CONTROL SYSTEMS - MCAIR will consider dual full authority series
 
servo mechanizations for the rear cockpit pitch, roll, yaw, throttle and nozzle
 
control systems in place of the single thread parallel/series servo systems. An
 
abbreviated failure mode and effects analysis will be performed."
 
"2.2.5 REDUNDANT THROTTLE AND NOZZLE CONTROL - MCAIR will prepare a conceptual
 
design of a dual, full authority series servo system for a throttle and nozzle
 
control system to operate in conjunction with single thread pitch, roll and yaw
 
control systems."
 
"3.0 DELIVERABLE ITEMS
 
As a minimum, MCAIR will deliver at the end of the study, a report including
 
the following:
 
a. 	Conceptual designs for the Harrier modification including the designation
 
of recommended purchased equipment. The basic modification package will
 
consist of items 2.1.1 through 2.1.8. Items 2.2.1 through 2.2.5 will be
 
considered as options and the effect of including each of these options
 
individually and sequentially into the program will be documented.
 
b. 	A modification plan, a test plan, and a schedule for the basic modifica­
tions of the Harrier G-VTOL aircraft and each of the options.
 
c. 	A cost estimate for the basic modification package (Paragraph 2.1) and for
 
each option item (2.2.1, 2.2.2, 2.2.3, 2.2.4, 2.2.5) will be provided.
 
Each of these cost estimates will contain information for the following
 
categories: Engineering, Manufacturing, Procurement, and Other Direct
 
Costs.
 
d. 	The estimated performance of the modified aircraft will be documented along
 
with a weight breakdown statement including weight of parts removed and
 
parts added."
 
A-3 CONTRACT SCOPE OF WORK
 
The Scope of Work section from NASA Contract NAS2-9748 is the following:
 
"A. Scope of Work
 
1. 	The contractor shall furnish the necessary services and materials to provide
 
a Conceptual Design Study of Modifications to Harrier G-VTOL as set forth
 
in McDonnell Douglas Corporation, MdDonnell Aircraft Company Report Number
 
MDC A4949 (Volume 1), dated August 29, 1977 to RFP 2-26931, dated August 5,
 
1977. The McDonnell Douglas Corporation, McDonnell Aircraft Company Report
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Number MDC A4949 and NASA Statement of Work 2-26931, dated August 5, 1977
 
are hereby made a part of this contract by reference."
 
2. 	The following addition is hereby made to Paragraph 3.0(c) of the McDonnell
 
Aircraft Company Report No. MDC A4949:
 
"In addition to the above cost estimates the contractor shall provide,
 
to the extent possible, the total cost estimates for the individual items
 
in Section 2.1; as a minimum the costs shall be provided for 2.1.1, 2.1.2,
 
2.1.5, 2.1.7 and 2.1.8."
 
A-4 	CONTRACT AMENDMENT SCOPE OF WORK
 
Amendment One to NASA Contract NASA-9748 modified the contract scope of work
 
as follows:
 
"1. 	Article II, Paragraph A (Scope of Work) is modified to include the
 
following additional work:
 
Alternate Control System Modifications for Harrier G-VTOL
 
(a) Redundant Parallel/Series Control Systems
 
The contractor shall conceptually design a triplex parallel-full
 
authority servo plus a single limited authority series servo mech­
anization for the rear cockpit pitch, roll, yaw, throttle, and
 
nozzle control systems in place of the single thread parallel/series
 
servo systems. Should the study indicate sufficient response in
 
throttle and nozzle operation can be obtained from the parallel
 
servos, the single thread series servo will not be included in these
 
systems.
 
(b) Redundant Parallel/Series Throttle and Nozzle Control
 
The 	contractor shall prepare a conceptual design of a triplex
 
parallel-full authority servo plus a single limited authority
 
series servo (if required) system for a throttle and nozzle
 
control system to operate in conjunction with single thread pitch,
 
roll, and yaw control systems.
 
The 	results of the conceptual design and estimated cost of each
 
of these two option studies will be included under the deliverable
 
items under this contract."
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APPENDIX B
 
TASK DESCRIPTIONS
 
B-1 INTRODUCTION
 
Technical descriptions of the aircraft modifications which will convert
 
the British civil registry Harrier G-VTOL to a V/STOL control, display, and
 
guidance research aircraft are contained in the main body of this report.
 
Brief descriptions of the major tasks required to implement these aircraft
 
modifications are contained in this appendix.- These task descriptions were
 
prepared for use in deriving planning prices for NASA. It was assumed in
 
preparing these task descriptions that the aircraft would be modified to the
 
applicable and appropriate TAV-8A standard configuration before delivery to
 
MCAIR.
 
The modifications studied for NASA fall into two categories: basic
 
modifications and optional modifications. The basic modifications include a
 
simplex parallel digital fly-by-wire flight control system, a data acquisi­
tion system,.a head-up display (HUD), a landing guidance system (MLS), and an
 
inertial navigation system (INS). This part of the program includes simula­
tion, system software, ground tests, and airworthiness tests. The optional
 
modifications include a duplex series digital fly-by-wire flight control
 
system, a triplex parallel digital fly-by-wire flight control system, a low
 
speed air data system, a side-arm controller, and a thrust and nozzle servo
 
system (simplex parallel, duplex series, and triplex parallel). The task
 
descriptions for the basic modifications are given in Section B-2. The task
 
descriptions for the duplex and triplex flight control systems are given in
 
Sections B-3 and B-4. The technical and task descriptions for the low speed
 
air data system, side-arm controller, and thrust and nozzle servo systems are
 
given in Sections B-5, B-6, and B-7.
 
B-2 BASIC MODIFICATIONS
 
Task descriptions for implementing the basic modifications to the two
 
place Harrier are given in this section. The control system modifications
 
(which include component hardware and the inertial navigation system) are
 
given in Section B-2.1. The data acquisition system, head up display, and
 
landing guidance system are discussed in Sections B-2.2 through B-2.4. System
 
software and simulation are discussed in Sections B-2.5 and B-2.6. Ground tests
 
and airworthiness tests are discussed in Sections B-2.7 and B-2.8.
 
B-2.1 FLIGHT CONTROL SYSTEM MODIFICATIONS - The flight control system modifi­
cations include aircraft modifications and equipment requirements.
 
B-2.1.1 AIRCRAFT MODIFICATIONS - The following aircraft modifications are,
 
required:
 
(a) Nose - Longitudinal Reaction Control System: The C292616 nozzle lever
 
is removed. A new electromechanical series servo actuator with associated linkage
 
is added and the existing nose boom is replaced with a flight test nose boom.
 
(b) Forward Cockpit - A fly-by-wire control panel with a DME Indicator
 
is designed to be located in the space left by the removal of the weapon
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control panel from the left hand main instrument panel. This panel has an engage
 
enable switch and indicators lights to display the functions of the control sys­
tem which are selected, which are operational, and any failures that occur. (The
 
Aft cockpit will have the selection capability and will decide when the system
 
will be activated.)
 
The Sidewinder control panel on the left hand subinstrument panel is revised
 
to give a jettison capability for stores such as fuel tanks. (This stores jetti­
son capability was lost when the weapon control panel was removed above.)
 
An INS Mode Select Panel is mounted on the right hand main instrument panel
 
where formerly the Ferranti INAS Control Panel was mounted.
 
The pilot's control stick is modified to remove the safety cover from the
 
bomb button. This switch is wired for system disengage so that the safety pilot
 
can quickly disengage the fly-by-wire system. The throttle grip on the left hand
 
console is also revised to include a system disengage switch.
 
The ballistic panel is removed from the pedestal panel between the forward
 
pilot's legs and a DHE frequency selector installed. On the right hand console
 
the ARC-114 radio is replaced with the INS control panel.
 
Rate gyros (405 RGU/l and 307 RGU/l), lockon/reject (9900-06), and camera
 
controls (B314828) are removed.
 
The standby sight on the left hand side of the Head-Up Display is removed
 
to save weight.
 
(c) Aft Cockpit - The weapon monitor panel on the left side of the main
 
instrument panel-is replaced with a fly-by-wire control panel which shows the
 
system status with function selection and failure indications repeated in'the
 
front cockpit. The panel includes variable stability controls, computer dis­
plays, and master engage switch.
 
A microwave landing system control panel is added to the center pedestal
 
where the aft cockpit pilot will control the selection of glideslope, sensi­
tivity, and other variables.
 
The following changes will be made to implement the feel systems:
 
o 	Lateral Feel System - The C292279 aileron-lever is revised so that
 
the B267697 rotatable control rod can be disconnected from the lateral
 
control system. A new bellcrank, a new RVDT, a new torque motor, and
 
a new force link are added.
 
o 	Longitudinal Feel System - The B290034 tailplane control rod is removed.
 
A new force link, RVDT, and torque motor are added.
 
o 	Directional Feel System - The B290103 rudder control rod and C287292
 
lever assembly are removed. A new force link, RVDT, and torque motor
 
are added.
 
The VHF Voice Radio (ARC-114) will be removed and the gyro for the attitude
 
heading reference set (under floor) will be removed.
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(d) Wing - A new lateral parallel servo is added to the front spar of
 
the wing and the B276941 aileron control lever assembly is revised to accept
 
the motion output of the lateral servo. A new spring cartridge is added.
 
(e) Aft Equipment Bay - The aft equipment bay shelf, P/N 317739, between
 
Frame 33 and Frame 36 is replaced with the new equipment shelf using the same
 
structural pickup points. The following equipment is removed:
 
o, 	IFF Test Set (TS-1843/APX)
 
o 	 IFF Test Set Mount (MT-3513A/APX-72) 
o 	 Secure IFF provisions 
o 	 Vertical speed transducer 
o 	 SEAM (ASA-83) 
o 	 Waveform Generator (202SUE/3) 
o 	 Attitude heading reference set components 
The following equipment is added:
 
o 	 Digital Computer (IBM AP-101) 
o 	 Rate gyros (3) 
o 	 Lateral accelerometer 
o 	 Vertical accelerometer 
o 	 Digital adapter 
o 	 Litton LTN-51 Inertial Navigation Unit 
(f) Aft Fuselage -- The new longitudinal servo actuator is installed in
 
the aft fuselage. The B136980 tailplane compensator is revised to accept the
 
output of the longitudinal servo actuator. A new spring cartridge is installed
 
between the longitudinal servo and the B136980 tailplane compensator. A new
 
directional servo actuator is fitted on Frame 41. A new bellcrank, new spring
 
cartridge, and new push rod are added. The 168864 rudder compensator is
 
revised to accept the directional servo actuator input. Install six (6) power
 
amplifiers (1 for each feel motor and 1 for each parallel servo motor) on
 
Frame 42.
 
(g) Top Center Fuselage --The VHF antenna and coupler are removed.
 
(h) Hydraulics - The simplex system requires no hydraulic system modi­
fications.
 
(i) Electrical - The wiring for the basic avionics changes, the electro­
mechanical parallel actuators, and the feel systems actuators are as follows:
 
o 	 31 wires from the nose to the forward cockpit. 
o 	 12 wires from the nose to the equipment bay shelf. 
o 	119 wires from the forward cockpit to the equipment bay shelf.
 
o 	115 wires from the aft cockpit to the equipment bay shelf.
 
o 	 12 wires from the wing to the equipment bay shelf. 
o 	24 wires from the engine compartment to the equipment bay shelf.
 
o 	1 coax from the equipment bay shelf to an added antenna located
 
on the bottom of the aircraft just forward of the ventral fin.
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o 	Approximately 200 wires are added or reterminated within
 
the equipment bay/aft fuselage area.
 
o 	 Existing wiring not used will be left in the aircraft 
but capped off. The removal of equipment will delete 
10 fuses in the distribution panel. The addition of 
equipment will add back 9 fuses. 
BL2.1.2 EQUIPMENT REQUIREMENTS - The following tasks are involved in obtain­
ing the digital flight control and avionics equipment associated with the con­
trol systems modification:
 
(a) Flight Control Components - Flight control system components which 
are to be purchased or manufactured by MCAIR are listed in Figure B-1. This
 
list does not include purchased avionics which are discussed later. Develop­
ment effort will be minimized by selecting components which can be qualified
 
by similarity whenever possible with only acceptance tests required of the
 
supplier. Supplier tests are expected to be analog. Where qualified compon­
ents cannot be obtained, a reduced qualification test program will'be utilized
 
which is informally agreed on by the supplier and MCAIR. A brief description
 
of 	the components follows:
 
o 	Feel System Servoactuators - To provide artificial feel forces
 
at the stick and rudder pedals in the aft cockpit. Single
 
channel electromechanical servoactuators are planned. Servo­
actuator ratings differ for each axis.
 
o 	RVDTs and Strain Gages - Position and force transducers which
 
will be attached to aft cockpit stick and rudder pedals to
 
provide command signals to the flight control and feel system
 
servoactuators.
 
o 	Force Switch Strain Gages - Transducers attached to the forward
 
cockpit stick and rudder pedals to disengage the fly-by-wire
 
controls when the forward cockpit pilot generates a sufficient
 
override force.
 
o 	Series Servoactuator and Solenoid - Limited authority center­
locked electromechanical servoactuator and solenoid to provide
 
series control of the pitch forward reaction control valve
 
presently installed in YAV-8B aircraft.
 
o 	Emergency Spring Cartridge - Required to protect against a
 
jammed motor.
 
o 	Parallel Servoactuators - The flight control servoactuators
 
used to drive the mechanical controls in yaw, pitch, and
 
roll will be electromechanical. Supplier tests are expected
 
to be analog. Ratings for the servoactuators differ for
 
each axis.
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FIGURE B-1 
SIMPLEX PARALLEL FLIGHT CONTROL EQUIPMENT 
NAME 
.Feel System Servoactuator-Yaw 
STATUS 
New 
TYPE 
E/M 
E/M 
MANUFACTURER 
MPC Products 
Plessey Dynamics 
PART NUMBER 
proposal 
#15974 
DDRWA-2 
CHANNELS 
PER 
UNIT 
1 
NUMBER OF UNITS 
A/C SPARE WEIGHT 
1 1 5.6 
Feel System Servoactuator-Pitch 
Feel System Servoactuator-Roll 
New 
New 
E/M 
E/M 
E/M 
E/M 
MPC Products 
Plessey Dynamics 
MPC Products 
Plessey Dynamics 
#15973 
DDRWA-1 
015972 
DDRWA-3 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
6.8 
2.7 
System RVDT's New TBD 1 3 2 .5 
System Strain Gages Existing MDC TBD 1 3 2 
Force Switch Strain Gages Existing MDC TBD 1 3 2 
Series Servoactuator Existing E/M MPC Products 11650-3-L59 1 1 1 2.8 
Series Servoactuator Solenoid Existing LEDEK 184-945-001 1 1 1 
Emergency Spring Cartridge New MDC 1 3 4.5 
Parallel Servoactuator-Yaw New E/N 
E/M 
MPC Products 
Plessey Dynamics 
#15977 1 1 1 6.9 
Parallel Servoactuator-Pitch New E/M 
E/M 
MPC Products 
Plessey Dynamics 
#15979-1 11 5.4 
* Parallel Servoactuator-Roll New E/M 
E/M 
MPC Products 
Plessey Dynamics 
#15978-1 1 1 2.6 
(b) Avionics - Avionic system components are the following:
 
o 	Digital Flight Control System (CFE)
 
- Computer (IBM AP-101)
 
- Rate Gyros
 
- Lateral Accelerometer
 
- Vertical Accelerometer
 
- Digital Adapter
 
o 	Inertial Navigation System (GFE)
 
- Litton LTN-51 Inertial Navigation Unit
 
- INS Control Display Unit
 
- INS Mode Select Unit
 
o 	Compass System (GFE)
 
The MCAIR and supplier tasks required to acquire, integrate and install the
 
avionics are:
 
o 	Digital Flight Control System and Digital Adapters (CFE) - MCAIR
 
will prepare the specifications and do the procurement. Two units
 
are to be procured (1 installed, 1 spare). Acceptance tests will
 
be done (included in ground tests), likewise a brief integration
 
test. MCAIR is also responsible for installation design and actual
 
installation, as checkout tests will be performed for reference.
 
o 	Inertial Navigation and Compass System (GFE) - MCAIR will perform
 
acceptance tests, likewise integration testing. These tasks are
 
included in the ground tests. Two units are to be obtained (1
 
installed, I spare).
 
(c) Failure Mode and Effects Analysis - The failure mode and effects
 
analysis (FMEA) will comprise three tasks:
 
o 	Determine Built-in-Test (BIT) percentage necessary and define
 
means to achieve these levels.
 
o 	Determine Inflight-Integrity Monitoring required and perform
 
detailed design to achieve the necessary coverage.
 
o 	Determine failure modes and their probability of occurrence.'
 
Using these failure modes and those of the components, conduct
 
and FMEA of:
 
- Lateral Flight Control System
 
- Longitudinal Flight Control System
 
- Directional Flight Control System
 
o 	Provide results of above efforts to simulator personnel for use
 
in simulating failures.
 
(d) Logistic Support - The publications, spares and GSE required to support
 
the aircraft over a 10 year period will be determined.
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B-2.2 DATA ACQUISITION SYSTEM - The data acquisition system for the aircraft will
 
be built around a Teledyne Remote Multiplexer/Demultiplexer Unit (RMDU) Model AIFTDS­
4000 and a Bell and Howell Airborne Tape Recorder, model MARS 141:4 LT30. Both of
 
these units, along with a suitable telemetry system and a time code generator, will
 
be provided to MCAIR as GFE equipment by NASA Ames. The tasks described herein
 
comprise the definition of the design, fabrication, installation, checkout and docu­
mentation of a data acquisition system incorporating-the GFE components.
 
B-2.2.1 DESIGN - The data acquisition system will be developed to support the
 
NASA flight development program. In order to ensure that all NASA requirements
 
have been satisfied, a series of coordination interface meetings will be held at
 
Ames with NASA project and instrumentation personnel to firm up measurand require­
ments and obtain familiarization with the Teledyne data acquisition system. A
 
preliminary list of 90 measurands has been defined and coordinated with project
 
and NASA personnel.
 
Procurement specifications will be generated to the extent that Instrumentation
 
Equipment Drawings (TED) will be prepared for each deliverable piece of CFE that is
 
to be delivered to MCAIR. Bid request and vendor coordination will be initiated.
 
Vendor proposals will be evaluated. Delivery dates and quantities will be negotiated.
 
Purchase orders will be prepared, vendors selected, and long lead purchases initiated.
 
Unique signal conditioning components necessary to interface vendor supplied items
 
with the Teledyne RMDU will be identified and designed during this phase of activity.
 
These signal conditioners will be new units requiring electrical design and packag­
ing support.
 
Instrumentation installation drawings to support the data acquisition require­
ments will be developed and coordinated with the cognizant Project Design Groups
 
prior to being released to manufacturing. Installation drawings consist of mech­
anical and electrical interface definitions. New electrical specification drawings
 
will be required for all 90 measurands. New mechanical drawings will be required for
 
approximately 75 of the measurands. Engineering Orders (EOs) and Design Change
 
Notices (DONs) will be required for approximately 15 measurands.
 
An external instrumentation pod will be required to carry the GFE equipment.
 
The design of the pod will be initiated using available conventional pod silhouettes.
 
If available silhouettes are not satisfactory, a new configuration will be designed
 
and detail drawings developed for delivery to NASA for manufacture. These design
 
drawings will consist of new mechanical and electrical specifications. Internal
 
shelf installation and equipment layouts will be designated. Electrical interfaces
 
will be designed and appropriate interface connectors will be specified. It is
 
anticipated that suitable qualification tests will be required of a new pod prior
 
to release for carry on a Harrier aircraft. The centerline instrumentation pod will
 
require provisions for cooling air during specific flight conditions. A new mech­
anical interface will be required utilizing bleed air from the Environmental Control
 
System. An electrical-pneumatic control system will be designed to provide this
 
capability. A flight test noseboom will be designed using data developed by MCAIR
 
to support other Harrier related programs.
 
B-2.2.2 FABRICATION - All components necessary to support the data acquisition
 
system will be fabricated using current MCAIR technology which has been proven on
 
earlier programs. Fabrication of new electrical signal conditioning components
 
will include development of engineering models for verification ad proof fit. The
 
instrumentation centerline pod will be fabricated by NASA Ames and will be delivered
 
to MCAIR as GFE.
 
180
 
I 
B-2.2.3 INSTALLATION - MCAIR will install all applicable instrumentation and
 
interface wiring with the GFE system components. All system wiring will be
 
checked out as an operating system.
 
B-2.2.4 CHECKOUT - The checkout of the data acquisition system will consist
 
of acceptance tests of contractor and government furnished components, com­
plete verification of system wiring and end to end confidence checks includ­
ing simulated sensor inputs through suitable readout equipment. Verification
 
of the total system will include end to end operation from the sensor to the
 
tape recorder playback. All ground support equipment required to interrogate
 
and decomutate the PMDU digital data will be provided as GFE from NASA Ames.
 
Ground simulation testing will provide initial total system checkout. The
 
aircraft evaluation measurands will be verified during the flight airworthi­
ness testing conducted in St. Louis.
 
B-2.2.5 DOCUMENTATION - MCAIR will furnish two sets of system block diagrams,
 
wire lists,mechanical installation drawings and test and operating procedures
 
-for the PCM system.
 
B-2.3 PROGRAMMABLE HEAD-UP DISPLAY (HUD) - The aircraft modifications, equip­
ment modifications, and .procurement required to incorporate the HUD are
 
described below.
 
B-2.3.1 AIRCRAFT MODIFICATIONS - The HUD Display Waveform Generator (DWG)
 
and Interface/Weapon Aiming Computer (I/WAG) are deleted and a Programmable
 
Display Processor (PDP) installed. The wiring between the DWG and I/WAC is
 
deleted and approximately 10 new wires are added between the PDP and various
 
aircraft sensors. Digital interface wiring (2 shielded pairs) is added from
 
the aircraft digital computer to the PDP and the existing I/WAG wiring is
 
'reterminated as required to be compatible with the PDP.
 
B-2.3.2 EQUIPMENT - The equipment to be procured comprises two PDPs
 
(1 installed and 1 spare) one programming adapter, a PDP test set and twelve
 
spare PROM elements. Because of their similarity with YAV-SB equipment, these
 
items will be procured sole source from Smiths Industries, Incorporated because
 
of their similarity with YAV-8B equipment. The PD? will be built and
 
tested to MCAIR specification.
 
B-2.3.3 PROCUREMENT - The MCAIR procurement activity will include design
 
specification generation, definition of the support requirements and data
 
requirements list, and necessary RFP and PO activity.
 
B-2.3.4 SUPPORT - The PDP supplier will provide engineering support for the
 
duration of the MCAIR modification effort. This support shall include:
 
o Spare PDP piece parts
 
o Maintenance
 
o Programming assistance
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B-2.3.5 TESTS - See Paragraph B-2.7.
 
B-2.3.6 SYMBOLOGY - The initial symbology programmed into the PDP will be
 
based on YAV-8B symbology.
 
B-2.4 LANDING GUIDANCE SYSTEM - The following tasks described below will be
 
performed. The equipment listed will be required.
 
B-2.4.1 AIRCRAFT MODIFICATIONS - The aircraft modifications consist of adding
 
the angle receiver in the nose, a C-band antenna to the lower fuselage in the
 
nose area, a DME indicator and MLS control in the cockpit, the DME interroga­
tor to the equipment bay, and an L-band antenna to the lower aft fuselage.
 
This stand alone system has no interface with the flight control system. It
 
does interface via the digital adapter unit to the computer for the flight
 
director computation and display on the ADI and head up display.
 
B-2.4.2 EQUIPMENT - The following WRAs (GFE) are required:
 
o 	MLS angle receiver
 
o 	Receiver mount
 
o 	MLS Control Panel
 
o 	C-Band antenna
 
o 	DME Interrogator
 
o 	DME Indicator
 
o 	L-Band antenna
 
B-2.4.3 DEVELOPMENT AND TEST REQUIREMENTS - There is no development require­
ment. Acceptance tests of WRAs prior to installation using delivered GSE and
 
operational tests of installed equipment are described in Paragraph B-2.7.
 
B-2.5 COMPUTER SOFTWARE - Development of the computer software is dependent
 
on NASA's furnishing MCAIR with the latest version of the HAL/S compiler.
 
Required from the computer vendor will be the support software needed in pro­
gram development such as the linkage editor, functional simulator, and
 
utilities as well as preflight and inflight computer self-test program modules.
 
The Flight Control System software will be developed during the System
 
Design Phase. The System Design Phase will be devoted to problem analysis,
 
planning and establishing standards for subsequent software activities.
 
Tasks to be accomplished during this phase are:
 
o 	Generate Integration Block Diagrams (IBDs).
 
o 	Extract major computation tasks from IBD's.
 
o 	Establish timing and program operation.
 
o 	Determine modes and mode switching requirements.
 
o 	Define logic for selection of secondary modes.
 
o 	Establish variables, iteration rates range scaling,
 
format and engineering units for computer interface signals.
 
o 	Organize software standards.
 
o 	Generate test specifications and software design
 
verification.
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B-2.5.1 DEVELOPMENT OF PROGRAM MODULES - After the system design has been
 
completed and the software requirements defined, the actual programming phases
 
of the software development will begin. Top-level flow diagrams will be gen­
erated from the IBD's, the equations will be formulated then put into a form
 
suitable for a digital computer. Detailed math flows will be converted. The
 
flight program will be organized into functional modules and will be programmed
 
in the HAL/S language. The program will be compiled and the program modules
 
debugged.
 
The individual software module will be tested in an isolated environment
 
before being combined with other modules. The objective is to determine that
 
the module does its job as a black box, i.e., provides the proper outputs for
 
a given set of inputs. The program module will be tested on an IBM 360/370
 
with a test driver which is a special test routine that provides the proper
 
test environment by simulating inputs and outputs to the module.
 
The individual modules will then be tested on a host computer (IBM 3601
 
370) using a functional simulator. This simulator is a computer program that
 
provides a bit-by-bit simulation of the airborne computer instruction set
 
while executing on the host computer. The functional simulator will be used
 
in conjunction with a User's Control Program, a Pathfinder program and Dyna­
mic Statistics Program, all of which are available from the F-15 program.
 
These programs will be modified for use on the NASA V/STOL research aircraft.
 
The software modules will then be modified based on the results of the instruc­
tion level simulator tests and MCAIR manned flight simulation.
 
B-2.5.2 MODULE - MODULE INTEGRATION - As groups of modules are completed and
 
tested, they will be integrated. The module integration will be completed
 
when the individual module source decks or tapes have been combined by the
 
linkage editor into a single object deck or tape. This tape will include the
 
inflight diagnostic support software which is furnished by the computer vendor.
 
The integrated modules will then be tested much as individual modules
 
were tested, i.e., by using test drivers, and performing tests with the fun­
ctional simulator and associated programs. The integration and testing will
 
be continued at ever-higher program levels until the complete operational
 
program is debugged and verified. An OFP tape will then be prepared in
 
object computer (IBM-AP01) language for insertion into the AP-101 computer
 
for on line testing.
 
B-2.5.3 ON-LINE SOFTWARE TEST - The flight computer program which was vali­
dated off-line will next be tested on-line in a Software Test Facility. The
 
Software Test Facility will contain:
 
o 	A flight computer loaded with the flight program.
 
o 	An auxiliary computer loaded with the software test
 
facility operating system program.
 
o 	Tapes containing software utility routines and an
 
assembler for the auxiliary computer.
 
o 	Peripheral equipment which interfaces with the
 
auxiliary computer.
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B-2.5.4 HARDWARE/SOFTWARE BENCH INTEGRATION - The integrated bench test is
 
described in Paragraph B-2.7.
 
B-2.5.5 SUPPORT SOFTWARE MODIFICATION - The support software which is used
 
in flight program generation and verification and which must be modified is
 
shown in Figure B-2.
 
B-2.6 SIMULATION - The simulation program will be conducted on the NASA Ames
 
Flight Simulator for Advanced Aircraft (FSAA). It will evaluate control
 
system modifications, associated flight safety aspects, and failure effects.
 
This three phase simulation program will be conducted by NASA Ames with MCAIR
 
technical assistance.
 
B-2.6.1 PHASE I - MCAIR will provide the software simulation model of the
 
two place Harrier aircraft, including aerodynamics, propulsion, flight con­
trol and landing gear characteristics. MCAIR will provide software for the
 
HUD and the Landing Guidance System and will flight test the aircraft model
 
in MCAIR simulation facilities. NASA pilots will familiarize themselves with
 
the handling qualities and flight characteristics of the aircraft on the MCAIR
 
simulator. (A three-day flight simulation familiarization program for two
 
Harrier-qualified NASA pilots is suggested.) Familiarization will include
 
VTOs, hover, transition, STOs, SLs and high speed maneuvers. Ground effects,
 
wind and turbulence will be simulated. Flights will be conducted with and
 
without stability augmentation. The MCAIR model will be programmed on the
 
CDC Cyber 175 computer. This phase will be of approximately 9 weeks' dura­
tion.
 
B-2.6.2 PHASE II - MCAIR will provide the basic simulation to NASA Ames in
 
sufficient detail to permit conversion to the Honeywell Information Systems
 
(HIS) Sigma 8 digital computer. Sufficient check cases will be furnished to
 
permit verification of the model following conversion. MCAIR will provide
 
technical assistance to NASA Ames for:
 
o Two place Harrier model conversion.
 
o Control system failure mode conversion. 
o Software/hardware checkout.
 
o Determination of data requirements, formats and units.
 
NASA Ames will provide the FSAA simulation facility with two cockpits, one to
 
simulate the Two Place Harrier front cockpit with standard Harrier flight con­
trols and the other, the rear cockpit with the experimental flight controls.
 
All hardware for the front cockpit such as the Harrier stick grip and throttle/
 
nozzle control quadrant and the HUD will be provided by NASA Ames. Develop­
mental hardware such as a thrust and nozzle servo control and sidestick con­
troller, and HUD for the simulated rear cockpit will likewise be provided by
 
NASA Ames. Conversion of the software package to the Sigma 8 digital com­
puter will be the basic responsibility of NASA Ames, with MCAIR technical
 
assistance. Check cases provided by MCAIR will be used to verify the soft­
ware conversion including the control system failure effects. Use of a spare
 
flight control research computer for onboard computations within the simula­
tion is suggested. This phase will be about 6 weeks in duration.
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STF Operating System 

User Control Program (UCP)

HInterface 
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Dynamic Statistics 
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Electrical Interface 
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FIGURE B-2 
SUPPORT SOFTWARE MODIFICATION
 
Function Program Size 

Provides real-time 8000 words 

inputs to Airborne Computer (24 BIT)
 
from modeled aircraft peripheral
 
systems previously recorded on
 
mag tapes in time history format.
 
Debugging facility for airborne
 
computer program.
 
Airborne Computer Functional Simulator 56K Bytes

with Environment Program.
 
Preprocessor to Compiler to source 16.5K Bytes 

cards to floating point coding to.
 
enable path analysis
 
Analysis of Trace Lines Output trom 29K Bytes 

UCP and Functional Simulator to give
 
dynamic statistics.
 
Bookkeeping program for maintenance 29K Bytes 

and sorting of OFP Data Base.
 
Checks Airborne Computer I/O 119K Bytes 
Interface with all peripherals. 
21 
Per Cent Rework
 
30
 
50
 
50
 
50
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B-2.6.3 PHASE III - MCAIR will provide a simulation test plan for NASA use.
 
The test plan will be balanced insofar as is possible for the effects of pilot
 
learning, pilot fatigue, time of day, day of test and candidate order of appear­
ance. This will permit a sufficient number of flight operating points to be
 
gathered to ensure that sufficient data of quality wilr be generated to permit
 
the determination of the statistical significance of results. NASA Ames will
 
furnish Harrier qualified pilots, operating personnel and technicians. NASA
 
Ames will generate and analyze the data. MCAIR will provide technical assist­
ance for the simulation, reduction and analysis of data, and report prepara­
tion.
 
Phase III may be conducted as a continuous 8 week simulation or two 4
 
week simulations with sufficient time to analyze data and modify the control
 
system.
 
B-2.7 GROUND TESTS - The ground tests which will be required include both
 
airframe tests and experiment tests.
 
B-2.7.l AIRFRAME - Ground vibration tests of the airframe will identify
 
the structural modes of significance to control system analysis:
 
o Fuselage first vertical bending mode.
 
o' Fuselage first lateral bending mode.
 
o Wing first bending mode.
 
o Vertical tail bending mode. 
o Stabilator bending mode.
 
o Rudder rotation mode.
 
o Stabilator rotation mode.
 
In conjunction with the ground vibration tests, tests will be performed
 
to determine free play and rigidity and frequency response of the aileron,
 
stabilator, and rudder. The weight and center of gravity of the aircraft
 
will also be determined.
 
B-2.7.2 EQUIPMENT - The tasks required to perform the equipment tests include
 
equipment acceptance tests, software development, integrated bench test, air­
craft installation and checkout, and EMI tests (EMI survey only). The equip­
ment tests will require MCAIR to design, develop, and fabricate three major
 
test equipment items: a digital adapter test bench, a control system test
 
bench and a flight line analyzer. These test benches will be delivered to
 
NASA with the modified aircraft.
 
(a) Equipment Acceptance Tests - Except for the Digital Adapter (DA),
 
all equipment acceptance tests will be performed using delivered GSE and test
 
sets. Thus, only the DA and its cockpit controls will require a test bench.
 
The equipment to be acceptance tested is that addressed above.
 
(b) Software Development - Software development is described in
 
Section B-2.5.
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(c) Integrated Bench Test - An integrated bench test will be performed
 
on the avionics system to validate the flight control system on the bench
 
prior to aircraft installation and flight. The integrated bench will have the
 
following capabilities:
 
o 	Interface capability with the MCAIR F-18 software test
 
facility for the duration that the bench is at MCAIR.
 
o 	The ability to interface with and perform integrated
 
bench test on the following flight hardware:
 
- Aircraft Digital Computer (AP-101)
 
- Digital Adapter and Control
 
- Control Surface Electromechanical Actuators
 
o 	The ability to simulate:
 
- Air Data Computer outputs 
- Inertial Navigation System outputs 
- Angle of attack 
- Rate gyros 
- Accelerometers 
- Control stick 
- Actuator dummy loads (if actuators not installed) 
o The ability to accept rate and acceleration inputs from
 
rate gyros/accelerometers mounted on an adjacent rate
 
table (the rate table is not deliverable as part of the
 
bench).
 
o 	The wiring and test points necessary to verify the microwave
 
landing system (MLS) and programmable display processor (PDP)
 
interface with the digital computer. The MLS and PDP equip­
ment will be exercised using delivered GSE and test equipment.
 
The integrated bench test will be performed by integrating the bench
 
with the MCAIR software test facility (STF). The STF will simulate the air­
borne system on the bench and simulate the equations of motion. It will also
 
provide (displays and data) output for assessing system operation. The soft­
ware required by the STF for the integrated bench test is shown in Figure B-2.
 
B-2.7.3 AIRCRAFT INSTALLATION AND CHECKOUT - A flight line analyzer (FLA)
 
will be designed and fabricated to permit rapid flight control system check­
out on the aircraft. It will provide open loop stimuli to the flight control
 
system to the extent necessary to assess the integrity of the system for
 
flight. System software checks performed by the FLA will be simplified tests
 
such as memory scan checks. This equipment will be delivered to NASA with
 
the aircraft.
 
B-2.7.4 EMI SURVEY - An EMI test shall be performed on the aircraft prior to
 
flight. This test shall be the minimum necessary to assure that no EMI
 
effects will compromise the performance of the flight control system.
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B-2.8 AIRWORTHINESS TESTS - The functional test flights of the aircraft will 
be conducted at the MCAIR, St. Louis facility. Five flights will be performed 
over a one month period to accomplish the checkout of the basic aircraft con­
trol system and the airborne data acquisition system. The digital fly-by-wire 
flight control system will not be turned on during the MCAIR flight tests. 
The instrumentation ground support equipment, to be supplied as GFE, will be
 
required at St. Louis during the flight test period and also during the pre­
ceding ground test of the fly-by-wire control system.
 
The functional checkout of the basic airplane will be accomplished in
 
accordance with NAVAIR Ol-AV8A-lF, NATOPS Functional Checkflight Checklist,
 
modified as required to accommodate the aircraft configuration. Additional
 
flights, over and above those normally required to complete the NATOPS check­
list, will be required to evaluate the frictional effects of the fly-by-wire
 
system servos attached to the basic flight control system. Maneuvers will
 
be performed throughout the conventional flight envelope and in the V/STOL
 
mode.
 
B-3 DUPLEX FLIGHT CONTROL SYSTEM
 
Task descriptions for implementing the duplex flight control system are
 
given in this section. The duplex series digital fly-by-wire flight control
 
system, data acquisition system, head up display, landing guidance system
 
(MLS), simulation system software, ground tests and airworthiness tests are
 
included.
 
B-3.1 CONTROL SYSTEMS MODIFICATIONS - The flight control system modifications
 
include aircraft modifications and equipment requirements.
 
B-3.1.1 AIRCRAFT MODIFICATIONS - The following aircraft modifications will
 
be required:
 
(a) Nose - Same as Paragraph B-2.1.1(a).
 
(b) Forward Cockpit - Same as Paragraph B-2.1.1(b).
 
(c) Aft Cockpit - Same as Paragraph B-2.1.1(c) except as follows:
 
o 	Longitudinal Feel System - Same as the longitudinal feel system
 
in Paragraph B-2.1.1(c) except the RVDT is dual and the stick is
 
still connected to the control column.
 
o 	Lateral Feel System - Same as the lateral feel system in Paragraph
 
B-2.1.1(c) except the RVDT is dual and the stick is still connected
 
to the control column.
 
o 	Directional Feel System - Same as the directional feel system in
 
Paragraph B-2.1.1(c) except the RVDT is dual and the pedals are
 
still connected to the control column.
 
(d) Wing­
o 	Revise the B276491 Aileron Control Lever to accept the output
 
of the dual series servo unit.
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o 	Add the dual series servo to the front spar.
 
(e) Equipment Bay - Same as Paragraph B-2.l.l(e).
 
(f) Aft Fuselage - Same as Paragraph B-2.1.1(f) except as follows:
 
o 	Longitudinal System
 
- Remove the B278853 Control Pod
 
- Add dual series servo actuator
 
- Add walking beam bellcrank
 
- Add two new control rods
 
o 	Directional System
 
- Add two F-15A rudder actuators
 
- Add new bellcrank
 
- Add new pushrod
 
- Power Amplifiers - Same as Paragraph B-2.1.1(f)
 
except only 3 three power amplifiers are required.
 
- Equipment Door - The second digital computer makes
 
it necessary to remove the present airplane door
 
266408 and build a new door similar to the AV-SC
 
flare and chaff door (75A338202).
 
(g) Top Center Fuselage - Same as Paragraph B-2.l.l(g).
 
(h) Hydraulics - Change engine gear box. Install Abex Pump 53227.
 
Revise plumbing from pump to engine/airframe interface. Add hydrulic lines
 
to connect hydraulic systems 1 and 2 to the pitch, roll, and yaw dual series
 
servo actuators.
 
(i) Electrical System - The wiring which will be required for the basic
 
avionics changes, the electrohydraulic series actuator, and the feel system
 
actuators is as follows:
 
o 	31 wires from the nose to the forward cockpit.
 
o 	18 wires from the nose to the equipment bay area.
 
o 	151 wires from the forward cockpit to the equipment bay area.
 
o 	166 wires from the aft cockpit to the equipment bay area.
 
o 	16 wires from the wing to the equipment bay area.
 
o 	32 wires from the engine compartment to the equipment bay area.
 
o 	1 coax from the equipment bay shelf to an added antenna located
 
on the bottom of the aircraft just forward of the ventral fin.
 
o 	Approximately 270 wires will be added or reterminated within
 
the equipment bay/aft fuselage area.
 
o 	Wiring not used will remain in the aircraft and be capped off.
 
The removal of equipment will delete 10 fuses from the distribution panel.
 
The .addition of equipment will add back 13 fuses.
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B-3.1.2 EQUIPMENT REQUIREMENTS - The following tasks are required to acquire
 
the digital flight control and electronic equipment for implementing the
 
duplex flight control system:
 
(a) Flight Controls - Flight control system components which are to be 
purchased or manufactured by MCAIR are listed in Figure B-3. This list does 
not include purchased avionics which are discussed later. Development effort 
will be minimized by selecting components which can be qualified by similarity 
whenever possible, only acceptance tests being required of the supplier. 
Supplier tests are expected to be analog. Where qualified components cannot 
be obtained, a reduced qualification test program will be utilized which is
 
Thformally agreed 6n by the supplier and MCAIR. A brief description of the
 
components follows:
 
o 	Feel System Servoactuators - Same as Paragraph B-2.1.2(a).
 
o 	RVDTs and Strain Gages - Position and force transducers
 
attached to the aft cockpit stick and rudder pedals will
 
be dual channel.
 
o 	Force Switch Strain Gages - Same as Paragraph B-2.1.2(a).
 
o 	 Series Servoactuator and Solenoid - The forward reaction control
 
valve servoactuator and solenoid will be the same as for the
 
simplex parallel configuration discussed in Paragraph B-2.1.2(a)
 
except that it will be dual and will have full authority.
 
o 	Modified Pumps and Gear Box - It is anticipated that two
 
modified pumps will be required, one for each system,
 
plus a modified engine gearbox.
 
" 	Yaw Dual Series Servoactuator - The yaw axis dual series
 
servoactuator is expected to consist of two F-15 rudder
 
actuators. Control from the forward cockpit will be
 
fully powered through the actuator.
 
o 	Pitch and Roll Dual Series Servoactuators - It is planned
 
that the dual series servoactuators for pitch and roll
 
will each use two F-4lateral series servos tied together
 
and modified for high response. Supplier tests are
 
expected to be analog.
 
o 	 Yaw Axis Trim Motor - A yaw axis trim motor will be required 
for the dual series configuration. Use of the F-15 rudder 
trim is planned. 
(b) Avionics - The avionic equipment requirements for the dual fly-by­
wire system are the same described in Paragraph B-2.1.2(b) except that addi­
tional avionics will be required:
 
o 	 One airborne computer 
o 	One digital adapter
 
o 	One rate gyro assembly (pitch, roll, yaw)
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FIGURE B-3 
DUAL SERIES FLIGHT CONTROL EQUIPMENT 
NAME STATUS TYPE MANUFACTURER PART NUMBER 
CHANNELS 
PER 
UNIT 
NUMBER OF UNITS 
NUMB 
A/C SPARE WEIGHT 
Feel System Servoactuator-Yaw New E/M 
E/M 
MPC Products 
Plessey Dynamics 
proposal 
#15974 
TED 
1 1 1 5.6 
Feel System Servoactuator-Pitch New E/M 
E/M 
MPC Products 
Plessey Dynamics 
#15974 
TED 
1 1 1 6.8 
Feel System Servoactuator-Roll New E/M Plessey Dynamics TED 
*0 
System RVDTs Existing TED 2 3 2 1.0 
System Strain Gages Existing MDC TBD 2 3 2 
Force Switch Strain Gages Existing MDC TED 1 3 2 
YAV-8B,Series Servoactuator Existing E/M MPC Products 1165-3-L59 2 1 1 2.8 
YAV-8B Series Servoactuator Solenoid Existing LEDEX 184945-001 1 1 1 
Hydraulic Pump-Modified, PC-I 
Engine Gear Box-Modified 
DualSeries Servoacttiator-Yaw 
Dual Series Servoactuator-Pitch 
Existing 
Existing 
TED 
E/H 
E/H 
(F-15 Rudder Actuator) 
Ronson 3U3151-8 
(F-4 Lateral Series Servo) 
MOOG PS 32-69054 
1 
1 
2 
1 
0 
1 
1 
1 
2 
1 
1 
24.0 
12.4 
Dual Series Servoactuator-Roll 
Trim Motor-Yaw 
Existing 
Existing 
E/H 
E/M 
M00G 
MPC 
Plessey DYN 
PS 32-69054 
Similar to 
11650-3-L59 
R15023MI-3 
(F-15 Rudder Trim) 
1 
1 
2 
1 
1 
1 
12.4 
6.5 
(a) Two units will be combined to form a dual unit
 
(c) Failure Mode and Effects Analysis - Same as Paragraph 2.1.2(c).
 
(d) Logistic Support - Same as Paragraph 2.1.2(d).
 
B-3.2 DATA ACQUISITION SYSTEM - Same as Paragraph B-2.2.
 
B-3.3 PROGRAMMABLE HEAD-UP DISPLAY - Same as Paragraph B-2.3.
 
B-3.4 LANDING GUIDANCE SYSTEMS - Same as Paragraph B-2.4.
 
B-3.5 COMPUTER SOFTWARE - The tasks required to generate the software for the
 
dual configuration are identical to those for the simplex system, Paragraph
 
B-2.5, except that the inflight integrity management module will be replaced
 
with the redundancy management module. Also, there is a slight increase in
 
BIT programming. The memory requirements of the Operating Flight Program
 
are given in Figure B-4.
 
The support software generation task will be the same as that for the
 
simplex configuration.
 
B-3.6 SIMULATION - Same as Paragraph B-2.6.
 
B-3.7 GROUND TESTS - The ground tests which will be required include both
 
airframe and equipment tests.
 
B-3.7.1 AIRFRAME - Same as Paragraph B-2.7.1.
 
B-3.7.2 EQUIPMENT - This section defines only those items affected by duplex
 
flight control implementation. Items not addressed in this section are
 
unchanged from the simplex implementation addressed in Paragraph B-2.7.2
 
herein.
 
(a) Equipment Acceptance Tests - This item is the same as the equiva­
lent item in Paragraph B-2.7.2 except that the equipment to be tested is
 
that addressed in Paragraph B-3.1.2.
 
(b) Integrated Bench Test - The changes to this item from Paragraph
 
B-2.7.2 for duplex implementation include making provisions for the following
 
items:
 
o Dual digital adapters 
o Dual AP-1O1 digital computers 
o Dual rate gyros 
o Dual electrohydraulic actuators
 
The test bench will be configured to perform integrated bench test on this
 
duplex system in a manner similar to that described for the simplex system.
 
Provision will be made to have a hydraulic power source adjacent to the
 
integrated bench. This power source will not be a deliverable item.
 
B-3.8 AIRWORTHINESS TESTS - Same as Paragraph B-2.7.
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FIGURE B-4 
OPERATIONAL FLIGHT PROGRAM MEMORY REQUIREMENTS 
- DUAL SYSTEM (HAIl/S PROORAMMTNG) 
MEMORY WORDS - 16 BITS 
MODULE COMPUTER 1 COMPUTER 2 
-
.o 
Control Laws 
Redundancy Mgt. 
Executive 
BIT 
I/0 
7200 
6100 
4300 
1800 
500 
7200 
6100 
4300 
1800 
500 
19900 19900 
MLS/Fit. Director 2400 -
TOTAL 22300 19900 
B-4 TRIPLEX FLIGHT CONTROL SYSTEM
 
Task descriptions for implementing the triplex flight control systems
 
are given in this section. The triplex parallel digital fly-by-wire flight
 
control system, data acquisition system, head up display, landing guidance
 
system (NLS), system software, simulation, ground tests, and airworthiness
 
tests are presented.
 
B-4.1 CONTROL SYSTEM MODIFICATIONS - The flight control system modifications
 
include aircraft modifications and equipment requirements.
 
B-4.1.1 AIRCRAFT MODIFICATIONS - The following aircraft modifications will be
 
required:
 
(a) Nose - Same as Paragraph B-2.1.1(a).
 
(b) Forward Cockpit - Same as Paragraph B-2.1.1(b).
 
(c) Aft Cockpit - Same as Paragraph B-2.1.1(c) except as follows:
 
o 	Lateral Feel System - Same as Paragraph B-2.1.1(c)
 
except that the RVDTs and force link are triplex.
 
o 	Longitudinal Feel System - Same as Paragraph B-2.1.1(c)
 
except that the RVDTs and force link are triplex.
 
o 	Directional Feel System - Same as Paragraph B-2.1.1(c)
 
except that the RVDTs and force link are triplex.
 
(4) Wing - Same as Paragraph B-2.1.1(d) except that lateral servo is
 
triplex.
 
(e) Equipment Bay - Same as Paragraph B-2.1.1(e). 
(f) Aft Fuselage - Same as Paragraph B-2.1.1(f) except that the longi­
tudinal and lateral servos are triplex, there are 12 power amplifiers mounted 
on Frame 42, and the equipment door described in Paragraph B-2.1.1(f) is 
installed. 
(g) Top Center Fuselage - Same as Paragraph B-2.1.1(g).
 
(h) Hydraulics - No hydraulic system modifications are required.
 
(i) Electrical System - Changes involving the avionics, the triplex
 
electromechanical parallel actuators, and the feel system actuators are:
 
o 	31 wires from the nose to the forward cockpit.
 
o 	18 wires from the nose to the equipment bay area.
 
o 	6 wires from'the nose to the gun pod containing
 
the digital adapter.
 
o 	151 wires from the forward cockpit to the equipment bay area.
 
-o 	18 wires from the forward cockpit to the gun pod containing
 
the digital adapter.
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o 	166 wires from the aft cockpit to the equipment bay area.
 
o 	56 wires from the aft cockpit to the gun pod containing
 
the digital adapter.
 
o 	24 wires from the wing to the equipment bay area.
 
o 	12 wires from the wing to the gun pod containing the ditial
 
the digital adapter.
 
o 	48 wires from the engine compartment to the equipment bay area.
 
o 	24 wires from the engine compartment to the gun pod containing
 
the digital adapter unit.
 
o 	I coax from the equipment bay shelf to the added antenna
 
located on the bottom of the aircraft just forward of the
 
ventral fin.
 
o 	58 wires between the left and right gun pods.
 
Approximately 300 wires will be added or reterninated within the equipment
 
bay/aft fuselage area. Wiring not used will be capped and left in the air­
craft.
 
The removal of equipment will delete 10 fuses in the distribution panel.
 
The addition of equipment will add back 17 fuses.
 
(j) Gun Pod - The third computer requires the installation of a rede­
signed and rebuilt gun pod. To incorporate an equipment shelf within the
 
gun pod for the required unit, a new mid section to replace the gun mounting
 
cradle and a new mid fairing to replace the present cradle fairing will be
 
necessary. The front and aft gun pod fairings will be adapted to the new mid
 
section using similar attach points. The equipment mount will attach to the
 
airplane at the same points as the gun mounting cradle did and the equipment
 
will be installed inverted to simplify the mount structure.
 
B-4.1.2 EQUIPMENT - The tasks required to acquire the digital flight control
 
and electronic equipment for implementing the triplex flight control system
 
are described below.
 
(a) Flight Controls - Flight control system components which are to be
 
purchased or manufactured by MCAIR are listed in Figure B-5. This list does
 
not include purchased avionics which are discussed later. Development effort
 
will be minimized by selecting components which can be qualified by similarity
 
whenever possible, with only acceptance tests required of the supplier.
 
Supplier tests are expected to be analog. Where qualified components cannot
 
be obtained, a reduced qualification test program will be utilized which is
 
informally agreed on by the supplier and MCAIR. A brief description of the
 
components follows:
 
o Feel System Servoactuators - Same as Paragraph B-2.1.2(a).
 
o RVDTs and Strain Gages - Position and force transducers
 
attached to the aft cockpit stick and rudder pedals are
 
triplex.
 
o Force Switch Strain Gages - Same as Paragraph B-2.1.2(a).
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0 
NAME 
Feel System Servoactuator-Yaw 

Feel System Servoactuator-Pitch 

Feel System ServoactuatorrRoll 

System RVDTs 

System Strain Gages 

Force Switch Strain Gages 

YAV-8BSeries Servoactuator 

YAV-8B Series Servoactuator Solenoid 

Emergency Spring Cartridge 

Parallel Servoactuator-Yaw 

ol Parallel Servoactuator-Pitch 

8#15978
 
Parallel Servoactuator-Roll 

0 
FIGURE B-5
 
TRIPLEX PARALLEL FLIGHT CONTROL EQUIPMENT
 
STATUS TYPE MANUFACTURER PART NUMBER 
New E/M MPC Products Proposal 
#15974 
E/M Plessey Dynamics TBD 
New B/M MPC Produots #15974 
E/M Plessey Dynamics TBD 
New E/M MPC Products #15974 
E/M Plessey Dynamics TBD 
Existing TED 
Existing MDC TED 
Existing MDC TBD 
Existing E/M MPC Products 11650-3-L59 
Existing LEDEX 184 945-001 
New MDC 
New E/M MPC Products TED 
E/M Plessey Dynamics 
New E/M MPC Products Proposal No. 
E/M Plessey Dynamics
 
New E/M MPC Products Proposal No. 

015978 
E/M Plessey Dynamics
 
CHANNELS 
PER
 
UNIT 
1 
1 
1 

-3 

3 

1 

1 

1 
1. 

3 

3 
3 

NUMBER OF UNITS 
A/C SPARE WEIGHT 
1 - 1 5.6 
1 1 6.8 
1 1 2.7
 
3 2 1.5
 
3 2
 
3 2.
 
1 1 2.8
 
1 1 
3 4.5
 
1 1 10.0
 
1 1 10.0
 
1 1 10.0
 
o 	Series Servoactuator and Solenoid - The forward reaction
 
control valve servoactuator and solenoid will be the same
 
as for the simplex parallel configuration discussed in
 
Paragraph B-2.1.2(a).
 
o 	Emergency Spring Cartridges - Same as Paragraph 3-2.1.2(a).
 
o 	Pitch, Roll and Yaw Servoactuators - The pitch, roll and yaw
 
parallel electromechanical servoactuators are triplex.
 
(t) Avionics - The avionic equipment requirements for the triplex
 
fly-by-wire system are as described in Paragraph B-2.1.2(b) except that
 
additional avionics will be required:
 
o 	Two airborne computers.
 
o 	Two digital adapters.
 
o 	Two rate gyro assemblies (pitch, rate, and yaw).
 
(c) Failure Mode and Effects Analysis - Same as Paragraph 2.1.2(c).
 
(d) Logistics Support - Same as Paragraph 2.1.2(d).
 
B-4.2 DATA ACQUISITION SYSTEM - Same as Paragraph B-2.2.
 
B-4.3 PROGRAMMABLE HEAD-UP DISPLAY - Same as Paragraph B-2.3.
 
B-4.4 LANDING GUIDANCE SYSTEM - Same as Paragraph B-2.4.
 
B-4.5 SYSTEM SOFTWARE - The task complexity for providing software for the
 
triplex configuration is the same as described for the dual configuration
 
in Paragraph B-3.5. Support software requirements are the same as described
 
for the simplex configuration in Paragraph B-2.5. The memory requirements
 
of the Operating Flight Program are given in Figure B-6.
 
B-4.6 SIMULATION - Same as Paragraph B-2.6.
 
B-4.7 GROUND TESTS - The ground tests which will be required include both
 
airframe tests and equipment tests.
 
B-4.7.1 AIRFRAME - Same as Paragraph B-2.3.1. 
B-4.7.2 EQUIPMENT This paragraph defines only those items affected by the
 
triplex flight control system implementation. Items not addressed in this
 
paragraph are unchanged from the simplex implementation addressed in Para­
graph B-2.7.1 herein.
 
(a) Equipment Acceptance Tests - This item is the same as the equiva­
lent item in Paragraph B-2.7.2 except that the equipment to be tested is
 
that addressed in Paragraph B-4.1.2.
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MODULE 

CONTROL LAWS 

REDUNDANCY MGT. 

EXECUTIVE 

H. 
co BIT 

I/O 
MLS/FLT DIRECTOR 

FIGURE B-6 
OPERATIONAL FLIGHT PROGRAM MEMORY REQUIREMENTS 
-TRIPLEX SYSTEM (HAL/S PROGRAMMING) 
MEMORY WORDS 

COMPUTER I 
7200 

4100 

4300 

2500 

500 

18,600 

2400
 
21,000 

(16 bits) 
COMPUTER 2 COMPUTER 3 
7200 7200 
4100 4100 
4300 4300 
2500 2500 
500 500 
18,600 18,600 
18,600 18,600 
(b) Integrated Bench Test - The changes to this item for triplex imple­
mentation includes triple equipment as follows:
 
o Three channel digital adapters
 
o Three AP-101 digital computers
 
o Three rate gyros
 
o Three electromechanical actuators
 
The test bench will be configured to perform integrated bench test on this
 
triplex system in a manner similar to that described for the simplex system.
 
B-4.8 AIRWORTHINESS TESTS - Same as Paragraph B-2.7.
 
B-5 LOW SPEED AIR DATA SYSTEM
 
B-5.1 AIRCRAFT MODIFICATION - One sensor will be mounted on the upper surface
 
of the nose immediately forward of the forward canopy and the associated elec­
tronic unit will be mounted in the nose area. YAV-8B derived structural modifi­
cations for the containment of the sensor in the nose upper fuselage are directly
 
applicable to the two place Harrier. The other sensor will be mounted on the
 
left side of the nose in a position which is a mirror image of the location of
 
the production angle of attack probe. Structural modifications for mounting
 
this probe must be designed. Since both the YAV-8B and V/STOL research aircraft
 
will have a flight test nose boom, the modifications related to the installation
 
of the electronics units in the nose area of the YAV-8B will also be applicable
 
to the V/STOL research aircraft.
 
B-5.2 EQUIPMENT REQUIRED - The equipment required is Applied Devices low range
 
air data sensors and two electronics units. The sensor is three inches long,
 
1.25 inches in diameter and weighs 0.5 pound. The associated electronic unit
 
is 3.5 inches by 2.5 inches by 10 inches and weighs 1.2 pound. The output of
 
this system interfaces with the airborne computer. The system is CFE.
 
B-5.3 DEVELOPMENT AND TEST REQUIREMENTS - The sensor units and electronics will
 
have been developed for the YAV-8B. However, unlike the YAV-8B the units must
 
be interfaced to the flight control computer and head up display through the
 
digital adapter unit. Thus, two hardware identical channels will have to be
 
developed for the digital adapter unit. Precision calibration of the units will
 
be required in the-mini-model lab and tunnel. Analysis of local field effects
 
such as the nose boom and sideslip effect on the sensor mounted on the port side
 
of the aircraft must be determined.
 
B-5.4 SOFTWARE - Software for processing the raw sensor data must be developed.
 
B-5.5 SPARES - Two spare systems, consisting of one sensor and electronic unit
 
each, will be required.
 
B-5.6 GSE - Available standard test equipment (multimeter, oscilloscope) will
 
be used for checkout so no special GSE is required.
 
B-6 SIDE-AEH CONTROLLER
 
The tasks required to implement the side-arm controller are described below.
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B-6.1 AIRCRAFT MODIFICATIONS - The side-arm controller will be installed in
 
the aft cockpit in the right hand console area. The right hand console will
 
be reworked to prepare for the side-arm controller by removing the ARC-114
 
radio, the ARC-150 radio and the voice recorder. (The ARC-150 is replaced
 
by the D403 radio outside of the cockpit.) A cover plate is to be used until
 
a side-arm controller is required. Some adjustment will be required to deter­
mine the optimum angles for pilot comfort.
 
B-6.2 EQUIPMENT REQUIREMENTS - The controller selected is the two axis, base
 
pivot unit which was developed in the F-15 High Acceleration Cockpit (HAC)
 
program. It has built-in electrical outputs through three separate wire bundle
 
connectors. P/N 68-031012-101 is the F-15 HAC procurement specification pre­
pared for such a unit but none has been purchased or qualified.
 
B-6.3 DEVELOPMENT AND TESTS - Qualification tests will be performed by the
 
supplier.
 
B-6.4 SOFTWARE - The software for the sidestick should be essentially the same
 
as the software for the center stick.
 
B-7 SIMPLEX THROTTLE AND NOZZLE SYSTEMS
 
The tasks required to implement the simplex parallel throttle and nozzle
 
systems are described below.
 
B-7.1 AIRCRAFT MODIFICATIONS - The tasks required for the installation of the
 
throttle control system are:
 
o 	Remove link assembly.
 
o 	 Add force link. 
o 	 Add servo to end of fuel control shaft. 
The tasks required to revise the throttle control lever are:
 
o 	 Revise throttle lever to allow motion carry-through from forward 
cockpit. 
o 	 Add RVDT. 
o 	Add disengage'switch.
 
The tasks required for the installation of the nozzle control system are:
 
o 	Revise quadrant assembly to accept parallel servo.
 
o 	Add parallel servo actuator.
 
o 	Remove B292227 connecting rod.
 
o 	Add force link.
 
The tasks required to revise the nozzle control lever are:
 
o 	Revise nozzle lever to allow motion carry-through from forward
 
cockpit.
 
o 	Add RVDT.
 
o 	 Add link. 
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B-7.2 EQUIPMENT REQUIRED - The equipment required for the nozzle and throttle
 
systems is listed in Figure B-7.
 
B-7.3 DEVELOPMENT AND TESTS - The development and tests will be similar to those
 
described for the simplex flight control system in Sections B-2.1.2(a), B-2.7.2(a),
 
B-2.7.2(c), and B-2.7.3.
 
B-7.4 SOFTWARE - Position transducers on the throttle and nozzle levers will
 
provide throttle and nozzle lever position information to the onboard digital
 
computer. The computer will then calculate the command signals for the parallel
 
servos attached to the fuel control unit'and the air motor servo unit. Since
 
MCAIR will provide the same throttle and nozzle system characteristics as the
 
production Harrier software development will be minimal, essentially gains.
 
Software'for implementing more complex systems, such as independent altitude
 
and velocity control, will be developed and tested by NASA after MCAIR delivers
 
the aircraft.
 
B-8 DUPLEX THROTTLE AND NOZZLE SYSTEMS
 
The tasks required to implement the duplex series throttle and nozzle
 
systems are described below.
 
B-8.1 AIRCRAFT MODIFICATIONS - The tasks required to make the installation of
 
the dual throttle and control system are:
 
o Remove B301672 idler lever. 
o Add walking beam bellcrank. 
o Add dual series servo.
 
The tasks required to revise the throttle lever are:
 
o Revise throttle lever.
 
o Add RVDTs.
 
o Add link.
 
o Add disengage switch.
 
The tasks required for the installation of the dual nozzle system are:
 
o Remove A263618 control rod.
 
o Add series actuator.
 
o Add bellcrank.
 
o Add walking beam bellcrank.
 
The tasks required to revise the throttle lever are:
 
o Revise nozzle lever. 
o Add RVDTs. 
o Add link. 
B-S.2 EQUIPMENT REQUIRED - The equipment required to implement the dual series
 
throttle and nozzle systems is listed in Figure B-8.
 
B-8.3 DEVELOPMENT AND TESTS - The development and tests required will be
 
similar to the development and tests required for the duplex fly-by-wire flight
 
control system.
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FIGURE B-7 
SIMPLEX PARALLEL THROTTLE AND NOZZLE SYSTEMS EQUIPMENT 
CHANNELS NUMBER OF UNITS 
PER 
- NAME STATUS TYPE MANUFACTURER PART NUMBER UNIT A/C SPARE WEIGHT 
Parallel Throttle New E/M ?IPC Products Proposal I 1 1 2.8 
Servoactuator E/M Plessey Dynamics- #15975 
Parallel Nozzle New E/M MPC Products #15976 1 1 1 2.8 
Servoactuator 
Throttle RVDT Existing 1 1 1 .2 
Nozzle RVDT Existing 1 1 .2 
NAME 
Dual Series Throttle 
Servoactuator 
Dual Series Nozzle 
Servoactuator 
Existing 
Existing 
DUAL SERIES 
STATUS TYPE 
New E/H 
New E/H 
FIGURE B-S 
THROTTLE AND NOZZLE 
MANUFACTURER 
MOOG 
MOOG 
SYSTEMS EQUIPMENT 
PART NUMBER 
32-69054 
32-69054 
CHANNELS 
PER 
UNIT 
1 
la 
2 
2 
NUMBER OF UNITS 
A/C SPARE WEIGHT 
2 1 12.4 
2 1 12.4 
1 1 o.4 
1 1 0.4 
(a) t'wo units will be combined to form a dual unit 
CD 
ci 
B-8.4 SOFTWARE - Same as Section B-7.4.
 
B-9 TRIPLEX THROTTLE AND NOZZLE SYSTEMS
 
The tasks involved in mechanizing the triplex parallel throttle and nozzle
 
systems are described below.
 
B-9.1 AIRCRAFT MODIFICATIONS - The aircraft modifications are the same as
 
described in Paragraph B-7.1, except that triplex actuators and RVDTs are used.
 
B-9.2 EQUIPMENT REQUIRED - The equipment required for the triplex parallel
 
throttle and nozzle systems is given in Figure B-9.
 
B-9.3 DEVELOPMENT AND TESTS - The development and tests required will be similar
 
to the development and tests required for the triplex fly-by-wire flight control
 
systems.
 
B-9.4 SOFTWARE - Same as Section B-7.4
 
OpoOR qUAU l 
... 2PAG0 
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FIGURE B-9 
TRIPLEX PARALLEL THROTTLE AND NOZZLE SYSTEMS EQUIPMENT 
NAME STATUS TYPE MANUFACTURER PART NUMBER 
CHANNELS 
PER 
UNIT 
NUMBER OF UNITS 
A/C SPARE WEIGHT 
Parallel Throttle 
Servoactuator 
New E/M 
E/M 
MPC Products 
Plessey Dynamics 
Proposal 
#15975 
3 1 1 4.0 
Parallel Nozzle 
Servoactuator 
New E/M 
E/M 
MPC Products 
Plessey Dynamics 
Proposal 
#15976 
3 1 1 4.0 
Throttle RVDT Existing 3 1 1 0.6 
totn 
Nozzle RVDT Existing 3 1 1 0.6 
APPENDIX C
 
FAILURE MODE AND EFFECTS ANALYSIS
 
This appendix presents the Failure Mode and Effects Analysis (FMEA) performed
 
for the NASA Two Place V/STOL Research Aircraft. Table C-I presents the FMEA of
 
the simplex system, Table C-2 presents the FMEA for the duplex system and Table C-3
 
presents that for the triplex system.
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of Control 
Surfaces 
Sudden BIT Prior 
Unexpected to Flt. 
Hatdover Ifn1t Mont-
Could be tor and 
Difficult Pilot 
to Recover ObservationAir-
BIT Test 
Capability 
Prior to 
£it. Safety 
Pilot Can 
TakeControl 
III (At Altitude) 
IV Clow Level) 
Parallel 
servo and 
display 
CD 
Incorrect 
Input to 
Wrong Data 
Analog 
Pilots DO 
Not have 
lot 
onparison 
lafety
?lot Cen 
II 
isplais Levels to 
Display 
accurate 
flt con-
trol 
Ith other 
Itstrumen-
kation and 
'ly Ai­
:raft with 
Status Wsessment 1 Controls 
info f A/C's 
espouse to 
AC r 
)isplays 
--
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Designation 
(2) (3) 
Reliabilit Function 
LogicDiagramFunctionalNumber 
(4) (5) 
S40.03 Evaluation 
PSlot 
potInput 
FAILURE 
MODE 
MODE 
(6) 
Jared 
at Pivot 
Operation 
Phase 
Phase 
(7) 
Failure Effect On 
Coponent/ N. exiher UppermotSubsystem System 
(8) (9) (10) 
Rear No Input No Lateral 
tIck to Computel /Long.
Won't Roll Axis Controltove from Rear From Rear 
Failure 
Detection 
Method 
(11) 
None 
Needed -ReadilyApparent 
Corrective 
Action Time 
Aviab.TtCR equir ed  
(12) 
Design 
Proviions 
T ReduceCritcality 
(13) 
Front 
SeatCan FlyAircraft 
Hazard 
clasifiic.tionl 
icuarks 
(14) 
III 
Seat. Seat. to Pilot 
t0 
Broken 
Off at 
Pivot 
Rear 
Stick 
Useless, 
Feel Sys 
Should 
Center 
Transducer 
No Rear 
Seat 
Input to 
Corpuer 
No Lateral 
/Long. 
Control 
from 
Rear Seat 
None 
Needed 
Readily 
Apparent 
to Pilot 
Safety III, 
Pilot 
Can 
Electrical y 
Disengae 
Back Seat 
Loose 
Pivot 
at No Solid 
ReactionPoar for 
Rear SeatInput 
Erratic 
Outputsfrom 
Rear StickTransducer 
Erratic MHay Feel 
Lateral/ Loose to 
Ing. Evaluation 
C.nrol 1 pilot -fro I Both Pilot 
Rear Seat Should 
Note 
ErraticHovemenrt 
Safety 
Pilot Can 
Electrical 
Disengage
Back 
Seat 
II 
7 
of Airc.af 
-
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Designation 
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Diagran 
Number 
(4) 
Function 
(5) 
FAILURE 
E 
(6) 
Opetation
phase 
(7) 
Failure Effect oComponentl N~nHse 
Functional Subsystem 
a"amably 
(8) (9) 
peo 
Systex 
(10) 
FailureDeltection 
Htbd 
(11) 
CorectiveAct:ion fa 
v.L1ab 
v ette 
(12) 
DesignProvisions 
o Reduce 
(13) 
BazardCiassficanionl 
eay 
(14) 
Fld Stick S40.04 aty 
Pilot 
Override 
Input 
Jaummed 
at Pivot 
Stick 
Won't 
Hove 
No Input No Long/ 
to Computei Lateral 
or to System
Aileron an Control 
Stabilatot with 
Control Either 
Valves stick 
Non 
Needed 
Readily 
Apparent
to Pilots 
1oc., as 
:onsider­
ble 
chanical 
dvantage 
o Push 
hcougb 
V 
otential 
Off at 
Pivot 
PdBroker, No Front 
Stick Seat Input 
Ueless toCompute
or to 
Aileron/ 
No Lat/ 
Long Sys 
Controlfrom 
Front 
NTon 
Needed-
ReadilyApparent 
to Front 
ack 
eat 
an Flyirctaft 
by Use of 
III 
Stab 
Control 
Valves 
Seat seat 
Pilot 
Eergency' 
Sw 
Cr Lous 
at 
Pivot 
No Solid 
Reaction 
Point for 
Fud PilotInput 
Errati 
or Sloppy
Inputs to 
Longe/
Lateral 
System 
Erratic 
ateral/
Long
COntrolfrom 
Front 
Seat 
ne 
Needed,
Readily
Apparent
to Pilot 
Back 
Seat 
an Fly,
arcraft 
by Use of 
"Emergeney" 
Sw 
III 
M stick S40.041 Emegency Failed Can't Loss of Pre-Flt Emergency U1 
Paddle Switch ElectricalDiaengage 
of Back 
Seat 
Controls 
Close BreakCircuit Stick-Nounted 
Emergency 
Disenage
Capability 
Checks isengage
Available 
wd Stick 
ore Link 
Failed 
Open 
Circuit 
Won't 
MAke 
Constant 
Disengage 
of Back 
Seat 
Controls 
317, 
Pra-Flt 
Checks 
afety 
List 
a Fly 
craft 
11 
C, 
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bdent Draving 
Rumber Reference 
Reliability Function 
LogCompoet 
Number 
FAILU 
RE  Operation Failure Effect On 
Next Higher eppernon
ciamramrun nt/onal Hhiy er Syta.e
eb yequired 
Failure 
Detection 
Method 
Corrective 
Action Time 
Available/TimeR 
DeaLn 
Ptovision. 
To ReduceCriticality 
Hazard 
CltslifitionI 
Remarks 
(I) - (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) 
Fwd Stick 
Force Link 
S40.042 Provide 
kutuatic. 
Takeover 
by Safety 
Pilot 
Jammed 
or 
Breakout 
Too High 
won't 
Switch 
at Speci-
fied 
Force 
Automatic Safety 
Override pilot
Inoperative Does Not 
Have 
Automatic 
override 
Function 
None 
Needed -
Readily 
Apparent 
to Safety 
Pilot 
Safety 
Pilot 
Can Use 
Paddle 
Switch 
to Cis­
engage 
Rear Seat 
II 
H 
i 
Breakout 
Too Low 
Switches 
Below 
Spe: 
Force 
Undesired Nuisance None 
Disengage- Disengage- Needed -
ment of ents Readily
Evaluation Would Apparent 
Pilot,& Invalidatl t o Both 
controls Some 'pilotsTest 
Ground 
Test and 
Adjustment 
or 
Replacemea
AfterPiFlot 
I 
| 
Results Squawk 
W i iSLt - _ _ 
• 
Sybaysteingle Chan-Parallel Flight_ 
Equipent 	 CSE 
Module 

It. Identification eliability
a.t .	 Logic 
logic
Nuber Reference Number 
Designati on
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
Aft Stick 540.11 
Position 
Transduce 
I..3 
Ft Sti:k 540.12 
dorce Trans-
Auger 
at Stick 	 S40.13 
VaibeQ-Pror-
Feel (Torque. - 0Motor) 
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Function 	 FAILURE Operation Failure Effect On Failure Corrective Desigr
herj Uppermost Detection Action Time ProvLotons Clasaificatio.oI 
MO! PhaIs 	 Cpae/ e t .i.g Method Aailable/Tme To Redace Rarks 
Aseybly Required Criticality 
(5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (1L) (12) (13) (14) 
Provide Open Distorted Incorrect Possible BIT, IIt1 
Aft Stick or or or No Aft Reduction Infit MNo onitoring 
Position Shorted Output Stick in Ab1t. Monitor Backed Up 
Data 	 Position to Fly by Force
 
to Compu- Data to Aircraft Traasducer 
tar Cooputer froo Safety 
Back 	 Pilot Can
 
Seat 	 Disengage 
Back Seat 
and Fly 
Aircraft 
Provide Open Distorted Incorrect Possible BIT, Inflight II 
Aft Stick or or No or No Reduction gnile Monitoring, 
Force Shorted Output Aft Stick in Abilitf Monitor Backed Up 
Data to Force to Fly by osicion 
Coputer Data to Aircraft Transduer. 
Coputer 	 from ,Safety Pi-
Back lot can 
seat Disengage 
Back Seat 
and Fly 
AfC Aircraft 
Provide Jamed Rear No Stick Possible BIT, BIT, infit n_ 
Stick Position Reduction Ilit Monitor 
mad ...... . TIobi . Transducer in Abilitj Monitor IForce Trans 
Variable iced Output to Fly 	 ducer Still 
Feel to 	 Aircraft Operatienal
 
Rear. fr fe.ty pilo
Seat Back can Die-
Stick seat engas. MCI 
Seat and 
Fly Air­
craft 
(CO tinmed Usx Page) 
_ _ 	 -,,­
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Subystm 
tirePe noetystem
tM 
DetectionMethod Action 
Tima 
Availeble/Tt ,
equired 
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To ReduceCriticality 
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Number Reference 
Designation 
Number ARqeu C 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) 
S40.13 Provide Shorted Little or Little Little or None BIT, Inflt II 
Variable 
Feel (Torque 
Motor) 
(Continued) Q-progam-
med 
Variable 
or 
Open 
No Resist-
ance to 
Stick 
or No 
Force 
Transducer 
No Tactil, 
Cues for 
Stick 
Needed-
Readily 
Apparent 
monitor 
Position 
Transducer 
Feel to Movement Output Position- to Back Still 
Rear Seat 
Stick 
ing, 
Tendency 
to Over-
Seat 
Pilot 
Operational 
Safety 
Pilot Can 
control Disengage 
Via Back Seat 
Position and Fly 
I- Sensor Aircraft 
Parallel S40.14E Move Con- Janed wone No Back Seat Readily BtT,Safety EI 
Servo trol Rod Move Response Controls Apparent Pilot Can 
(Electrical) Linkage 
as Corn-
to Back 
Seat 
Useless, 
Front 
to Back 
Seat 
Electrical­
ly Die,­
manded. by
Computer 
in Res-
Pilot 
Cosmands 
Seat 
Controls 
Sniffer 
Pilot, 
BIT would 
Detect If 
gage Rear 
Controls 
aud Fly 
ponse to 
Aft Stick 
Transducer 
Outputs 
than , 
Usual, 
Hay Trip 
Circuit 
Breaker 
Existing 
Prior to 
Flight 
Aircraft 
by Over­
poweriLg 
Parallel 
Servo Out­
put Safety 
Spring 
Cartridge, 
. .. Circuit 
.... SIBreaker 
(Come sued Next Page) 
_- -_ - , _-_ 
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it. IdenjtficbtlonId~hea. ReLiabilitLoReRDE Function1AI.R  operAtIUonPberempnotncekt Failure EffectIl~e OnUHpber FailureDflbltto CorrectfieA(t oouin De.16nPrvlos i C Vatardiaafcyo 
Jianr 
Number RCeaCgaCCotibr 
mdent Yncttonal 
Annebly 
Sabsya Sy'I e Method AvAJlAbL./TtA. 
P.qutred 
To Reduce 
Crteat 
mtarks 
(( 
(Coodmuod)
Paralel 
Se0vo 
(Eletrica.) 
(2) ) 
S40.014E 
(5) (6) 
(co ia d 
Burned Out 
or Shorted 
(1) (8) 
Little or 
No Move-
nt 
(10) 
Little or Back $ear 
No Response Controls 
to Sack Virtually 
Seat Pilot Useless, 
Comnd. Front Seat 
ControlS 
May Be 
Stiffer 
then Usual 
if Shorted 
Will Pob-
(11) 
Readily 
Apparent 
to Back 
Seat Pilot 
Fwd Pilot 
Would 
Probably 
Notice 
Change in 
Feel of 
Stink 
(12) (13) 
SIT Prior 
to Fit, Ck 
Draak.r to 
prevet 
Overheat, 
safety 
Pilot Can 
7l.oetti.l­
ly Olea­
&ge Rear 
Control. 
III 
(4) 
1-1 
41circuit 
ably Trip 
Breaker j 
II 
and Fly 
Aircraft 
by Over-Spowering 
Parallel 
IIi 
5ervo 
Sprias 
Carcridgo 
Drivirgthe 
Parlle 
Brok~en Roed 
EMor 
Head End 
Attachment 
W.c 
Reaction 
IPoint for 
Coaa 
Forces 
I 
No output Rear, seat 
Controls 
Useles 
Problesa 
Readfy 
Apparent 
to Rear 
Pilot 
Normal 
operation 
from Front 
Seat uitb 
Near Seat 
Control. 
flectrical 
ly Dia­
erga9d 
III 
- ----------------------------------------------------------------------­
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Funtion FAILURE 
MODE 
Operation 
h 
Failure Effect On 
Coponent/ Next Higher Uppemostopon t/a bxt  Sy t 
Pailure 
BaectionMethod 
Corrective 
Action TimeAvailAble/Tiqlte 
Design 
ProvisilonI s £Reduce 
azard 
Classification/Re~rks 
(1) 
Number 
(2) 
Reference 
Designation 
(3) 
Number 
(4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
tAttTebly 
(9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) 
U, 
Parallel 
Servo 
Safety 
Spring 
Cartridge 
S40.15 Couple 
Parallel 
Servo 
to Heh 
Control 
System and 
Provide 
Capbili-
ties 
for Mech 
Sys to 
Override 
ElectricalSystem 
Jammed Cartrildge 
Won t t 
Collapse 
or Extend 
Direct 
Link 
Between 
Servo 
and 
Hech 
System 
Loss of 
Direct 
Mechanical 
Override 
Protecti 
No Effect 
Unless 
Coupled 
with an 
Electrica 
system 
Failure 
Single 
-. in 
artridge 
at 
Significant 
Second 
Failure 
in Back 
Seat 
Controls 
Required 
to Cause 
Problesa. 
I 
Broken
spring 
NoR.esifstance 
in One 
Direction 
ServoCould 
Not 
love 
Linkage 
In One 
Direction 
Problems BITWould Be Prior 
Noted by to Flight
Pilot Pilot 
an Errati Ob.arva-
Response tion 
to Back in Flight 
Seat 
Commands IAircraft 
Safety
Pilot 
Can 
Electrical­
ly Diane­
gage Back 
Seat 
Controls 
and Fly 
From Front 
seat 
Broken 
Attachment 
No 
Resistance 
in Elther 
Direction 
Servo 
Could Not 
Move Link-
age in 
Either 
Direction 
No 
Response 
to Back 
Seat 
Comnands 
Readily 
Apparent 
to Back 
Seat 
Pilot 
Safety 
Pilot Can 
Electrical­
ly Disen­
gage Back 
Seat 
Controls 
ad Fly 
Aircraft 
from Front 
Sent 
III 
________________ - ---
- -a - -
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Ident Drawing 
Nuaber ReferenceDssigt'ttiOO 
{)() (3) 
ReliabilitLogic 
Diagram 
Number 
(4) 
Function 
•(), 
FAILUREMOE 
LoicMOE 
() 
Operation
.phase 
Phse 
(7) 
Fallor Effect On Failure 
omponent/ Ne gher Upeost" Detection 
Copoes/ ex Hghr PPcw8t Method 
Functional Subsystem Sytem 
Assembly 
(8) (9) (20) (11) 
Corrective 
Action Tine 
Avtil~bleflti-c
aRequired 
(12) 
Design 
Provisions 
To ReduceCriticality 
(13) 
Hazard 
Classification/
Remarks 
(t 
H 
O 
Front Seat 
(M.chn.ical)Trim 
TriSitach 
S40,16 Reacts to 
Pilot BeepSwitcb 
Comand 
to Triilerouc 
by Changing 
stickNeutral 
PointCici 
i 
Open 
Short 
Winding 
Burnout 
Shorted 
Winding 
Trim 
Motor 
Won't 
Run 
Sluggish 
operation, 
Hay Trip 
rcudt 
Breaker 
No 
Mechanical 
Trim 
Capability 
Trim 
Fixed 
at One 
Position 
Poor or 
No Mech-
anical. 
Trip 
Operation I 
Pilot Can 
Hold in 
Trim with 
Stick, RealStilot 
Seat Pilot 
Can Put 
i Tri 
Bias 
Electricall 
circuit 
Breaker 
to Prevent 
Overheat, 
Rear Seat 
Pilot Can 
put in 
Trim Bias 
II 
I 
1I 
Jnined, 
or Strip-
ped Gear-pu G 
lae 
ot 
Stripped 
inTrim 
NOTrim 
Output 
Loss of 
Mucchol 
TrimCapability. 
Fixed 
at One 
Position 
Pilot Can 
in 
Trim with 
Stick, 
Rear Seat 
Pilot Can 
Put in 
Trim Bia. 
Electri­
cally 
11 0 0 
I'd 
C . 
Loss of 
Structtal 
Ground 
(ttach-mt 
.toeq 
Broken) 
No React-
ion Point 
for Trim 
MotorTorqueSeat 
No Trim 
otion 
Lossof 
Mechanical 
Trim 
Capability 
Pilot Can 
Gold in 
Trim with 
StAck, 
Pilot Can 
Put in 
Trim Bias 
El.tri­
cally 
" 
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Front Stick S40.17 Provides Janed Stick Input No None Ulot IV 
Feel Spring Artificial Won't to Computer Lateral Needed- "onsder-
Feel for move or to Al- System Readily ble 
Nwd Pilot eron Control Apparent 	 echanial 
ecdantagwith to Pilots 

Valves Either 

Control 

vantage
Stick 
 through
 
Some 
Potential
 
Ja.s 
Broken Absence Unbalanced Difficult None With Hands II 
Spring of Peel Feel to Fly Needed- Off in 
and Trim Forces, Aircraft Readily Front Seat, 
In One Erratic with Apparent Back Seat 
Direction Trim Front I to Pilot Pilot Can 
Stick 	 Fly Aircraf
 
Electrical­
ly.
I. 	 "Emorgency 
SWCan be 
Used to 
Prevent' 
DFCS Dis­
engage. 
Broken Absence Logo of Difficult Non. With aends III 
Head End of Feel Tactile to Fly Needed- Off in 
or Rod Forces Cues for Aircraft Readily Front Seat, 
End and Trim Proper with Apparent Back Seat 
Attach- Position Stick Front to pilot Pilot Can 
Meets In Both Positioning Stick Fly Air-
Directions craft 
Electrical­
ly.

"Emergency" 
SW Can Be
 
Used to 
Prevent 
FCS Die­
_ _ 	 e'EaS 
Syeo n-- h-P-l- O lightSybsytziflelC n-Frllel Flight________Bt._________ 
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Reliabilit8£c 
Dagram 
Number 
Function FAILUREmot Operationase Falire Effect On 
n r 
75omponet ex igher UPPe 
uctonal Subsytem Syst 
Asanably 
FailureIDamot eec iont 
i Methd 
CorrctvlAc t I onTi e 
Awailtble/TiJU
Required 
DesignPrWI. oL.a..1rcaly 
To Reduce 
Criticalit 
Y 
Hazardc cZ 
Remarks 
n 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (l1 (2) (13) (14) 
No 
Aft Stick 
Position 
Transducer 
S40.21 Provide 
Aft Stick 
Positian 
Data 
to Compu-
ter 
Open 
or 
Shorted 
Distorted 
or No 
Output 
Incorrect 
or No Mft 
Stick 
Position 
Dat to 
Computer 
Possible 
Reduction 
in Abilit: 
to Fly 
Aircraft 
from 
Back 
Seat 
BIT, 
mI it 
Monitor 
Inflt 
Monitoring 
Backed Up 
by Force 
Transducer, 
Safeiy 
Pilot Can 
Disengage 
Back Seat 
E 
H)
H 
and Fly
Aircraft 
Aft Stick 
Fore Tran-
540.22 Provide 
Aft Stick 
Open 
or 
Distorted 
or No 
Incorrect 
oNo 
Possible 
Reduction 
BIT, 
refit 
Inflight 
Monitoring, 
11 
ucForce 
Data toComputer 
Shorted Output Aft Stick 
ForceData to 
in Abilitf Monitor 
to Fly ' Aircraft 
Backed Up 
by FositloTransducer. 
Sseat 
Computer fromBack Safety PI­lot can 
Disengage
BIck Seat 
and Fly 
Aircraft 
Aft Stick 
Variable 
Feel (Torque. 
Motor) 
S40.23 ovie 
Q-progrsm-
md 
Variable 
Feel to 
Rear 
Seat 
Stick 
J e 
Stick 
brnobil. 
lzed 
No Stick 
Position 
Transducer 
Output 
Possible BIT, 
Reduction I tnf1t 
in Abfllt Monitor 
to Fly 
Aircraft 
from 
Back 
SEat 
BIT, BuT1i 
Monitor 
Force Trans 
dater Still 
Operational 
afery Pilot 
can Dis­
enag Sac 
Seat and 
Fly Air­
craft 
II 
(COLtinned Nex Page) 
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Number Deferance 
N~meIden Refernce~fDesiSsati£on 
ellabilit 
Logic 
Number 
Dar 
Function FAILURE 
MODE 
Operation 
Phase 
Failure Effect on 
Componeatl Netiligher Uppermast 
Cpsenbly 
Functional Subsystem yetAsml 
PaOiae 
Detection 
Method 
corrective 
Action Tine 
AvilableJise 
Required 
Dealg 
Provisiona 
To Reduce 
Criticality 
Hlzard 
Cl.asification/ 
(1) (2) (3). (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) 
Variable 
Feel (Torque 
Motor) 
Continued) 
Provide 
Q-prograt-
ed 
Variable 
Shorted 
or 
Open 
Little or 
No Resist-
anse to 
Stick 
Little 
or No 
Force 
Transducer 
Little or 
No Tact£1 
Cues for 
Stick 
None 
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(Continued) 
Parallel S40.34E 
(Continued 
Burned Out Little or Little or Back Seat Readily BIT Prior III 
Servo or Shorted No Move- No Response Controls Apparent to Flt, Ck 
(Electrical) mont to Back Virtually to Back Breaker to 
Seat Pilot Useless, seat Pilot Prevent 
Comands Front Seat 
Controls 
fay Be 
Fwd Pilot 
Would 
Probably 
Overheat, 
Safety
Pilot Can 
Stiffer Notice Electrical 
than Usual Change in ly Disen-
If Shorted Feel of gage Rear 
Will Prob- Pedals Controls 
ably Trip and Fly 
Circuit Aircraft 
H I 
Breaker by Over­
powering 
Parallel 
Servo 
Spring 
Cartridge 
or BackDriving
the 
Parallel 
Servo 
Broken Rod No b Output Rear Seat Problem Normal I 
End or Reaction Control Readily Operation 
Head End Point for Useless Apparent fron Front 
Attsaohent Coannd to Rear Seat with 
Forces ii Pilot Bear Seat Controls 
ly Dis­
engaged 
Sy s FtGT C0rRn 
Sybyst ele rI 
IRE T 
LaPisht .. 
-
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Iden.t 
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Drawing 
Reference 
Designation 
) 
Logic 
Diagrve 
Number 
() (5) 
MODE 
(6) 
P1as. 
(7) 
Component/ 
FunCtonal 
is =lyA#al 
(a) 
Next Higher 
SubysNt 
(9) 
Uppermost 
Syst 
(10) 
Detection 
Method 
(1) 
Action Time 
Available/Tim 
Required 
(12) 
ProvLions 
To Reduce 
Criticality 
(13) 
Classification/ 
Remarks 
Paralle. S40.35 Couple Jammed Cartridge Direct Loss of Single El 
Srvo arallel Won.t Link Direct Tam in 
Safety Servo collapse Between Mechanical artaidg. 
Spring to Much or Exten.d Servo Override .ot 
Cartridge Control 
System and 
Provide 
and 
ech 
Syste 
Protectio 
No Effect 
Unless 
Significant 
Second 
Failure 
Capabill- Coupled in Back 
ties with an Seat 
for Mch Electrica Controls 
Sys to System Required 
Cverride , Failure to Cause 
, Electrical Proble . 
System 
Broken. 
S 
s 
No 
Resistance 
in One 
Servo 
Could 
Not 
Problems 
Would Be 
Noted by 
BIT 
Prior 
to Plight 
Safety 
Pilot 
Can 
III 
Direction Hove Pilot Pilot Electrical­| Linkaqe e. Erratiq Obseve- ly .. , 
in One 
Direction 
Response 
to Back 
tion 
in Flight 
gage 
Seat 
Back 
Seat Controls 
Comands and Fly 
Aircraft 
From Front 
seat 
Broken 
Attachment 
No 
[Resistance 
Servo 
Could Not 
No 
Resp.nse 
Readily 
Apparent 
Safety 
Filot Ca. 
III 
in Either Hove Link- to Back to Back Electrical-
Direction age in 
Cither 
Seat 
Commands 
Seat 
Pilot 
lr Cisen­
gage Back 
Direction Seat 
ontrols 
Ld Fly 
ircraft 
from Front 
Seat 
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Computers (2) D40.01 	 Accept Disagree- Automatic Loss of Front Sea Comparison Safety Pilot Comparison II (At Altitude) 
Position ment Disengage Rear Seat Safety f Two Must ImedL- Technique III (Low Level) 
and Force betwena of DFCS Control Pilot omputer ately Assume Automati-
Transducer Two to Front Must utputs. Control of cally Dis-
Inputs Computers Seat Assume ilots are Aircraft engages of 
From Aft Safety Control o Signaled Difference 
Stick/ Pilot Aircraft ith Warn- is Detected 
Pedals a Time aing Lights This Tech-
Force Link of Dig- that Dis- nique
 
Discretee engage engage Prevents ]
 
from Fwd Has Ecroneous 
Stick/ Occurred Rardover 
Pedals Dat and Safety Commands 
Analogs Pilot Must Unless They 
from :Take Are Being 
Motion 'Control Commonly 
Sensors Issued By
 
C and Air Both
 
Data Com- Computers
,potation. 
Provide
 
Command 
Outputs
 
for Para­
llel Servo 
and Aft
 
d 	 Stick/ 
Pedals
 
Variable
 
IFeel; for­
matted 
Data
 
f r Ulu­
plays.
 
Provide
 
Storage,
 
Execute,
 
and
 
Decision
 
Cpability
 
for BIT
 
and IFIM 
 j 
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Motion Sensors D40.02 Provide Incorrect Automatic Loss of Front Seat Difference Safety Pilot Comparison II (At Altitude) 
Rotational Inputs to Disengage Rear Seat Safety in Outputs Aust Immedi- Technique III (Low Level) 
and Trans- Computer of DFCS Control to Pilot Must of Redun- stely Assume Automatic-
Lational Resulting Front Seat Assume dant Control of ally Dis-
Motion in Auto- safety Control Of motion Aircraft engages If 
Data to matic Pilot. Aircraft Sensors Difference 
Conputer Disengage-
ment of 
at Time 
of Dis-
Results in 
Failure of 
is Detecte 
This Tech­
the DPCS engage Compirison nique 
Test and Prevents 
Automati- Erroneous 
W') callyDisengages 
Hardover 
Commands 
* 
41 the DFCS Unless 
They Are 
Being 
Commonly 
Issued by 
Both 
I Computers 
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Systi 
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Rear Stick S40.03 Evaluation Jammed Rear No Input No Laeteral None front i 
Pilot at Pivot Stick to Compute, /Long. Needed - Seat 
Input Won't 
Hove 
Roll Axis 
from Rear 
Control 
from Rear 
Readily
Apparent 
Can Fly
Airuraft 
Seat. Seat. to Pilot 
Broken 
Off at 
Rear 
Stick 
No Bear 
Seat 
No Letera 
ILong. 
None 
Needed a 
Safety 
Pilot 
in 
Pivot Useless,
Feel Sys 
Input to 
Copnter 
Control 
from 
Readily
Apparent 
Can 
Electrical y 
Should Rear Seat to Pilot Disengage 
Center Back Seat 
Transducer 
Loose 
Pivot 
at No Solid 
Reaction 
PcEnt for 
Rear Seat 
Input 
Erratic 
Outputs
fv=a 
Rear Stick 
Transducer 
Erratic 
Lateral/ 
Lz. 
Control 
from 
May Feeli Loose to 
Evaluation 
Pilot -
I Both Pilot 
Safety 
Pilot Can 
Electrical 
Disengage 
Back 
III 
y 
Rear Should Seat 
Seat. Note 
Erratic 
Movement 
1 of Aircraf 
System, FIT CONTROLS - LATERA/LONGITUDINAL 
Sybays tnBual Chain-Series Flight 
Equipment GSE 
Module 
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Function FAILURE operation 
MeDEgDiara 
Failure Effect On 
Component/ Next Higher Uppermostjunctional Subsyst Sem 
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Failure 
Detection 
Method 
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Ptovisions 
C Ridtct 
Razard 
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Fwd Stick D40.04 Safety 
Pilot 
Override 
Input 
Jammed 
at Pivot 
Stick 
Won't 
Hove 
Input to 
Computer 
and to 
Aileron 
and Sea-
bilator 
Control 
Valves 
Only From 
Roar 
Stick 
Loss of 
Lateral/ 
Long 
System
Control 
with Front 
Stick 
None 
Needed 
Readily 
Apparent 
to Pilots 
lack Seat 
:an Fly 
Xircraft 
by Use of 
"Emergency 
FCS" 
Switch 
II. 
Broken 
O)'ff at 
Pivot 
Fd 
Stick 
Useless 
No Front 
Seat Input 
to Computez 
or to 
Aileron 
No Lat None 
Sys Con- Needed-
trol from Readily 
Franc !Apparent
Seat to Front 
ack 
eat 
an Fly
ircraft 
y Use of 
III 
ControlValves SeatIPilot Emergency"SW 
Loose 
at 
Pivot 
No Solid 
Reaction 
Point for 
FPd PilotInput 
Erratic 
or Sloppy 
Inputs 
to LateralSyt 
Erratic 
Lateral 
Control 
frFront 
Seat 
NoneINeeded, 
j Readily 
Apparent
to pilot 
Back 
Seat 
Can Fly,
Aircraft 
by Use of 
'Emergency" 
II 
M Stick 
Paddle Swih 
Emergemoy 
Electrical 
Disengage 
of Back 
Seat 
Controls 
Failed 
Closed 
Can't 
Break 
Circuit 
No 
Disengage 
Loss of 
Stick-
Mounted 
Emergency 
Disengage 
Cpabilt 
Pre-FIt 
Checks 
mergency 
)isengage%vailable 
7w Stick 
ore Link 
II 
FailedOpen 
CircuitWon't 
MAke 
EngageSolenoid 
Won't 
Latch 
Constant
Disengage 
of Back 
Seat 
Controls 
BIT,. -
Pre-FI0 
Checks 
afetyilot 
an Fly 
craft 
IT 
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Corrective 
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Provie.neTo Reduce 
Criticality 
Hazard 
Classtfication/Remarks 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) 
Pud Stick 
Force Link (2) 
Each Axis 
D40.042 provide 
Automatic 
Takeover 
by Safety 
Pilot 
Jammed 
or 
Breakout 
Too High 
Wont 
Switch 
at Speci-
fLied 
Force 
Automatic 
Override 
Programmed 
To Operate 
On Lesser 
Of Two 
None Built-In 
Test 
Routine/ 
Ground 
Checks 
Ground Tes 
and 
Adjustment 
or 
Replaceen 
After 
I 
Force Identified 
Xducer 
Outputs 
U3 
Breakout 
Too Low 
Switches 
BelowSpec 
Undesired 
Disengage-
ment of 
Nuisance 
Disengage-
meets 
None 
Needed -Readily 
Ground 
Test and 
Adjustment 
IT 
Force Evaluaion 
Pilot's 
Would 
Iava1idate 
Apparen.t 
to Both 
or 
Replacemeo 
Controls Some Pilots After 
Test Pilot 
Results Squawk 
00 
Fl-Z 
ro. 
Sysytm FL? -OV' SLA1ERAL 
Sybaystem Dual Chan-Series' Plight_ 
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Operation 
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Subeyatmn Sytr
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Failure 
Detection 
Method 
Corrective 
Action Time 
Available/Time
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Design 
Provisions 
TO Reduce 
Criticality 
Hazard 
Classifliction/
Renarks 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) 
Aft Stick 
Position 
Transducers (2) 
D40.11 provide 
Aft Stick 
Position 
Data to 
Computer 
Open 
or 
Shorted 
Difference Automatic 
in Outputs Disengage 
of 2 Aft of DFCS 
Stick 
Position 
Xducers 
Front Seat Difference 
Safety in Outputs
Pilot of 2 Stick 
Must Position 
Assume Xducers is 
Control of Sensed and 
Safety Pilot 
Must Imnedi-
arely Assume 
Control of 
Aircraft 
-
Comparison 
TechniqueAutosti­
cally 
Disengage 
if 
IT Ckt Altitude) 
III (LoJ Level) 
Aircraft 
at Time 
of Dis-
engage 
Auto Dis-
engage 
Sequence 
Initiated 
Difference 
is Detects 
CW Aft Stick 
Force Trans-
duceres (2) jFare. 
D40.12 Provide 
Aft Stick 
Data to 
computer 
Open 
or 
Shorted 
Difference Antomatic 
in Outputs Disengage 
of 2 Aft of DFCS 
Stick 
Force 
XTucers 
Front Seat Difference 
Safety in Outputs 
Pilot tof 2 Stick 
must :osition 
Assume :Xducers is 
Control of Sensed and 
Aircraft lAuto Dit-
Safety Plot 
Must lumedi-
ately Assume 
Control of 
Aircraft 
Coeparison 
Technique 
Autmnati­
cally 
Disengage
if 
Difference 
II Cit Altitude) 
IIIL oiell 
at Time I engage is Detecte 
of Dis-
engae 
ISequence 
Initiated 
Aft Stik 
Variable Feel 
(Torque Motor) 
D40,13 provide 
Variable 
Feel to 
Rear Seat 
Stick 
Jard Rear 
Stick 
Immobil-
Ized 
No Stick 
Position 
Transducer 
Output 
Iosle BIT, 
Reduction ITflt 
in Ability Monitor 
to Fly 
Aircraft 
BIT, Iailt 
Monitor 
Fore 
Transducer 
Still 
II 
from 
Back Seat 
Operationa
Safety 
Pilot Can 
Disengage 
Back Seat 
and Fly 
Aircraft 
(Canun d Next Fng 
System FLY CONTROLS'- I.ATERAL 
SybaystemDU1 1  mSnries PlightDae___t 
Equi ment GSE 
Module_________Approved________ 
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Failure 
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CorrectiveActionblTie 
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Available/ie 
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Design RazardTBRdceg ~a 
Provisions Classificationl 
T Reduce Remrks 
Criticality 
to 
Cl) 
Ini tUeii)variable 
Veel (Torque 
Motor) 
(2) (3) 
tOPositloa 
(4) 
)40.13(Continued)(-program-
(5) 
(Continued
Provide 
mead 
Variable 
Pool to 
Rear Seat 
Stick 
(6) 
Shorted 
or 
Open 
(7) (8) 
Little or 
No Resist-
ance to 
Stick 
Moveen.t 
(9) 
Little 
or No 
Force 
Transducer 
Output 
(10) 
Little or 
No Tactli 
Cues for 
Stick 
Positon-
ing, 
Tendency 
to Over-
control 
fvia 
Sensor 
(11) 
None 
Needed-
Readily
Apparent 
to Back 
Seat 
Pilot 
(12) (13) 
BIT, mfltMonitor 
Position 
Transducer 
Still 
Operational 
Safety 
Pilot Can 
Disengage 
Back Seat
and Fly 
Aircraft 
IT 
(14) 
Series 
Servo 
(Electrical) 
D40.14E Hove Con-
trol Rod 
Linkage 
as Corn-
manded by 
Computer 
in Res-
pons. to 
Aft Stick 
Transducer 
Outputs 
Jamed Decreased 
Movement 
Decreased 
Response 
to Back 
Seat 
Pilot 
Commands 
Back Seat 
Controls 
Degraded
Front 
Seat 
Controls 
Stiffer 
than 
Usual. 
May Trip 
Circuit 
Breaker 
Readily 
Apparent 
to BackSeat 
Pilot, 
IBfl would 
Detect if 
Existing
Prior to 
Flight 
Automatic 
Disengage 
Safety 
Pilot Must 
ImmediatelyAssume 
Control of 
Aircraft 
Comparison 
Technique 
Automati­
cally 
Disengages 
if 
Difference 
is 
Detected. 
IT (At Altitude) 
III (Lo.wLevel) 
(Cont, nud Next PigS) 
SystmT CONTROLS '-
Sy sat~ f u l C a - ees 
-TERALih 
-"lht"-'-- -B 
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Design 
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To ReduceCriticality 
Mazard 
Classificatilon 
Remarks 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
(1l) (12) (13) (14) 
(Continued) 
Series 
Serve 
(Electrical) 
(Continued: 
Burned Out 
or Shorted 
Little or 
No Hove-
tant 
Little or Back Seat 
No Response Controls 
to Back virtually 
seat Pilot Useless, 
Readily 
Apparent 
to Back 
Seat Pilot 
BIT Prior III 
to Flt, Ckt 
Breaker to 
Prevent 
Commands Front Seat Fwd Pilot Overheat, 
Controls Would Safety 
Lay Be 
Stiffer 
Probably
Notice 
Pilot Can 
Electrical­
than Usual Change in 
If Shorted Feel of 
ly Disen­
gagse Rear 
13 
CDS 
O 
Will Prob- Stick 
ably Trip
Circuit 
Breaker 
Controls 
and Fly
Aircraft 
by Over­
powering 
Servo 
t Spring 
Ior 
Cartridge
Back-
Driving 
th& 
Stries 
Servo 
C) 
Broken Rod 
End or 
Head End 
AttachmentCommon to 
No 
Reaction 
Point for 
CommandForces 
No Output Front and 
Rear Seat 
Controls 
Useless 
Problem 
Readily 
Apparent 
to Bothpilot 
Stress 
Analysis 
of Series 
Sec.Common 
III 
Bothicyl 
Attach­
ments and 
,or Free Ends. 
Movement Ensre 
of Both Failure to 
Cylinders Dual Act­uatcr Does 
E:! I, - Not Allot, Both Cylinders 
to Move 
Freely. 
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Series Couple Jamed Cartridge Direct Loss of 
Servo Series Won't Link Direct 
Safety Servo Collapse Between Mechanical 
Spring to Moth or Extend Servo Override 
Cartridge (2) Control and Protecti System and Mach No Effect 
Provide System Unless 
CapabL1i- Coupled 
ties with an 
for Mech Electrica 
Sys to System 
Override Failure 
Electrical 
System 
Broken Limited Degrade Problems BIT 
Spring Resistane Servo Would Be Prior 
in One Ability to Noted by to plight
'Diection Hove Pilot Pilot 
I Linkage as Erratil Observa-
in One Response tion 
Direction to Back in Flight 
Seat 
Commands 
roe________
Corrective Design Hazard 
Action Time Provisions ClassificationRequtJ irbedTm CoRic laty 
equired Criticalit 
(12) (13) (14) 
SIngle II 
am in 
artridge 
t 
Significant
Second 
Failure 
in Back 
Seat 
Controls 
Required 
to Cause 
Problens. 
Safety in 
Pilot 
CanEle tial­
ly Dlsen­
gage Back 
Seat 
Controls 
and Fly 
Aircraft 
From Front 
Seatu 
_ _ -
_ 
-
Sy Vtb.y.cn , - LATflStc 
Sybyat Dual Cha-Sertes Pist.__ 
EqietGSE________
Equipent 
Module . 
_ 
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(1) 
Itee Identification Reliability 
____________- lgi 
Logic
Ideut Drawing Digrm 
Number Reference Number Designation 
(2) (3) (4) 
Function 
(5) 
FAILUREMDE 
MDE 
(6) 
Operation
PhsePhase 
(7) 
Failure Effect On 
Component/ Next Higheri Upper 
unconat Subsystem S>J"e.. 
Assmbl. 
(6) (9) (10) 
Failure
eteecionetheod 
(11) 
CorrectiveAction TimeAvailable/TmRequir.ed 
(12) 
Design
ProvisionsT  ReduceCricica ttt 
(13) 
Hazard 
Classoicat ion/Remarks 
Front Seat 
(Mechanical) 
Trim 
D40.16 Reacts to Open 
Pilot Beep 
Switch 
Co=and 
to Trim 
Ailerons 
by Changing 
Stick 
Neutral 
Point 
Short 
~Electrical. 
Winding 
Burnout 
Shorted 
Winding 
rirm 
Motor 
Won't 
Run 
Sluggish
Operation, 
Hay Trip 
Circuit 
Breaker 
No 
Mechanical 
Trim 
Capability. 
Trim 
Fixed 
at One 
Position 
Poor or 
No Mech-
anical 
Trip 
Operation 
I 
Pilot Can 
Hold in 
Trim with 
Stick, Real 
Seat Pilot 
Can Put 
inTrim 
Bias 
Electrical 
Circuit 
Breaker 
to Prevent 
Overheat, 
gear Seat 
Pilot Can 
Put in 
Trim Bias 
1I 
U 
ly 
00 
Jammed, 
or Strip-
pad Car-
Ing 
Jammed 
or 
Stripped 
No Trim 
Output 
Loss of 
Each 
Trim 
Capability 
Trim 
fixed 
at One 
Position 
Pilot Can 
Hold in 
Trim with 
Stick, 
Rear Seat 
Pilot Can 
Put in 
Trim Bias 
Electri­
cally 
it 
C:: 
Loss ofStructural 
Ground 
(Attach-
ments 
Broken) 
No React-ion Point 
for Trim 
Motor 
Torque 
No Trim 
Motion 
loan of 
Mechanical 
Trim 
Capability 
~ 
Pilot Can 
Hold in 
Trim with 
Stick, 
Rear Seat 
Pilot Can 
Put in 
Trim Bias 
Electri­
cally 
11 
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Front Stick D40.17 Provides Jarred Stick Input Loss of None Back Seat I 
Feel Spring Artificial 
Feel for 
won't 
Move 
to Computer 
or to Aui-
Lateral 
System 
Needed-
Readily 
Can Fly 
Aircraft 
Fwd Pilot eron 
Control 
Control 
with 
Apparent 
to Pilots 
By Use 
of 
Valves Front "Ecergency 
Only fromRear Stick Stick DFECS"Switch 
Broken Absence Unbalanced Difficult None With Hands III 
Spring of Feel Feel to Fly Needed- Off in 
and Trim Forces, Aircraft Readily Front Seat, 
In One Erratic with Apparent Back Seat 
Direction Trim Front t Pilot Pilot Can 
Stick Fly Aircraf 
Electrical-
Ly. 
"Emrgency"SW Can be 
Used to 
Prevent'DFCS Die­
engage. 
Broken 
Head End 
Absence 
of Feel 
Loan of 
Tactile 
Difficult 
to Fly 
Non. 
Needed-
With HNws 
Off in 
fIU 
or RodEnd 
Attach-
Forces
and Trhm 
Position 
Cues forProper 
Stick 
Aircraft
with 
Front 
ReadilyApparent 
o Pilot 
Front Seat,Back Seat 
Pilot Can 
ments In Both Positioning Stick Fly Air-
Directions craft 
Electrical­
ly. 
"Emergency"SW Can Be 
Used to 
Prevent 
FCS Die­
Syste FLT CONTROLS-LOGITUDIAL 
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Item Identification 
Ment Drawing 
Number Reference 
Reltability 
Logic 
Diagram 
Pumber 
Function FAILURE 
MODE 
Operation 
Phase 
Failure Effect On 
Component/ Next Higher Uppermost 
:unctional Subsystem System 
Aaembly 
Failure 
Detection 
Method 
Corrective 
Action Time 
Available/Tie 
Required 
Desgn 
Provisions 
To Reduce 
Criticality 
c 
Hazard 
iassicaaonl 
Remarks 
Designation 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (B) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) 
Aft Stick 
Position 
Transducer (2) 
D40.21 Provide 
Aft Stick 
Position 
Data 
Open 
or 
Shorted 
Difference 
in Outputs 
of 2 Aft 
Stick ' 
Automatic 
Disengage 
of DFCS 
Front Seat 
Safety 
Pilot Must 
Assume 
Difference Safety Pilot 
in Outputs Must Immedi-
of 2 Stick ately Assume 
Position Control of 
Comparison 
Technique 
Automahti­
cally 
11 (At Altitude) 
III(Low Level) 
to Compu-
tar 
Position 
Xducers 
Control of 
Aircraft 
Xducers Is Aircraft 
Sensed and 
Disengages 
if Differ­
at Time .Auto ence is 
of Dis- Disengage Detected 
engage Sequence
Is 
Initiated. 
Aft Stick Provide Open Difference Atomtir Front Seat Difference Safety Pilot Coparison II (At Altitude) 
Force 
ducer 
Trans- Aft Stick 
Force 
Data to 
or 
Shorted 
in Outputs 
of 2 Aft 
Stick 
Disengage 
of DFCS 
Safety 
Pilot Mus 
Assume 
in Out~uts 
of 2 Stic 
Position 
Must Imedi-
ately Assume 
Control of 
Technique 
Autoati­
tally 
III (Log Level) 
Computer Force Control o Educae Is Aircraft Disengages 
at Time Auto ence is 
of Dis- Disengage Detected 
engage Sequence 
Is 
Initiated. 
Aft Stick Provide Jammed Rear No Stick Possible BIT, BIT, InfIt ITT 
Variable Feel Q-Program- Stick Position Reduction I1flt Monitor 
(Torque Motor) med 
Variable 
Ina bil-
ized 
Transducer 
Output 
in Abilit: 
to Fly 
Monitor Force 
Transducer 
Feel to Aircraft Still 
0 
Rear Seat 
Stick 
from 
Back Seat 
Operational 
Safety
pilot Can 
-' 0 
Disengage 
Back Seat 
and Fly 
Aircraft 
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module 
Itm Identification 
Braving

Number Deigntce 
Desitnation
 
(1) 	 (2) (3) 

ojuid)(Continued
 
Variable 
FeelMotor)(Torque 
Series 

Servo 
zlecrical) 

. 
Relibility 	 Function 
Logi ' 
c
Nseraa
ogient 
Number 

(4) (5) 

D40.23 	 Provide 

(Continued) Q-program-
and 

Variable 

Feel to 
Rear Seat 
Stick 

D40.24E 	 Move Con-
trol Rod 
Lik.a.as Comm-
manied by

I 	 Computer 
In Res-
posse to 
Aft Stick 
Transducer 
Outputs 
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MCDEo phase oponent/ Next Nightr
Functional Subsysate
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(6) (7) (8) (9) 
Shorted Little or Little 
or No Resist- or No 
Open ane to Force 
Stick Transducer 
Movement Output 
..... 

Jarxmed Won't No 
Hove Response 
to BackSeat 
piot

Commando 
I 
(Coat.nu.d"PsoBreaker
 
(Goot audNext I a-) 
On 
Uppermost

Systm 

(10) 
Little or 

No Tactil 
Cues for 

Stick 

Position-

in. 

Tendency 

to Over-

control 

Via 

Position 

Sensor 

Back Seat 
Controls 

Useless.Front 

Seat 
Controls 

Stiffer 

than 

Usual, 
May Trip 

Circuit 

Breaker 

Failure 

Detection 

Method 

(11) 

None 

Needed-

Readily 

Apparent 

to Back 

Seat 

Pilot 

Readily 
Apparent 

to Back
Seat 
Pilot,
BIT would 
Detect If 
Existing 
Prior to 
Flight 
Corrective 
Action Time 

AvaLlable/Tlm
Required 

(12) 
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Date 
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By-
Approved 
DeIea ft.rd 
Provision, Classibcat.iont 
To Reduce Reaarks 
Crltcality
 
(13) (14)
 
BIT, Wilt II
 
Monitor
 
Position
 
Transducer 
Still
 
Operationat 
Safety
 
Pilot Can
 
Disengage 
Back Seat 
and Fly
 
Aircraft
 
BITSafety 	 III 
Pilot Can
 
Electrical­l i.
 
gage Rear 
Controls
 
and Fly 
Aircraft 
by Over­
poveriab 
Series
 
Servo Out­
put Safety
 
Spring
 
Cartridge, 
Cir..uit 
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Sytsyatem.u 1 Chan-Sereg Pigbt__ A.a_ 
Moule TABLE C-' CONT.FALRAW N FET WI X 
By.e_..Pproved- . 
Ito Idennification 
Wa ernen 
oueer Reerence 
aellibilit 
Lotte 
Nmer 
Furctiob VALURE 
MODE 
Operation 
FD. 
Fallu, 
Functional 
b l 
Effect On 
Tpm
b ~y $ygte , 
Failure1 
Dtcl. 
Method 
Corrective 
Asi-ee 
Avslable1Tia, 
Reuirda 
Design 
rall.To Reduce 
Criticality 
1 
Dazara 
Remarks 
(I)(2)
(n uu)(Contiued) 
(Cotios dSeri. 
Se 
(Eleltcal) 
(3) (4) 
D40.14E 
(5) (6) 
(Contirued:Burned Out 
or Shoreted 
(7)() 
Little ar 
No Move-
mat 
(9) (10) (11) 
Little or Back Seat Readily 
NoResponse Controls Apparenr 
to Back Virtually to Bak 
Beat Pilot Useless. Seat Pilot 
Cocands Front Seat Fad Pilot 
Controls Would 
May Be probably
Stiffer Notice 
than Usual Change in 
If Shorted Fee), of 
Will PFrob-Stick 
) (13) 
BIT Prior 
to Fit, Ckt 
Breaker to 
Prevent 
Overheat, 
Safety
Pilot Can 
Electrical 
IF Biso­
gag. RearControls 
%IT 
(14) 
4Cicuic 
a % , • 
ably Trip 
Breaker 
}Series 
and Fly
Aircraft 
by Over­powerglo 
rroCartridge 
toS t 
Servo 
Spring 
v Back-
Driving 
the 
Series 
00 
Stokes Rod 
Bud or 
Head End 
Attachen 
Commonto Both 
NO, 
Rsaction 
Point for 
i Command 
Forces' 
No Otut Front end 
Reir Seat 
Controls 
Useless 
Problon 
Readily 
Apparent 
to Both 
PlIOt "Attnch-
Stress 
Analysli
of Series 
Servo 
Comon 
IV 
~or CylindersFr~o t. an 0n 
_ ---
Movement 
of Both 
Cylinders 
j ,__ 
Ensure 
Failure to 
Dual 
Ac cuatars 
Ddes Not 
AJlowq Both 
Cylinders 
to Move 
Freely. 
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Series 	 D40.25 Couple Janmed Cartridge Direct LOSS of Single II 
Servo 	 Series Won't Link Direct Ias inSafety 	 Servo Collapse between Mechanical ctridge

Spring to Mesh or Extend Stevo Overrid t
 
Cartrldge Control 
 and 	 Proteo o Significant
System and 	 Mech No Effect Second 
Provide 	 System Unless alure 
Capabill- Coupled in Back 
ties with an Seat 
for Mech Electric Controls1. Sys to System Requlred
-T- Override Failure to Cause 
1 Electricel Problems. 
System 
Broke Limited flegrade Problems BIT Safety III 
Spring Resistance Servo Would Be Prior Pilotin One Ability to Noted by Ito Flight Can 
DIxection MIove Pilot Pilot Electrical-
Linkage as Erratic Observe- ly Disen­in One 	 Response tion gags Back 
fDirection 	 to Back in Flight Seat 
Seat Con.tol. 
Cosands and ElyAircraft 
From Front
 
Seat
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Drawing 
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Diagram 
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Fsctol 
Nraw 
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Op t method Available/Tme
Action ie 
To Reduce 
Cticts 
Reuarks 
(1) (2) <3) (4) (5) (() (7) (B) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
(13) (1'4 
Prone Seat 
(Mechanical) 
Trim 
D40,26 Reacts to 
Pilot Beep 
Switch 
Conad 
to T 
Stabilator 
by Changing 
Stick 
Neutral 
Open Winding 
Burnout 
Trim 
Motor 
on't 
Run 
No 
Mechanical 
Trim 
Capability. 
Trim 
Fixed 
at One 
Position 
Pilot Can 
Hid In 
Trim with 
Stick, Rest 
Sea Pilot 
Can Put 
in Trim 
Bias 
Electrical 
11 
Point 
Short Shorted 
Winding 
Sluggish 
Operation. 
May Trip 
Circuit 
Breaker 
Poor or 
No Much-
anical 
Trip 
Operation I' 
Circuit 
Breaker 
to Prevent 
Overheat. 
Rear SeatPilot Can 
II 
• 
Put in 
Trim Bias 
Electrical 
ly 
Jammed , Jammed N Trim Loss of pilot Can BI 
or Strip-
ped Gear-
log 
or 
Stripped 
Output Mech 
Trim 
Capability 
Trim 
Fixed 
old in 
Tri with 
Stick, 
Rear Seat 
Pilot Can 
at One 
Position 
Put in 
Trim Bias 
cally 
Loss of 
Structural 
Ground 
(Attach-
ments 
Broken) 
No React-
Ion Point 
for Trim 
Moto 
Torque 
No Trim 
otion 
Loss-of 
Mechanical 
Trim 
Capability 
Pilot Can 
Hold in 
Trim with 
Stick, 
Rear Seat 
Pilot Can 
Put in 
II 
Trim Bias 
- Electri­
cally 
41 
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Diagram
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(4) (5) .. .(6). 
D40.27 Provides Jammed 
Artificial 
Feel for 
Fwd Pilot 
Broken 
Spring 
Broken 
BaEd BA 
or Rod 
End 
Attach-
.enat 
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Copnet Nsn P rMethod 
Functional Subsystem Syste meureeriialtAssemblyssb 
. (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) 
Stick Input Loss of None 
Won't to Computer Pitch Needed-
Move t o System Readily 
Stabilator Control Apparent 
.ontrol with to Pilots 
Valves Only Front 
frot Rear Stick 
Stick 
Absence Unbalanced Difficult None 
of Feel Feel to Fly Needed-
and Trim Forces, Aircraft I Readily 
in One Erratic with Apparent 
Direction Trim Front to Pilot 
Stick 
Absence Loss of Difficult None 
of Feel Tactile to Fly Needed-
Forces Cues for Aircraft Readily
and Trim Proper with Apparent 
Position Stick Front to Pilot in Both Positioning Stick 
Directions 
17 26_ agsag. of  e 
Date-

Approved 
Corrective Dain Hazard 
Action Ti. 
Available/Time 
Provisions 
To Reduce 
Classification/ 
Remarks 
Required Criticalit 
(12) (13) (14) 
Back Seat III 
Can Fly 
&ircraft 
By Use Of 
"Emergency 
DFCS" 
Switch
 
With Hand, III 
Off in 
Front Seat. 
Back Seat 
Pilot Can 
Ply Aircraf
 
Electrical­
ly. 
"Emergency' 
SW Can be
 
Prevent'
 
DFCS Dis­
engage. 
With Hand. III 
Off in 
Front Seat, 
Back Seat 
Pilot CanFly Air­
craft
 
Electrical­
ly.
 
'Emergency" 
SW Can Be 
aendto 
Prevent
 
OFCS Dia­
engage. 
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fletixbitt 
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function TAXLu;BE 
DOE 
Operacloo 
Ph s 
Failure Effect On 
acl,oc ntijNast Hi herj -PP -LD 
-~ntoa,uastecMI ably 'tequtrf.edFunctionaln Boj~.I 
Failur 
ecoction 
MEWho 
Cor'activa Noisea 
AUtOOn riseUFP 
s.LleblatThse to Red...ISAh.Cri£tality
qi 
gazrd 
bQto 
(1) 
Valved iesive Series 
Actuat.o (2) 
(2) (3) (4) (5) 
r0.25vue S"
apabilty 
afront 
SValy.n 
(6) 
Iamed o 
belleratk 
(Y) (8) 
Liitd
Novement 
relative 
o 
Sellaroak 
(9) 
tifemed
Ik Stick 
f ROS 
s.e 
(10) (12) 
Partial BIT, ia-klt 
Lons of 
Front MEN 
A5 VaIv, 
StVil 
Operation-
a 
<12) (13) 
V/Cstill 
,MOvmpletely 
lya.ble Ix4nitor;ith Is­
.ease 
fot Work­
loai Stem 
Pitch OCS 
AS Still 
Xvailable 
fl. Rear 
ICS and 
Front RCS 
(l) 
~Valve. No 
Incerfer­
1f landing. 
ibroke;bumncA tu 
hortedwhich 
Allows Pro, 
Movemont o 
Cylind r 
ServoDegaded Lirdte4TV a....tt-a 
of PilotCommand 
PartialLoss of 
ee ofFront RCS 
Valve VIOL 
operations 
Difficult 
with F 
C.G. Alr-
aaft 
Bn, I,-flghe 
' cr 
31T or Is- Ixfit satins 
It ons.pitoroc to 
trerp ve 
ical ope­
lons with 
. 1aildsot­
tOo. No 
iterferen. 
ith con­
et tonal
enting. 
afety 
FCS and 
and. 
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To Reduce 
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ClassiC ication/ 
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) 
NwdPedals D40.38 Safety Jammed Pedals No Input 0nly None Bark Seat III 
Pilot at Pivot Won't to Computer Direction- Needed Can Fly 
Override Move or to al System Readily Aicraft 
Input Rudder from Control Apparent y Use of 
Pedals Pedals FCS" 
Switch 
Broken Fwd No Front No Direc- None Back III 
Off at Pedals Seat Input tional Needed - Seat 
to 
In 
Pivot Useless to Computer Sys 
or to Control 
Rudder from 
Readily
Apparent
to Front 
Can Fly
Aircraft 
by Use of 
Front Seat "Emergency" 
Seat Pilot SW 
Loose No Solid Erratic Erratic gone Back III 
at Reaction or Sloppy Control uNeeded, Seat 
Pivot Point for 
Fwd Pilot 
Inputs to 
Directiona 
from 
Front 
Readily
Apparent 
Can Fly
Aircraft 
Input System Seat to Pilot by Use of 
"E..rgoncy" 
SW 
flu" 
System F 
Syb y t m 
Equipment 
Module 
O -D 
e 
TIONAL 
Srodes light. 
GSE 
_ 
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Failure 
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Corrective 
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Design 
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Criticalityl 
Hazard 
Classificationt 
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8> (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) 
Fwd Pedal 
,orce Link (2) 
D40,39 Provide 
Automatic 
Takeover 
by Safety 
Pilot 
Jaaraed 
or 
Breakout 
Too High 
Won't 
Switch 
at Speci-
Lied 
Force 
Automatic 
Override 
Programed 
to Operate 
on Lesser 
of Two 
None ault-In 
rest 
loutine/ 
round 
hecks 
Ground 
Test and 
Adjustment 
or 
Replacement 
After 
I 
Force Identified. 
Xducer 
Outputs, 
0 I 
Breakout 
too Low 
Switches 
Jlow 
Spec 
Force 
Undesired 
Disengage-
met of 
Evaluation 
Pilot's 
Controls 
lulse ce 'one 
is....gBge- .eded -
ents adily
4ould pparent 
Invalidate 'to Both 
ome 'Pilots 
eat 
Ground 
Test and 
Adjustment 
or 
Replasoeant
After 
Pilot 
11 
eunl to Squawk 
"#1 
Equipment USE 

Module 

Item Identification 
same. ide Drawing 
Number ReferenceDesignat ion 
(1) (2) (I 2 ( )()(3) 
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Relability 
Logic 
Diagram 
Function FAIWRE 
MODE 
Operation 
'h-sc 
Number 
(4 ) 
5 . (6.((6) -
)()
(7) 
Front Pedal 
Feel Spring 
D40.37 Provides 
Artificial 
Feel for 
Fwd Pilot 
Jammed 
LA Broken 
Spring 
01v 0 .Beed 
Broken 
End 
or Rod 
Attach-
ments 
'Urt ' 1 
Functional Suby" 
Assembly 
(9)

()______ 
Aproved 
Failure Effect On Failure Corrective Design Hazard 
P~ n 
(0) 
Only Dir-
ectional 
System 
Control 
with 
Rear 
Pedals 
Detection 
ethd 
(1) 
None 
Needed-
Readily 
Apparent 
to Pilots 
Action Tie 
il.ble/T 
(12) 
Provaiaon. C1assfficationf 
To Reduce IRemark, 
(13) (14) 
Back Seat III 
Can Fly 
Aircraft 
By Us. Of 
"Emergency 
DFCS" 
Switch 
Difficult None 
to Fly Needed-
Aircraft I Readily 
with Apparent 
Front to Pilot 
Pedals 
Difficult None 
to Fly Needed-
Aircraft Readily 
with Apparent
Front to Pilot 
Pedals 
With Hands 
Off in 
Front Seat, 
Back Seat 
Pilot Can 
Fly Aireraf 
Electrical­
ly. 
"Emergency" 
SWCan be 
Used to 
Prevent' 
DFCS Dis­
engage. 
With Hands 
Off inFront Sea , 
Back Seat
Pilot Can 
Fly Air­
craft 
Electrical­
ly.
"Emergency" 
SWCan Be 
med to 
IPCS 
Di­
egage 
.s 
III 
III 
Pedals 

Won't 

Hove 

Absence 

of 

Feel 

Dn One 
Derecao. 

Absence 

of EeltForces 
fvin Both 

No Input 

to Compuyec 

or to 

Rudder from 

Front 

Pedals 

Unbalanced 
Feel 

Forces 

Loss of 
Tactile
Cues for 

Proper

Directions Pedal 

Positioning 
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Rear Pedals D40.38 Evaluation Jammed Rear No Input No Direc- None Front III Pilot at Pivot Pedals to Compute tional Needed - Seat 
Input Won't Yaw Axis Control Readily Can Fly
Move from Rear from Rear Apparent Aircraft 
Seat. Seat, to Pilot 
Broken Rear No Rear No Direc- None Safety ITT 
Off at Pedals Seat tional Needed pilot 
Pivot Useless, Input to Control Readily Can
 Feel Sys Computer Apparent Electrical y 
Should Seat to Pilot Disengage 
Center Balck Seat 
Transducer 
Loose at No Solid Erratic Erratic IMay Feel Safety ITT 
Pivot Reaction Ouputs Direcrion4 Loose to Pilot CanPoint for f, , al Control Evaluation Elecrical y 
Rear Seat Rear Pedal from : Pilot - Disengqa
Input Transducer Rear t Both Pilot Back 
Seat Should Seat 
Not.e 
Erratic 
Movement 
of Aircraf
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Aft Pedal 
Position 
Transducer (2) 
D40.31 Provide 
Aft Pedal 
Position 
Data to 
Computer 
Open 
or 
Shorted 
Difference 
in Outputs 
6f 2 Aft 
Pedal 
Position 
Xducers 
Automatic 
Disengage 
of DFCS 
Front Seat Difference Safety Pilot 
Safety in Outputs MIust Immedi-
Pilot Must of 2 Stick ately Assume 
Assume Position Control of 
Control of Xducers Is Aircraft 
Aircraf t Sensed and 
At Time Auto Dis-
of Dis- engage 
engage Sequence 
omparison 
'echnique 
utomati­
ally Dis­
ngaged if 
ifference 
s Detected 
11 (At Altitude) 
III (Low Level) 
Initiated 
Ln 
tl 
Aft Pedal 
Force Tranaducer 
(2) 
Provide 
Aft Pedal 
Force 
Data to 
Computer 
Open 
or 
Shorted 
Difference 
in Outputs 
of 2 Aft 
Pedal Forc( 
Xducers 
Automatic 
Disengage 
of DFCS 
Front Seat Differene Safety Filot 
Safety in Output. Hunt Immedi-
Pilot Mus of 2 Stick ately Assume 
Assume Position [Control of 
Control oB Xducers Is Aircraft 
Aircraft Sensed and 
At Time IAuto Dis-
Comparison
Technique 
Automati­
cally Dis­
engaged if 
Difference 
is Detected 
II (At Altitude)
l1(tow Level) 
of Dis-
engage 
engage 
Sequence 
Initiated 
ft Pedal 
'ariable Feel 
(Torque Motor) 
Provide 
Variable 
Feel to 
Rear Seat 
Pedal. 
Jammed, 
• 
Rear 
Pedals 
Iarobil-
Ized 
. 
No Pedal 
Position 
Transducer 
Output 
Possible BIT, 
Reduction Infit 
in Abilit; Monitor 
to Ply 
Aircraftfro. Back 
Seat 
BIT, Inflt 
Monitor 
Force 
Transducer 
StillOper atinal 
Safety Pilo 
II 
can Dis­
engage Back 
Seat and 
Fly Air­
craft 
(Conti ed Next Pa e) 
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Little 
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Little orNo Tactile None Needed' ET. ToiltMonitor IT 
Feel (Torque Feel to Open once to Force Cues for Readily Position 
Motor) Rear Seat Pedal Transducer Pedal Apparent Transducer 
Pedlas Movement Output Position-
ing. 
to Back 
Seat 
Still 
Operational 
Tendency Pilot Safety 
to Over- Pilot Can 
control Disengage 
Via Back Seat 
, -Position 
Sensor 
and Ply 
Aircraft 
Series D40.34B Hove Con- Sjsayd Deor.anc Decreased Back Seat Readily Safety Comparison I1 (At Altitude) 
Servo trol Rod Movement Response Controls Apparent Pilot Must Technique III(tov Level) 
(Electrical) Linkage to Back Degraded, to Back Imediately Automati­
as Com- Seat Front Seat Assume cally 
2 manded by Pilot Leat Pilot, Control of Disengages 
Computer Commando Controls P BIT vould Aircraft if 
in Res- Stiffer Detect If Difference 
ponse to than Existing is Sensed. 
Aft Pedal Usual, Prior to 
0 Transducer May Trip Plight 
Outputs Circuit 
Breaker 
Automatic 
Disengage 
(Cost sued Next P 98) 
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D40.34E (Continued) 
Burned Out Little or Little or ok Seat eadily BIT Prior III 
(Electrical) or Shorted No Hove-
meat 
No Reopens 
to Back 
Seat Pilot 
ontrola 
irtually 
rselesa, 
pparent 
o Back 
eat Pilot, 
to Flt, Ckt 
Breaker to 
Prevent 
Commands rent Seat wd Pilot Overheat, 
ontrols ould Safety 
ay Be rohably Pilot Can 
Stiffer otice Electrical­
than Usual 
If Shorted 
dill Prob-
fhange in 
eel of 
edals 
ly Disen­
gage Rear 
Controla 
to 
L4 Iircuit 
ably Trip and Fly 
Aircraft 
Breaker by Over­
powering 
Series 
Servo 
Spring 
I Cartridge 
or Back-
Driving the 
Series 
Servo 
Broken Rod NO No Output Front and Probles Stress IV 
End or Reaction tear Seat Veadily Analysis 
Head End 
Attachnent 
Point for 
Command 
'ontrols 
relesa 
pparent 
to Bozh 
or Series 
Servo Corn-
Common to Forces ?ilot mon Attach-
Both ments and 
Cylinders Ends. 
or Free Ensure 
Movement of Failure to 
Both ual 
Cylindero Actuator 
oes Not 
1lw BothCylinders 
to Move 
reely 
FAILURE MODEAND EFFECTS ANALYSIS 
System FLIGHT CNTRni - DIRECTIONLkt NASA TWOPLACE V/STOL RESEARCH AIRCRAFT page 26 of 26 paj&, 
Sybaystesin li e Flight_ Date 
Equipment CSE By _ 
hedule TABLE C-2 CONT. Approved 
lae 
Iten Identtfication 
Ideat DrYi 
N umber ReferenceDesignation 
Reliablit 
K uber 
Function FAILURE 
MDpereet 
Operation 
p 
Failure Effect O. 
Cooponent? ext Higher
etm system 
A s s. b y 
Failure 
Detection 
Method 
Corrective 
Action Time 
Av.lath/TS, 
Required 
Design 
Provifens 
to Reduce 
r iic it y 
azard 
Clas1.ifcatioaRemarks 
L, .(1 __ (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) 
Un 
Series 
Servo 
Safety 
Spring 
Cart r fge(2) 
D40.35 Couple 
Sries 
Servo 
to Mech 
ControlSystem and 
Provide 
Cpabili-
ties 
for Moch 
Sys to 
Override 
Electrical 
System 
Jamed Cartridge 
Won't 
Collapse 
or Extend 
Direct 
Link 
Between 
Servo 
andMach 
System 
Loss of 
Direct 
Hechanica] 
Override 
ProtectioNo Eect 
Unless 
Coupled 
with an 
Eletrica 
System 
Failure 
Single 
am in 
artridge 
at 
Significant 
. Seemd 
Failure 
in Zack 
Seat 
Controls 
Required 
to Cause 
Problems. 
If 
Broken 
Spring 
* Liited 
Resistance 
in One 
Direction 
Degraded 
Servo 
Ability to 
MoveLinkage 
Problems BIT 
Would Be Frior 
Noted by to Flight 
Pilot Pilot 
as Erratid Observe-
Safety 
Pilot 
Can 
Electrical­ly Big.n-
III 
in OneDirection Responseto Back 
Seat 
Cc~nds 
in Flight rionage BackSeat 
Contol. 
and Fly 
Aircraft 
?Co. Front 
Seat 
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puter 
Voted 
Outputs 
Output 
From Two 
Light Is Warning 
Lit Warnm Light to 
At Evaluation 
Safety 
Voting 
Technique 
and Force Produces 
Transducer Incorrect 
Inputs Output to 
From Aft Parallel 
Stick/ Servo, 
Identifies 
the Com-
puter 
Output as 
Incorrect. 
Computers 
Which Are 
In Agree-
ment is 
Utilized. 
Both PilotPilots. 
That a 
First 
Failure Hal 
Occurred 
Pilot's 
Convenience 
DFCS is 
Disengaged 
and Control 
(Best Two 
of Three) 
Prevents 
Single 
Computer 
Pedals Variable Malfunc- at One of Returned to Failure 
Force Link Feel 
Diecrete, Device, 
From Fwd BIT, or 
tioning 
Computer 
Output is 
the Voting 
Planes. 
the Safety 
Pilot. 
From 
Causing 
Erroneous 
U, 
Stick/ 
Pedals 
Display Identified 
and 
Outputs. 
Data Ana- Disregards 
logs from 
Motion 
Sensors 
And Air 
Data Con­
putatlon. 
Provide 
Command 
Outputs 
for Para­
llel Sevc 
and Aft 
Stick/ 
Pedals 
Variable 
Feel; for­
matted 
Data for 
Displays. 
Provide 
!Storage, 
Execute, 
and 
Decision 
Capabilitl 
for BIT 
end fItIM 211 
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(3) Each Chan. 
T40.02 Provide 
Rotational 
and Trans-
lational 
Motion 
Data to 
Computer 
Incorrect 
Inputs to 
Computer 
Resulting 
in Incorre t 
Input Bein 
Voted Out, 
Computers 
Vote the 
Inputs 
frm the 
Motion 
Sensors 
and Input 
Identified 
as Dis-
Output fron Light is 
Two Lit 
Channels Warning 
Which Are Both 
In Agree- Pilot's 
ment is that a 
Utilized. First 
Failure 
Has 
Warning 
Light to 
Pilots. 
At Evaluation 
'Safety Pilot' 
Convenience 
DNWSIs 
Disengaged 
and Control 
Returned to 
the Safety 
Pilot. 
Voting 
Technique
(Best Two 
of Three) 
Prevents 
Single 
Sensor 
Failure 
from 
% 
0' 
CD 
Iis 
agreeing 
with the 
Other Two 
Dis-
regarded. 
Occurred 
at One of 
the Voting
Planes. 
Causing 
Erroneous 
Outputs 
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Input 
Janed 
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Rear 
Stick 
Won't 
No Input 
to Comptez
Roll AxiS 
'No lateral 
/Long
Control 
None 
Needed -
Readily 
Front 
Seat ,
Can Fly 
III 
Move from Rear 
Seat. 
From Rear 
Seat. 
Apparent 
to Pilot 
Aircraft 
Broken Rear No Rear No Latera None Safety II 
Off at Stick Seat /Long. Needed Pilot 
Pivot useless, Input to Control Readily Can 
Pea By. Computer fr.. Apparent Electrical y 
Should Rear Seat to Pilot Diengage 
Center Back Seat 
Transducer 
Loose at 	 No Solid Erratic Erratic May Feel Safety III 
Pivot 	 Reaction OutpuLs Lateral/ Loose to Pilot Can 
Foit for fr-.m %,on Evaluatio Electrical y 
Rear Seat Rear Stick Control Pilot - Disengage 
Input Transducer from Both Pilot Back 
Rear Seat 	 Should Seat 
Note 
Erratic
 
Movement
 
Of Aircraf 
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Fwd Stick T40.04 Safety 
pilot 
Override 
Input 
Jammed 
at Pivot 
Stick 
Won't 
Move 
No Input 
to Computer 
or to Ail-
trot and 
Stabilator 
Control 
Valves 
go Long/ 
Lateral 
System 
Control 
with 
Either 
Stick 
None 
Needed 
Readily 
Apparent 
to Pilots 
?ilot Has 
:onsider­
tble 
.chanical 
Avantage 
o Push 
hrough
0ame 
oteutial 
IV 
P3 
Broken 
Off a 
Pivot 
Pd 
Stick 
Useless 
No Front 
Seat Input 
to Computex
or to 
Aileron/
Stab. 
control 
Valves 
No Laet/
Long Sys 
Controlfr.m 
Front 
Seat 
None 
Needed-
ReadilyApparent 
to Front 
Best 
Pilot 
ack 
-eat 
an Flyircraft 
y Use of 
ergecy" 
AT 
rcrat 
II 
I/ 
Loose 
at 
Pivot 
No Solid 
Reaction 
Point for
Fud Pilot 
Input 
Erratic 
or Sloppy 
InputsCo Long/ 
Lateral 
System 
Erratic 
lateal/ 
LongControl 
from 
Front 
Seat 
None 
Needed,
IReadily
Apparent 
to Pilot 
lack 
;eat 
;a, Fly,
Ureraft 
'y Use of 
"Emergecy" 
;W 
II 
Ft Stick T40.041 Eergency Failed Can't No Loss of Pre-Flt Emergency 1i 
paddle Switch Eectrical Disengage 
of Back 
Seat 
controls 
Closed Break 
Circuit 
Disengage Stick-
Mounted 
Emergency 
Disengage 
Capabilit 
Checks Disengage 
vailable 
.wd Stick 
Force Link 
Failed 
Open 
Circuit 
Won't 
Make 
Engage 
Solenoid 
Won't 
latch 
Constant 
Disengage 
of Back 
Seat 
Controls 
BIT, 
Pre-Plt 
Cheeks 
afety 
ilot 
a Fly 
craft 
I 
C 
FAILURE MOE ANDEPFhOU ANALYSIS 
tFL'T CON SQL3- TATEIRA/LONITDINA NASA WO PUCE /STOL RSEARC ATRCRAFT Pge 5 of Pages 
Sybsyste Three Chan-Paralel Plight -Dae 
quient__ RSE By 
Hodule TABLE C-3 CONT. Approved 
Item Identification Reliability Function FAIR Operation Failure Effect On Failure Corrective Design Hazard 
loIc MODE Phse Icponent/Nt Nleherl Uppermost Detection Action Time Provi.ion. Ciss.ficti.l/ 
Name Ienet 
Number 
Drawing 
Reference 
Diagram 
umber 
Fntol 
Asembly 
Subsystem System eod A illsTr 
Rquired 
ToRucI 
Criticalityi 
krs 
(2) (s) ( ) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) " (12) (13) (14) 
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Force Links (3) Automatic 
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Inputs 
from Two 
Force Link 
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Light
the 
to Safety Pilots 
Convenience 
Technique
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by Safety
Pilot 
Too High from the 
Force 
which are 
in Agree-
Both 
Pilots 
Pilots DFCS is 
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Prevents 
Links and meat is 
Force Lin] Utilized. 
Input 
that a 
First 
Failure 
and Control 
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Safety Pilot. 
Single 
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Failure 
Identifia lsa from 
as Dia- Occurred Causing 
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-
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Aft Stick 
Position 
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Aft Stick 
Position 
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ter 
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output 
Voting 
Technique 
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Output 
fro. Two 
Position 
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which are 
Light is 
Lit 
Warning 
Both 
Pilots 
that a 
First 
Failure 
Has 
Warning 
Light to 
the 
Pilots 
At Evaluation, 'oting 
Safety Pilots Technique 
Convenience (Best Two 
DrS is f Three) 
Dienraged Prevents 
and Control Single
Returned to railureSafety Pilot from 
causing 
T 
CY, Aft Stick 
Force Traes-
ducer (3) 
Me Stik 
Variable 
Feel (Torque 
tioor) 
T40.12 
V.O.f3 
Provide 
Aft Stick 
Force 
Data to 
Computer 
Provide 
Q-progrem-
mod. 
Variable 
Feel to 
Rear 
Seat 
Stick 
Open 
or 
Shorted 
Jammed 
.e.. . 
Distorted 
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output 
Rest 
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ized 
in agree- 
enat 
Voting 
Technique 
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output 
fro Tw 
Fom 
Tres-
ducats 
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in agree-
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Occurred 
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Seat and 
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APPENDIX D 
ACTION ITEM SUMMARY 
During the course of this research program four technical coordination 
meetings were held: 
o 	 13 October 1977 - Program "Kick Off" Meeting
 
(NASA Ames Research Center)
 
o 	14 November 1977 - Design Coordination Meeting
 
(NASA Ames Research Center)
 
o 	13 December 1977 - Option Selection Meeting
 
(McDonnell Aircraft Company)
 
o 	16 January 1978 - Final Oral Presentation
 
(NASA Ames Research Center)
 
A number of MCAIR and NASA action items were identified at each meeting.
 
Figures D-1 through D-4 list these action items and their disposition.
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FIGURE D-i ACTION ITEM SUMMARY 
13 October 1977 Program "Kick Off" Meeting 
Responsibility Subject Status 
NASA Identify Redundant Control System Concepts 
to be Studied 
Complete 
MCAIR Study Feasibility of Retaining Rear Cockpit 
Mechanical Controls Connected Until Confidence 
in FBW is Gained 
Complete 
MCAIR MCAIR/NASA Pilots Begin Dialogue Complete 
MCAIR Can YAV-8B Roll Nozzle Design be Used to 
Improve Roll Control? 
Complete 
MCAIR Determine Control System Frequency Response 
and Velocities 
Complete 
MCAIR Contact NASA to Identify Telemetry Interface 
Required 
Complete 
MCAIR Determine Time Identification of Data Which 
is not Time Tagged 
Not Required 
MCAIR Can Low Speed Sensor be Mounted on- Flight 
Test Boom? 
Complete 
MCAIR Contact NASA for LTN-51 INS Data and Usage Complete 
MCAIR Add Four Weeks Simulation Support at NASA Complete 
MCAIR Study Feasibility and Cost of Software 
Verification Prior to Flight 
Complete 
MCAIR Select Computer Which Uses HAL/S Higher 
Order Language and Size Software Accordingly 
Complete 
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FIGURE D-2 ACTION ITEM SUMMARY 
14 November 1977 Design Coordination Meeting 
Responsibility Subject Status 
MCAIR Add Disengage Button to Forward Cockpit 
Stick and Throttle 
Complete 
MCAIR Put Computer Control in Aft Cockpit, Avionics 
Controls in Forward Cockpit 
Complete 
MCAIR Keep Aft Cockpit Stick and Rudder Pedals 
Mechanically Connected to Control System 
in Dual Series Configuration 
Complete 
MCAIR Compute Frequency Response Between Servo 
and Forward Stick 
Complete 
MCAIR Keep Throttle and Nozzle Levers Mechanically 
Connected to Present Systems in Dual Series 
Configuration 
Complete 
FIGURE D-3 ACTION ITEM SUMMARY 
13 December 1977 Option Selection Meeting 
Responsibility- Subject Status 
MCAIR Investigate Feasibility of Using Ferranti INS Complete 
MCAIR Review Word Number Estimate for Computer Program Complete 
NASA Provide Measurand List Incomplete 
MCAIR Add Second Low Speed Air Data Sensor Complete 
MCAIR Provide Instrument Design Aids for Ron Gerdes 
Trip to U.K. 
Complete 
MCAIR Include NASA Engineering Safety Review and 
Flight Readiness Review in Schedule 
Complete 
MCAIR Revise Support Plan to Four Years/One Site/ 
120 Hours Per Year 
Complete 
MCAIR Prioritize Aircraft Mods to be Done at NARF Deferred 
ORIGINAL PAGE IS 
OF POOR QUALIT? 
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FIGURE D-4 ACTION ITEM SUMMARY 
16 January 1978 - Final Oral Presentation 
Responsibility - Subject Status 
MCAIR Include a Computer Cost Comparison in the 
Final Report 
Complete 
MCAIR Provide Technical Explanation of Engine 
Limitations in Hover 
Data Being 
Obtained, 
Will be 
Provided 
by April, 
1978. 
MCAIR Provide Model for Simulating Dynamics 
Relating Longitudinal Parallel Servo Input 
to Actuator Valve Input and Forward Stick 
Complete 
NASA Initiate review of AV-8A Simulation Data 
Package currency 
Pending 
MCAIR Provide Descriptions of Theory of Operation 
of Low Speed Air Data Sensor 
Complete 
2a8
 
